The ideal of Gemeinschaft did not o

The ideal of Gemeinschaft did not originate with Toennies, though
it had a peculiarly strong appeal to several generations of German
thinkers from the middle of the Nineteenth Century onward right
down to the Nazis - a period throughout which Germany felt herself
hovering on the borderline between feudal tradition and modem
industrial society. The contrast between Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft is the distinction between Confucius’ ‘ Great Similarity ‘
and ‘ Small Tranquility ’, between Socrates’ conception of the
State founded on justice, which unites people, and Glaucon’s sketch
of the State founded only on self-interest, where all alliances are
temporary and unstable. It is the distinction between Augustine’s
City of God and his Society of Man, between Hegel’s family society
and civil society.
One of the main weaknesses of classical political philosophy, and
of Toennies’ own work, I should argue, has been the failure to
examine at all closely the possible different relationships that these
thinkers associate with the harmony of Gemeinschaft. The crucial
issue is that of hierarchy, of the authority-relations within a society.
Confucius, not unlike Toennies, sees the harmonious political society
based on the wu-lun, the five relationships: those of governor and
governed, parents and children, husband and wife, elder brother
and younger brother, friend and friend. In the first four, and
in Confucius’ general conception of the sound society, the concept
of hierarchy is essential; the senior partner must rule devotedly
and justly, the junior obey loyally and wholeheartedly. Yet this
is not the relationship between friends, and it is this relationship,
and not the four others, on which Confucius bases his picture of
the perfect society.
The possible conceptions of Gemeinschaft were dichotomised
for us, in the latter half of the Nineteenth Century; by the quarrel
between romantic conservatives and romantic socialists, between
those who wanted the restoration of the old community ruled by
the strong and able and those who wanted the inauguration of
the new community in which all men were brothers, caught upas equal partners in tasks and interests of common concern. Today,
there are few of us in Western society prepared to advocate the
former or to believe in the possibility of the latter. It is, I believe,
true that men can be caught up in such fellowships in the course
of production, of artistic and scientific creation and appreciation,
or in times of danger and adversity. But few of us believe that
such a spirit of fellowship can pervade an entire society; it
occurs rather in sectional groups, in dedicated companies and in
unusual moments of wider crisis and effort.
Dedication is a dangerous term; large areas of the world have
learnt to fear the dedication of men committed to fascism,, communism
and various varieties of religious and non-religious puritanism ;
the influence of the rule-conscious Gesellschaft still makes us
reluctant to distinguish one dedication from another, to ask what
motives are dedicated to what ways of living. In the end, I should
argue, the concept of Gemeinschaft can be clarified only by seeing
it in its ethical and not merely political context, by our being
prepared to abandon the ethical neutralism of so-called social science
and devoting our attention to the differing psychological motives
and social traditions to be found operating in people, to distinguishing
ethically between different ways of living and different human
interests. To such ethical distinctions, Toennies’ opposition between
Wesenwille and Kiirwille seems to me an important and illuminating
contribution.
FOO

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Ideal Gemeinschaft tidak mengasalkan dengan Toennies, meskipun itu secara kuat bagi beberapa generasi Jerman pemikir dari pertengahan abad kesembilan belas seterusnya tepat ke Nazi - periode seluruh Jerman yang merasa dirinya melayang-layang pada batas antara tradisi feodal dan modem masyarakat industri. Kontras antara Gemeinschaft dan Gesellschaft adalah perbedaan antara Konfusius 'kemiripan besar' dan 'Ketenangan kecil', antara konsepsi Socrates Negara yang didirikan pada keadilan, yang menyatukan orang-orang, dan Glaucon's sketsa negara didasarkan hanya pada kepentingan diri, mana semua aliansi yang sementara dan tidak stabil. Ini adalah perbedaan antara Augustine Kota Tuhan dan dalam masyarakat manusia, antara Hegel keluarga masyarakat dan masyarakat sipil. Salah satu kelemahan utama dari klasik Filsafat politik, dan Toennies' pekerjaan, saya harus berdebat, telah kegagalan untuk memeriksa di segala erat hubungan berbeda yang mungkin bahwa ini pemikir mengasosiasikan dengan harmoni Gemeinschaft. Yang penting masalah adalah bahwa dari hirarki, hubungan wewenang dalam masyarakat. Konfusius, tidak seperti Toennies, melihat masyarakat politik yang harmonis Berdasarkan wu-lun, hubungan lima: orang-orang dari Gubernur dan diatur, orangtua dan anak, suami dan istri, kakak dan adik, teman dan teman. Dalam empat pertama, dan in Confucius’ general conception of the sound society, the concept of hierarchy is essential; the senior partner must rule devotedly and justly, the junior obey loyally and wholeheartedly. Yet this is not the relationship between friends, and it is this relationship, and not the four others, on which Confucius bases his picture of the perfect society. The possible conceptions of Gemeinschaft were dichotomised for us, in the latter half of the Nineteenth Century; by the quarrel between romantic conservatives and romantic socialists, between those who wanted the restoration of the old community ruled by the strong and able and those who wanted the inauguration of the new community in which all men were brothers, caught upas equal partners in tasks and interests of common concern. Today, there are few of us in Western society prepared to advocate the former or to believe in the possibility of the latter. It is, I believe, true that men can be caught up in such fellowships in the course of production, of artistic and scientific creation and appreciation, or in times of danger and adversity. But few of us believe that such a spirit of fellowship can pervade an entire society; it occurs rather in sectional groups, in dedicated companies and in unusual moments of wider crisis and effort. Dedication is a dangerous term; large areas of the world have learnt to fear the dedication of men committed to fascism,, communism and various varieties of religious and non-religious puritanism ; the influence of the rule-conscious Gesellschaft still makes us reluctant to distinguish one dedication from another, to ask what motives are dedicated to what ways of living. In the end, I should argue, the concept of Gemeinschaft can be clarified only by seeing it in its ethical and not merely political context, by our being prepared to abandon the ethical neutralism of so-called social science and devoting our attention to the differing psychological motives and social traditions to be found operating in people, to distinguishing ethically between different ways of living and different human interests. To such ethical distinctions, Toennies’ opposition between Wesenwille and Kiirwille seems to me an important and illuminating contribution. FOO