.On March 9, 2001, Indonesia's defe

.
On March 9, 2001, Indonesia's defense minister and its armed forces commander announced new military operations against GAM. On the same day, Exxon Mobil, the region's largest foreign investor, closed three of its gasfields in North Aceh, citing attacks on its employees. Almost immediately, more troops were sent to North Aceh. The government claimed the additional troops were essential for the protection of Exxon-Mobil and the re-opening of operations, as Indonesian contracts with Japan and the Republic of Korea for sales of natural gas depended on the re-opening of the fields. (As of early August, two of the fields had reopened but with much reduced production.) Many in Aceh believed the army was using the closure of the gasfield as a pretext to start a long-planned offensive.
Presidential Instruction No.4
For the first four months of 2001, President Wahid resisted requests from Indonesia's military leaders to mount a major military operation against the rebels or to declare a civil emergency in Aceh. Under pressure, however, he issued Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No.4 of April 11, 2001.13The instruction stated that efforts at resolving the conflict through dialogue with "armed separatists" had produced no results and that violence on the part of the latter were increasing. The government had therefore decided to adopt a more comprehensive approach, and to address the political, economic, social, law and order, security, and information and communication aspects of the problem. To do so it set up an unwieldy structure headed by the vice-president and involving fifteen cabinet members, the commanders of both TNI and Polri, the head of the national intelligence agency, the governor of Aceh and all Indonesian-appointed district heads in Aceh.
In practice, however, the main result of Inpres No.4 was the restructuring of the security apparatus responsible for Aceh. A new "Operation for the Restoration of Security and Upholding the Law"(Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukumor OKPH) was formed under the overall supervision of the national mobile police brigade (Brimob) commander, Yusuf Manggabarani. Under Manggabarani, who arrived in Aceh in early May 2001, Aceh's then chief of police, Brig.Gen.(Pol) Chairul Rasjid, and army commander Brig.Gen. Zamroni, were given equal responsibility for command of the operations, which were envisioned as being under police authority, but with full army back-up. Rasjid was replaced in June by Brig.Gen (Pol) Ramli Darwis. Zamroni, a former deputy commander of the army special forces (Kopassus), was to command TNI troops, including eleven companies reportedly given special training by Kopassus in West Java.14
The new troops embarked on a systematic effort to target suspected GAM strongholds and headquarters, with many claims by local organizations of civilians killed in the process. In June, Central Aceh was the site of a particularly violent eruption with the army claiming that GAM had massacred more than forty Javanese migrants on June 5-6 in the areas of Bandar and Timang Gajah, and GAM claiming that the TNI, together with a Javanese militia called Puja Kusuma, had massacred even more ethnic Acehnese and Gayo people in retaliation in the weeks that followed. (Both claims appear to be well-founded, but Human Rights Watch has not been able to independently confirm them.) Between the first week of June and mid-July, some 150 people had been confirmed dead by the Indonesian Red Cross, and 800 homes had been burned to the ground.15
When one of Indonesia's most respected human rights organizations, Kontras, tried to conduct a fact-finding mission in Central from July 7-19, 2001 its members were stopped by Indonesian security forces and two of them detained and tortured. Both individuals were eventually released.
10Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion 1989-92,Cornell Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: 1995) pp. 62-63.
11Al-Chaidar, Sayed Mudhahar Ahmad and Yarmen Dinamika, Aceh Bersim

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

.Pada tanggal 9 Maret 2001, Indonesia Menteri Pertahanan dan panglima angkatan bersenjata yang mengumumkan baru operasi militer melawan GAM. Pada hari yang sama, Exxon Mobil, investor asing terbesar di wilayah ini, ditutup tiga nya ladang gas di Aceh Utara, mengutip serangan terhadap karyawannya. Hampir segera, lebih banyak pasukan dikirim ke Aceh Utara. Pemerintah mengklaim pasukan tambahan penting untuk perlindungan Exxon Mobil dan pembukaan kembali operasi, seperti Indonesia kontrak dengan Jepang dan Korea Selatan untuk penjualan gas alam bergantung pada pembukaan kembali bidang. (Pada awal Agustus, dua bidang telah dibuka kembali tetapi dengan banyak mengurangi produksi.) Banyak di Aceh percaya tentara menggunakan penutupan gasfield sebagai alasan untuk memulai serangan lama direncanakan.Instruksi Presiden No.4For the first four months of 2001, President Wahid resisted requests from Indonesia's military leaders to mount a major military operation against the rebels or to declare a civil emergency in Aceh. Under pressure, however, he issued Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No.4 of April 11, 2001.13The instruction stated that efforts at resolving the conflict through dialogue with "armed separatists" had produced no results and that violence on the part of the latter were increasing. The government had therefore decided to adopt a more comprehensive approach, and to address the political, economic, social, law and order, security, and information and communication aspects of the problem. To do so it set up an unwieldy structure headed by the vice-president and involving fifteen cabinet members, the commanders of both TNI and Polri, the head of the national intelligence agency, the governor of Aceh and all Indonesian-appointed district heads in Aceh.In practice, however, the main result of Inpres No.4 was the restructuring of the security apparatus responsible for Aceh. A new "Operation for the Restoration of Security and Upholding the Law"(Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukumor OKPH) was formed under the overall supervision of the national mobile police brigade (Brimob) commander, Yusuf Manggabarani. Under Manggabarani, who arrived in Aceh in early May 2001, Aceh's then chief of police, Brig.Gen.(Pol) Chairul Rasjid, and army commander Brig.Gen. Zamroni, were given equal responsibility for command of the operations, which were envisioned as being under police authority, but with full army back-up. Rasjid was replaced in June by Brig.Gen (Pol) Ramli Darwis. Zamroni, a former deputy commander of the army special forces (Kopassus), was to command TNI troops, including eleven companies reportedly given special training by Kopassus in West Java.14The new troops embarked on a systematic effort to target suspected GAM strongholds and headquarters, with many claims by local organizations of civilians killed in the process. In June, Central Aceh was the site of a particularly violent eruption with the army claiming that GAM had massacred more than forty Javanese migrants on June 5-6 in the areas of Bandar and Timang Gajah, and GAM claiming that the TNI, together with a Javanese militia called Puja Kusuma, had massacred even more ethnic Acehnese and Gayo people in retaliation in the weeks that followed. (Both claims appear to be well-founded, but Human Rights Watch has not been able to independently confirm them.) Between the first week of June and mid-July, some 150 people had been confirmed dead by the Indonesian Red Cross, and 800 homes had been burned to the ground.15When one of Indonesia's most respected human rights organizations, Kontras, tried to conduct a fact-finding mission in Central from July 7-19, 2001 its members were stopped by Indonesian security forces and two of them detained and tortured. Both individuals were eventually released.10Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion 1989-92,Cornell Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: 1995) pp. 62-63.11Al-Chaidar, Sayed Mudhahar Ahmad and Yarmen Dinamika, Aceh Bersim

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

.
Pada tanggal 9 Maret 2001, menteri pertahanan Indonesia dan komandan angkatan bersenjata mengumumkan operasi militer baru melawan GAM. Pada hari yang sama, Exxon Mobil, di kawasan itu investor asing terbesar, ditutup tiga ladang gas di Aceh Utara, mengutip serangan terhadap karyawannya. Hampir segera, lebih banyak pasukan yang dikirim ke Aceh Utara. Pemerintah mengklaim pasukan tambahan yang penting untuk perlindungan Exxon-Mobil dan pembukaan kembali operasi, seperti kontrak Indonesia dengan Jepang dan Republik Korea untuk penjualan gas alam tergantung pada pembukaan kembali ladang. (Pada awal Agustus, dua dari bidang telah dibuka kembali tetapi dengan banyak mengurangi produksi.) Banyak di Aceh diyakini tentara menggunakan penutupan ladang gas sebagai dalih untuk memulai serangan lama direncanakan.
Instruksi Presiden No.4
Untuk empat bulan pertama tahun 2001, Presiden Wahid menolak permintaan dari para pemimpin militer Indonesia untuk me-mount operasi militer besar-besaran terhadap para pemberontak atau untuk menyatakan keadaan darurat sipil di Aceh. Di bawah tekanan, namun, ia mengeluarkan Instruksi Presiden (Inpres) No.4 dari 11 April instruksi 2001.13The menyatakan bahwa upaya menyelesaikan konflik melalui dialog dengan "separatis bersenjata" telah menghasilkan tidak ada hasil dan bahwa kekerasan pada bagian yang terakhir adalah meningkat. Oleh karena itu pemerintah telah memutuskan untuk mengadopsi pendekatan yang lebih komprehensif, dan untuk mengatasi politik, ekonomi, sosial, hukum dan ketertiban, keamanan, dan informasi dan aspek komunikasi dari masalah. Untuk melakukannya itu diatur struktur berat dipimpin oleh wakil presiden dan melibatkan lima belas anggota kabinet, komandan dari kedua TNI dan Polri, kepala badan intelijen nasional, gubernur Aceh dan semua bupati Indonesia ditunjuk di Aceh .
Dalam prakteknya, bagaimanapun, hasil utama Inpres No.4 adalah restrukturisasi aparat keamanan yang bertanggung jawab untuk Aceh. Sebuah "Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukum" yang baru (Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan Dan Penegakan Hukumor OKPH) dibentuk di bawah pengawasan keseluruhan dari Brimob nasional (Brimob) komandan, Yusuf Manggabarani. Di bawah Manggabarani, yang tiba di Aceh pada awal Mei 2001, Aceh maka kepala polisi, Brigjen (Pol) Chairul Rasjid., Dan komandan militer Brigjen. Zamroni, diberi tanggung jawab yang sama untuk perintah operasi, yang dibayangkan sebagai berada di bawah otoritas polisi, tetapi dengan tentara penuh back-up. Rasjid digantikan pada bulan Juni oleh Brigjen (Pol) Ramli Darwis. Zamroni, komandan wakil mantan tentara pasukan khusus (Kopassus), adalah perintah pasukan TNI, termasuk sebelas perusahaan dilaporkan diberikan pelatihan khusus oleh Kopassus di West Java.14
Pasukan baru memulai upaya sistematis untuk menargetkan diduga benteng dan markas GAM , dengan banyak klaim oleh organisasi lokal warga sipil yang tewas dalam proses. Pada bulan Juni, Aceh Tengah adalah situs letusan terutama kekerasan dengan tentara mengklaim bahwa GAM telah membantai lebih dari empat puluh migran Jawa di 5-6 Juni di bidang Bandar dan Timang Gajah, dan GAM mengklaim bahwa TNI, bersama-sama dengan milisi Jawa disebut Puja Kusuma, telah membantai lebih etnis masyarakat Aceh dan Gayo pembalasan di minggu-minggu berikutnya. (Kedua klaim tampaknya cukup beralasan, tapi Human Rights Watch belum mampu mandiri mengkonfirmasi mereka.) Antara minggu pertama Juni dan pertengahan Juli, sekitar 150 orang telah dikonfirmasi tewas oleh Palang Merah Indonesia, dan 800 rumah telah dibakar untuk ground.15 yang
Ketika salah satu dari organisasi hak asasi manusia yang paling dihormati di Indonesia, Kontras, mencoba untuk melakukan misi pencari fakta di Central dari 07-19 Juli 2001 anggotanya dihentikan oleh pasukan keamanan Indonesia dan dua dari mereka ditahan dan disiksa. Kedua orang itu akhirnya dibebaskan.
10Tim Kell, The Roots of Rebellion Aceh 1989-1992, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: 1995) pp 62-63..
11Al-Chaidar, Sayed Mudhahar Ahmad dan Yarmen Dinamika, Aceh Bersim