Secondary inhibiting loopsAs we hav

Secondary inhibiting loops
As we have seen, people create loops to protect the
primary inhibiting loops, and so we have loops
nested within loops that inhibit learning. Model
I blinds people to their weaknesses. For instance,
the six corporate presidents were unable to realize
how incapable they were of questioning their assumptions
and breaking through to fresh understanding.
They were under the illusion that they
could learn, when in reality they just kept running
around the same track.
President A told the group that Vice President Z,
whom he had viewed as a prime candidate to be the
next president, was too submissive and did not show
enough initiative. The presidents questioned A carefully,
and they soon produced evidence that A might
be the cause of Z's behavior. A was surprised and
irked about his own lack of awareness, but he was
pleased with the help he got. He invented a solution
based on the new diagnosis, which was, in
effect, "to lay off the vice president and give him
more breathing space."
His colleagues were able to help A to see that the
solution was simplistic. As one said, "If I were Z
and you suddenly changed by letting me alone, I
would wonder if you had given up on me." A, again
surprised and irked, nevertheless learned. Next, he
tried out the solution that he and the others finally
designed, with his peers acting as Z. In all cases,
what he produced was not what he and they had
invented.
The point to this story is that A honestly thought
that he was doing the right things. What he learned
was that he did not have the skills to discover, to
invent, to produce double loop solutions, and that
he was unaware of this fact.
What happens is that people provide incomplete
and distorted feedhack to each other; each knows
that this is the case; each knows that the other
knows; and each knows that this game is not usually
discussable. The second set of factors, therefore, that
helps to create secondary inhibitions are the games
people play in order not to upset each other. These
games can become complex and spread quickly
throughout an organization.
For example, the R&D people, not being able to
meet a promised deadline, assure the top management
that they have at least enhanced the state of
the art. Then there are the hudget games, such as
"throwing the dead cat into the other department's
yard." There is also the game of starting a crisis
in order to get attention and to obtain more of the
scarce financial resources.
These factors tend to reinforce each other. Eventually
they form a tight system that inhibits individual
and organizational learning. I call this a Model
0-1 (see Exhibit U) learning system, and I have found
such a system in most of the organizations I have
studied, both private and public, product- or serviceoriented.
The result is that people are taught to have a limited
set of maps for how they must act, and they erect
elaborate, defensive smoke screens that prevent both
themselves and anyone else from challenging either
their actions or the assumptions on which they arc
based.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Secondary inhibiting loopsAs we have seen, people create loops to protect theprimary inhibiting loops, and so we have loopsnested within loops that inhibit learning. ModelI blinds people to their weaknesses. For instance,the six corporate presidents were unable to realizehow incapable they were of questioning their assumptionsand breaking through to fresh understanding.They were under the illusion that theycould learn, when in reality they just kept runningaround the same track.President A told the group that Vice President Z,whom he had viewed as a prime candidate to be thenext president, was too submissive and did not showenough initiative. The presidents questioned A carefully,and they soon produced evidence that A mightbe the cause of Z's behavior. A was surprised andirked about his own lack of awareness, but he waspleased with the help he got. He invented a solutionbased on the new diagnosis, which was, ineffect, "to lay off the vice president and give himmore breathing space."His colleagues were able to help A to see that thesolution was simplistic. As one said, "If I were Zand you suddenly changed by letting me alone, Iwould wonder if you had given up on me." A, againsurprised and irked, nevertheless learned. Next, hetried out the solution that he and the others finallydesigned, with his peers acting as Z. In all cases,what he produced was not what he and they hadinvented.The point to this story is that A honestly thoughtthat he was doing the right things. What he learnedwas that he did not have the skills to discover, toinvent, to produce double loop solutions, and thathe was unaware of this fact.What happens is that people provide incompleteand distorted feedhack to each other; each knowsthat this is the case; each knows that the otherknows; and each knows that this game is not usuallydiscussable. The second set of factors, therefore, thathelps to create secondary inhibitions are the gamespeople play in order not to upset each other. Thesegames can become complex and spread quicklythroughout an organization.For example, the R&D people, not being able tomeet a promised deadline, assure the top managementthat they have at least enhanced the state ofthe art. Then there are the hudget games, such as"throwing the dead cat into the other department'syard." There is also the game of starting a crisisin order to get attention and to obtain more of thescarce financial resources.These factors tend to reinforce each other. Eventuallythey form a tight system that inhibits individualand organizational learning. I call this a Model0-1 (see Exhibit U) learning system, and I have foundsuch a system in most of the organizations I havestudied, both private and public, product- or serviceoriented.The result is that people are taught to have a limitedset of maps for how they must act, and they erectrumit, defensif asap layar yang mencegah keduadiri sendiri dan orang lain dari menantang baiktindakan mereka atau asumsi-asumsi yang mereka busurBerdasarkan.