In reregulated and restructured ele

In reregulated and restructured electricity markets the production and retail of
electricity is conducted on competitive markets, the transmission and
distribution on the other hand can be considered as natural monopolies. The
financial regulation of Distribution System Operators (DSOs) has in many
countries, partly as a consequence of the restructuring in ownership, gone
through a major switch in regulatory policy. From applying regulatory regimes
were the DSOs were allowed to charge their customers according to their actual
cost plus some profit, i.e. cost-based regulation, to regulatory models in which
the DSOs performance are valued in order to set the allowable revenue, i.e.
Performance-Based Regulation (PBR). In regulatory regimes that value
performance, the direct link between cost and income is weakened or sometimes
removed. This give the regulated DSOs strong cost cutting incentives and there
is consequently a risk of system reliability deterioration due to postponed
maintenance and investments in order to save costs. To balance this risk the
PBR-framework is normally complemented with some kind of quality regulation
(QR). How both the PBR and QR frameworks are constructed determines the
incentive that the DSO will act on and will therefore influence the system
reliability development.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Dalam reregulated dan direstrukturisasi listrik pasar produksi dan ritel
listrik dilakukan pada pasar kompetitif, transmisi dan
distribusi di sisi lain dapat dianggap sebagai alami monopoli.
Regulasi keuangan dari operator sistem distribusi (DSOs) memiliki banyak
negara, sebagian sebagai konsekuensi dari restrukturisasi kepemilikan, pergi
melalui sebuah saklar utama dalam kebijakan peraturan. Dari menerapkan peraturan rezim
yang DSOs diizinkan untuk mengisi mereka pelanggan mereka sebenarnya
biaya ditambah beberapa keuntungan, yaitu berbasis biaya peraturan, peraturan model di mana
DSOs kinerja dinilai untuk mengatur pendapatan diijinkan, yaitu
peraturan berbasis kinerja (PBR). Dalam peraturan rezim yang nilai
kinerja, hubungan langsung antara biaya dan pendapatan melemah atau kadang-kadang
dihapus. Ini memberikan insentif pemotongan biaya kuat DSOs diatur dan ada
adalah akibatnya risiko kemerosotan kehandalan sistem karena untuk menunda
pemeliharaan dan investasi untuk menghemat biaya. Untuk menyeimbangkan risiko ini
PBR-kerangka biasanya dilengkapi dengan beberapa jenis kualitas peraturan
(QR). Bagaimana kerangka PBR maupun QR dibangun menentukan
insentif yang DSO akan bertindak dan karena itu akan mempengaruhi sistem
keandalan pembangunan.