The overall number of attacks remains very difficult to1 The gauge bec terjemahan - The overall number of attacks remains very difficult to1 The gauge bec Bahasa Indonesia Bagaimana mengatakan

The overall number of attacks remai

The overall number of attacks remains very difficult to
1 The gauge because incidents often go unreported. The attacks damage Nigeria’s lucrative oil industry as the hijackings of product tankers increase the risk of doing business in the country. Estimates indicate that the country is losing approximately $1.5 billion a month to maritime crime, which includes piracy, armed robbery at sea, smuggling, and bunkering fraud, and its production is 400,000 barrels below its capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day.
Criminal groups that conduct KFR in Nigeria typically target small tug and supply vessels, and these groups are likely operating separately and independently from the fuel-theft networks likely based in Lagos. All of the reported KFR incidents around the GOG have occurred off the Niger Delta region.
In the GOG, maritime criminals are able to take advantage of a well-established illicit and corrupt political economy, as well as a lack of consistent and effective governance in the maritime domain. Criminals in this region maintain access to established international criminal networks and close ties to the shipping industries. Consequently, attacks are better coordinated than off the Horn of Africa, executed with precision, and often impossible to trace. West Africa’s criminal organizations have deep international ties, and the trends indicate an increased willingness for criminal gangs to venture further from their shore-side bases to commit their crimes.
On average, there are 12 to 15 GOG port calls a year by U.S.-flagged, deep draft cargo ships. Approximately 70 U.S.-registered Offshore Supply Vessels (OSVs) are working out of Nigerian and Ghanaian ports supporting offshore oil exploration. Both types of vessels carry crews that may include U.S. citizens. In addition, there are numerous vessels operating in the GOG and engaged in coastwise trade, which requires operating in territorial seas and coastal waters and making frequent port calls in the region. An unknown number of U.S. mariners work aboard these vessels, as well as on cargo ships, tankers, and OSVs flagged in other nations operating in the region. The escalation in violent criminal activities will increasingly put U.S. citizens in harm’s way and has already required the expenditure of significant resources to resolve hostage situations.
The pattern of piracy and related maritime crime also raises an increasing concern due to the violence associated with hijackings. In its 2014 report on piracy and armed robbery at sea, the International Maritime Bureau warns of the dangers to ships transiting West African waters, particularly around Nigeria, Benin, and Togo, and urges heightened vigilance, drawing particular attention to the expansion of the danger region. In 2013, the number of Nigerian criminal maritime attacks grew and currently stands at its highest level since 2008. Nigerian criminals accounted for 31 of the 51 attacks reported in the region in 2013, and West Africa, as a whole, saw 19 percent of attacks worldwide last year. The increase in maritime attacks in West Africa led London-based Lloyd's Market Association, an umbrella group of maritime insurers, to list Nigeria, Benin, and nearby waters in the same risk category as Somalia. The result was a significant decrease in maritime traffic in the region, which led to a substantial loss in revenue for regional nations and significant impact on the livelihoods of the country’s citizens through an increase in the cost of imports and a decrease in the competitiveness of exports.
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The nature of the attacks, porous borders, limited maritime law enforcement and interdiction assets, endemic corruption, and lack of political will allow criminal gangs to carry out fast attacks with the ability to quickly return to shore and avoid detection and capture. In addition, a high number of attacks are widely believed to be unreported due to an ongoing failure by regional States to pursue criminal action, complicity by law enforcement officials, and a desire to keep insurance rates low.
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Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1: [Salinan]
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Jumlah keseluruhan serangan masih sangat sulit untuk1 gauge karena insiden sering pergi tidak dilaporkan. Serangan merusak industri minyak menguntungkan Nigeria pembajakan produk tanker meningkatkan risiko melakukan bisnis di negara. Perkiraan menunjukkan bahwa negara adalah kehilangan kira-kira $1.5 milyar sebulan untuk kejahatan Maritim, yang meliputi pembajakan, perampokan bersenjata di laut, penyelundupan, dan Bunker penipuan, dan produksi adalah 400.000 barel di bawah kapasitas dari 2,5 juta barel per hari.Kelompok-kelompok kriminal yang melakukan KFR di Nigeria biasanya tug kecil target dan pasokan kapal, dan kelompok-kelompok ini mungkin beroperasi secara terpisah dan independen dari jaringan bahan bakar-pencurian yang mungkin berbasis di Lagos. Semua insiden KFR dilaporkan di sekitar GOG telah terjadi dari wilayah Niger Delta.Dalam GOG, Maritim penjahat mampu mengambil keuntungan dari mapan ilegal dan korup ekonomi politik, serta kurangnya tata-pemerintahan yang konsisten dan efektif dalam domain Maritim. Penjahat di wilayah ini tetap memiliki akses ke jaringan kriminal internasional didirikan dan tutup ikatan dengan industri pelayaran. Akibatnya, serangan lebih terkoordinasi daripada dari Tanduk Afrika, dieksekusi dengan presisi, dan sering tidak mungkin untuk melacak. Organisasi kriminal Afrika Barat memiliki ikatan yang mendalam internasional, dan tren menunjukkan kesediaan peningkatan untuk geng-geng kriminal untuk menjelajah lebih jauh dari basis sisi pantai mereka melakukan kejahatan mereka.Rata-rata, ada 12-15 GOG port panggilan setahun oleh kapal kargo berbendera U.S., dalam draft. Sekitar 70 terdaftar di U.S. Offshore Supply kapal (OSVs) bekerja dari Nigeria dan Ghana Port mendukung eksplorasi minyak lepas pantai. Kedua jenis kapal membawa kru yang mungkin terdiri dari warga negara Amerika. Selain itu, ada banyak kapal beroperasi di GOG dan terlibat dalam perdagangan coastwise, yang memerlukan beroperasi di wilayah laut dan perairan pantai dan membuat sering pelabuhan panggilan di wilayah itu. Jumlah yang tidak diketahui US mariners kerja kapal kapal ini, dan juga tentang kapal kargo, tanker, dan OSVs ditandai dalam bangsa-bangsa lain yang beroperasi di daerah. Eskalasi dalam kegiatan kriminal akan semakin menaruh warga negara AS dalam bahaya dan sudah diperlukan untuk penggunaan sumber daya yang penting untuk menyelesaikan situasi sandera.Pola perompakan dan kejahatan maritim yang terkait juga menimbulkan keprihatinan yang meningkat karena kekerasan yang terkait dengan pembajakan. Dalam laporannya 2014 pembajakan dan perampokan bersenjata di laut, Biro Maritim Internasional memperingatkan bahaya untuk kapal-kapal yang transit perairan Afrika Barat, khususnya di sekitar Nigeria, Benin, dan Togo, dan mendesak kewaspadaan tinggi, menggambar perhatian khusus terhadap perluasan wilayah bahaya. Pada tahun 2013, jumlah serangan Maritim pidana Nigeria tumbuh dan berdiri pada tingkat tertinggi sejak 2008. Nigeria penjahat menyumbang 31 51 serangan dilaporkan di wilayah pada tahun 2013, dan Afrika Barat, secara keseluruhan, melihat 19 persen dari serangan di seluruh dunia tahun lalu. Peningkatan Maritim serangan di Afrika Barat dipimpin berbasis di London Lloyd's Market Association, grup payung Maritim asuransi, ke daftar Nigeria, Benin, dan perairan terdekat sama risiko Kategori sebagai Somalia. Hasilnya adalah penurunan yang signifikan dalam lalu lintas Maritim di wilayah, yang mengakibatkan kerugian yang cukup besar dalam pendapatan untuk negara-negara regional dan dampak signifikan pada mata pencaharian warga negara melalui peningkatan biaya impor dan penurunan daya saing ekspor.4Sifat serangan, perbatasan berpori, hukum Maritim terbatas penegakan dan larangan aset, endemik korupsi, dan kurangnya politik akan memungkinkan geng-geng kriminal untuk melaksanakan serangan cepat dengan kemampuan untuk dengan cepat kembali ke pantai dan menghindari Deteksi dan menangkap. Selain itu, jumlah serangan yang tinggi secara luas diyakini menjadi tidak dilaporkan akibat kegagalan yang berkelanjutan dengan negara-negara regional untuk mengejar tindakan kriminal, keterlibatan petugas penegak hukum, dan keinginan untuk menjaga asuransi harga rendah.
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Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:[Salinan]
Disalin!
The overall number of attacks remains very difficult to
1 The gauge because incidents often go unreported. The attacks damage Nigeria’s lucrative oil industry as the hijackings of product tankers increase the risk of doing business in the country. Estimates indicate that the country is losing approximately $1.5 billion a month to maritime crime, which includes piracy, armed robbery at sea, smuggling, and bunkering fraud, and its production is 400,000 barrels below its capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day.
Criminal groups that conduct KFR in Nigeria typically target small tug and supply vessels, and these groups are likely operating separately and independently from the fuel-theft networks likely based in Lagos. All of the reported KFR incidents around the GOG have occurred off the Niger Delta region.
In the GOG, maritime criminals are able to take advantage of a well-established illicit and corrupt political economy, as well as a lack of consistent and effective governance in the maritime domain. Criminals in this region maintain access to established international criminal networks and close ties to the shipping industries. Consequently, attacks are better coordinated than off the Horn of Africa, executed with precision, and often impossible to trace. West Africa’s criminal organizations have deep international ties, and the trends indicate an increased willingness for criminal gangs to venture further from their shore-side bases to commit their crimes.
On average, there are 12 to 15 GOG port calls a year by U.S.-flagged, deep draft cargo ships. Approximately 70 U.S.-registered Offshore Supply Vessels (OSVs) are working out of Nigerian and Ghanaian ports supporting offshore oil exploration. Both types of vessels carry crews that may include U.S. citizens. In addition, there are numerous vessels operating in the GOG and engaged in coastwise trade, which requires operating in territorial seas and coastal waters and making frequent port calls in the region. An unknown number of U.S. mariners work aboard these vessels, as well as on cargo ships, tankers, and OSVs flagged in other nations operating in the region. The escalation in violent criminal activities will increasingly put U.S. citizens in harm’s way and has already required the expenditure of significant resources to resolve hostage situations.
The pattern of piracy and related maritime crime also raises an increasing concern due to the violence associated with hijackings. In its 2014 report on piracy and armed robbery at sea, the International Maritime Bureau warns of the dangers to ships transiting West African waters, particularly around Nigeria, Benin, and Togo, and urges heightened vigilance, drawing particular attention to the expansion of the danger region. In 2013, the number of Nigerian criminal maritime attacks grew and currently stands at its highest level since 2008. Nigerian criminals accounted for 31 of the 51 attacks reported in the region in 2013, and West Africa, as a whole, saw 19 percent of attacks worldwide last year. The increase in maritime attacks in West Africa led London-based Lloyd's Market Association, an umbrella group of maritime insurers, to list Nigeria, Benin, and nearby waters in the same risk category as Somalia. The result was a significant decrease in maritime traffic in the region, which led to a substantial loss in revenue for regional nations and significant impact on the livelihoods of the country’s citizens through an increase in the cost of imports and a decrease in the competitiveness of exports.
4
The nature of the attacks, porous borders, limited maritime law enforcement and interdiction assets, endemic corruption, and lack of political will allow criminal gangs to carry out fast attacks with the ability to quickly return to shore and avoid detection and capture. In addition, a high number of attacks are widely believed to be unreported due to an ongoing failure by regional States to pursue criminal action, complicity by law enforcement officials, and a desire to keep insurance rates low.
Sedang diterjemahkan, harap tunggu..
 
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