2.1 Formal EqualityWhen two persons

2.1 Formal Equality
When two persons have equal status in at least one normatively relevant respect, they must be treated equally with regard to this respect.This is the generally accepted formal equality principle that Aristotle formulated in reference to Plato: “treat like cases as like” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.3. 1131a10-b15; Politics, III.9.1280 a8-15, III. 12. 1282b18-23). Of course the crucial question is which respects are normatively relevant and which are not. Some authors see this formal principle of equality as a specific application of a rule of rationality: it is irrational, because inconsistent, to treat equal cases unequally without sufficient reasons (Berlin 1955-56). But most authors instead stress that what is here at stake is a moral principle of justice, basically corresponding with acknowledgment of the impartial and universalizable nature of moral judgments. Namely, the postulate of formal equality demands more than consistency with one's subjective preferences. What is more important is possible justification vis-à-vis others of the equal or unequal treatment in question — and this on the sole basis of a situation's objective features.

2.2 Proportional Equality
According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of equality, numerical and proportional (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1130b-1132b; cf. Plato, Laws, VI.757b-c). A form of treatment of others or as a result of it a distribution is equal numerically when it treats all persons as indistinguishable, thus treating them identically or granting them the same quantity of a good per capita. That is not always just. In contrast, a form of treatment of others or distribution is proportional or relatively equal when it treats all relevant persons in relation to their due. Just numerical equality is a special case of proportional equality. Numerical equality is only just under special circumstances, viz. when persons are equal in the relevant respects so that the relevant proportions are equal. Proportional equality further specifies formal equality; it is the more precise and detailed, hence actually the more comprehensive formulation of formal equality. It indicates what produces an adequate equality.

Proportional equality in the treatment and distribution of goods to persons involves at least the following concepts or variables: Two or more persons (P1, P2) and two or more allocations of goods to persons (G) and X and Y as the quantity in which individuals have the relevant normative quality E. This can be represented as an equation with fractions or as a ratio. If P1 has E in the amount of X and if P2 has E in the amount Y, then P1 is due G in the amount of X′ and P2 is due G in the amount of Y′, so that the ratio X/Y = X′/Y′ is valid. (N.B. For the formula to be usable, the potentially great variety of factors involved have to be both quantifiable in principle and commensurable, i.e., capable of synthesis into an aggregate value.)

When factors speak for unequal treatment or distribution, because the persons are unequal in relevant respects, the treatment or distribution proportional to these factors is just. Unequal claims to treatment or distribution must be considered proportionally: that is the prerequisite for persons being considered equally.

This principle can also be incorporated into hierarchical, inegalitarian theories. It indicates that equal output is demanded with equal input. Aristocrats, perfectionists, and meritocrats all believe that persons should be assessed according to their differing deserts, understood by them in the broad sense of fulfillment of some relevant criterion. And they believe that reward and punishment, benefits and burdens, should be proportional to such deserts. Since this definition leaves open who is due what, there can be great inequality when it comes to presumed fundamental (natural) rights, deserts, and worth — and such inequality is apparent in both Plato and Aristotle.

Aristotle's idea of justice as proportional equality contains a fundamental insight. The idea offers a framework for a rational argument between egalitarian and non-egalitarian ideas of justice, its focal point being the question of the basis for an adequate equality (Hinsch 2003). Both sides accept justice as proportional equality. Aristotle's analysis makes clear that the argument involves the features deciding whether two persons are to be considered equal or unequal in a distributive context.

On the formal level of pure conceptual explication, justice and equality are linked through these principles of formal and proportional justice. Justice cannot be explained without these equality principles; the equality principles only receive their normative significance in their role as principles of justice.

Formal and proportional equality is simply a conceptual schema. It needs to be made precise — i.e., its open variables need to be filled out. The formal postulate remains quite empty as long as it remains unclear when or through what features two or more persons or cases should be considered equal. All debates over the proper conception of justice, i.e., over who is due what, can be understood as controversies over the question of which cases are equal and which unequal (Aristotle, Politics, 1282b 22). For this reason equality theorists are correct in stressing that the claim that persons are owed equality becomes informative only when one is told — what kind of equality they are owed (Nagel 1979; Rae 1981; Sen 1992, p. 13). Actually, every normative theory implies a certain notion of equality. In order to outline their position, egalitarians must thus take account of a specific (egalitarian) conception of equality. To do so, they need to identify substantive principles of equality, discussed below.

2.3 Moral Equality
Until the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings are unequal by nature — i.e., that there was a natural human hierarchy. This postulate collapsed with the advent of the idea of natural right and its assumption of an equality of natural order among all human beings. Against Plato and Aristotle, the classical formula for justice according to which an action is just when it offers each individual his or her due took on a substantively egalitarian meaning in the course of time, viz. everyone deserved the same dignity and the same respect. This is now the widely held conception of substantive, universal, moral equality. It developed among the Stoics, who emphasized the natural equality of all rational beings, and in early New Testament Christianity, which elevated the equality of human beings before God to a principle: one to be sure not always adhered to later by the Christian church. This important idea was also taken up both in the Talmud and in Islam, where it was grounded in both Greek and Hebraic elements in both systems. In the modern period, starting in the seventeenth century, the dominant idea was of natural equality in the tradition of natural law and social contract theory. Hobbes (1651) postulated that in their natural condition, individuals possess equal rights, because over time they have the same capacity to do each other harm. Locke (1690) argued that all human beings have the same natural right to both (self-)ownership and freedom. Rousseau (1755) declared social inequality to be a virtually primeval decline of the human race from natural equality in a harmonious state of nature: a decline catalyzed by the human urge for perfection, property and possessions (Dahrendorf 1962). For Rousseau (1755, 1762), the resulting inequality and rule of violence can only be overcome by tying unfettered subjectivity to a common civil existence and popular sovereignty. In Kant's moral philosophy (1785), the categorical imperative formulates the equality postulate of universal human worth. His transcendental and philosophical reflections on autonomy and self-legislation lead to a recognition of the same freedom for all rational beings as the sole principle of human rights (Kant 1797, p. 230). Such Enlightenment ideas stimulated the great modern social movements and revolutions, and were taken up in modern constitutions and declarations of human rights. During the French Revolution, equality — along with freedom and fraternity — became a basis of the Déclaration des droits de l´homme et du citoyen of 1789.

The principle of equal dignity and respect is now accepted as a minimum standard throughout mainstream Western culture. Some misunderstandings regarding moral equality need to be clarified. To say that men are equal is not to say they are identical. The postulate of equality implies that underneath apparent differences, certain recognizable entities or units exist that, by dint of being units, can be said to be ‘equal.’ (Thomson 1949, p. 4). Fundamental equality means that persons are alike in important relevant and specified respects alone, and not that they are all generally the same or can be treated in the same way (Nagel 1991). In a now commonly posed distinction, stemming from Dworkin (1977, p. 370), moral equality can be understood as prescribing treatment of persons as equals, i.e., with equal concern and respect, and not the often implausible principle of treating persons equally. This fundamental idea of equal respect for all persons and of the equal worth or equal dignity of all human beings (Vlastos 1962) is accepted as a minimal standard by all leading schools of modern Western political and moral culture. Any political theory abandoning this notion of equality will not be found plausible today. In a period in which metaphysical, religious and traditional views have lost their general plausibility (Habermas 1983, p. 53, 1992, pp. 39-44), it appears impossible to peacefully reach a general agreement on common political aims without accepting that persons must be treated as equals. As a result, moral equality constitutes the ‘egalitarian plateau’ for all contemp

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

2.1 formal kesetaraanKetika dua orang memiliki status sama dalam setidaknya satu hal yang relevan secara normatif, mereka harus diperlakukan sama berkenaan dengan hal ini. Ini adalah prinsip kesetaraan formal yang diterima secara umum yang diformulasikan Aristoteles merujuk kepada Plato: "Perlakukan seperti kasus seperti" (Aristoteles, etika Nikomakea V.3. 1131a10-b15; Politik, III.9.1280 a8-15, III. 12. 1282b18-23). Tentu saja pertanyaan penting adalah hal yang relevan secara normatif dan mana yang tidak. Beberapa penulis melihat ini prinsip kesetaraan formal sebagai aplikasi tertentu dari sebuah aturan rasionalitas: sangat tidak rasional, karena kasus tidak konsisten, untuk mengobati sama tidak sama tanpa alasan (Berlin 1955-56). Tetapi penulis malah menekankan bahwa apa yang di sini dipertaruhkan adalah prinsip moral keadilan, pada dasarnya sesuai dengan pengakuan sifat imparsial dan universalizable penilaian moral. Yaitu, dalil formal kesetaraan menuntut lebih dari konsistensi dengan preferensi subyektif. Apa yang lebih penting adalah mungkin pembenaran vis-à-vis orang lain yang sama atau tidak seimbang perawatan bersangkutan — dan ini atas dasar satu-satunya fitur objektif situasi.2.2 proporsional kesetaraanMenurut Aristoteles, ada dua jenis kesetaraan, numerik dan proporsional (Aristoteles, etika Nikomakea, 1130b-1132b; cf. Plato, undang-undang, VI.757b-c). Bentuk perawatan orang lain atau sebagai akibat dari hal distribusi sama numerik ketika ia memperlakukan semua orang sebagai dibedakan, dengan demikian memperlakukan mereka identik atau memberi mereka sama jumlah yang baik per kapita. Itu tidak selalu hanya. Di sebaliknya, bentuk perlakuan terhadap orang lain atau distribusi proporsional atau relatif sama ketika ia memperlakukan semua relevan orang sehubungan dengan haknya. Kesetaraan hanya numerik adalah kasus khusus dari proporsional kesetaraan. Persamaan numerik adalah hanya di bawah keadaan khusus, yakni ketika orang-orang sama dalam hal relevan sehingga relevan proporsi sama. Kesetaraan proporsional lebih lanjut menentukan kesetaraan formal; Hal ini lebih akurat dan rinci, maka benar-benar lebih komprehensif perumusan formal kesetaraan. Ini menunjukkan apa menghasilkan kesetaraan yang memadai.Proportional equality in the treatment and distribution of goods to persons involves at least the following concepts or variables: Two or more persons (P1, P2) and two or more allocations of goods to persons (G) and X and Y as the quantity in which individuals have the relevant normative quality E. This can be represented as an equation with fractions or as a ratio. If P1 has E in the amount of X and if P2 has E in the amount Y, then P1 is due G in the amount of X′ and P2 is due G in the amount of Y′, so that the ratio X/Y = X′/Y′ is valid. (N.B. For the formula to be usable, the potentially great variety of factors involved have to be both quantifiable in principle and commensurable, i.e., capable of synthesis into an aggregate value.)When factors speak for unequal treatment or distribution, because the persons are unequal in relevant respects, the treatment or distribution proportional to these factors is just. Unequal claims to treatment or distribution must be considered proportionally: that is the prerequisite for persons being considered equally.This principle can also be incorporated into hierarchical, inegalitarian theories. It indicates that equal output is demanded with equal input. Aristocrats, perfectionists, and meritocrats all believe that persons should be assessed according to their differing deserts, understood by them in the broad sense of fulfillment of some relevant criterion. And they believe that reward and punishment, benefits and burdens, should be proportional to such deserts. Since this definition leaves open who is due what, there can be great inequality when it comes to presumed fundamental (natural) rights, deserts, and worth — and such inequality is apparent in both Plato and Aristotle.Aristotle's idea of justice as proportional equality contains a fundamental insight. The idea offers a framework for a rational argument between egalitarian and non-egalitarian ideas of justice, its focal point being the question of the basis for an adequate equality (Hinsch 2003). Both sides accept justice as proportional equality. Aristotle's analysis makes clear that the argument involves the features deciding whether two persons are to be considered equal or unequal in a distributive context.On the formal level of pure conceptual explication, justice and equality are linked through these principles of formal and proportional justice. Justice cannot be explained without these equality principles; the equality principles only receive their normative significance in their role as principles of justice.Formal and proportional equality is simply a conceptual schema. It needs to be made precise — i.e., its open variables need to be filled out. The formal postulate remains quite empty as long as it remains unclear when or through what features two or more persons or cases should be considered equal. All debates over the proper conception of justice, i.e., over who is due what, can be understood as controversies over the question of which cases are equal and which unequal (Aristotle, Politics, 1282b 22). For this reason equality theorists are correct in stressing that the claim that persons are owed equality becomes informative only when one is told — what kind of equality they are owed (Nagel 1979; Rae 1981; Sen 1992, p. 13). Actually, every normative theory implies a certain notion of equality. In order to outline their position, egalitarians must thus take account of a specific (egalitarian) conception of equality. To do so, they need to identify substantive principles of equality, discussed below.2.3 Moral EqualityUntil the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings are unequal by nature — i.e., that there was a natural human hierarchy. This postulate collapsed with the advent of the idea of natural right and its assumption of an equality of natural order among all human beings. Against Plato and Aristotle, the classical formula for justice according to which an action is just when it offers each individual his or her due took on a substantively egalitarian meaning in the course of time, viz. everyone deserved the same dignity and the same respect. This is now the widely held conception of substantive, universal, moral equality. It developed among the Stoics, who emphasized the natural equality of all rational beings, and in early New Testament Christianity, which elevated the equality of human beings before God to a principle: one to be sure not always adhered to later by the Christian church. This important idea was also taken up both in the Talmud and in Islam, where it was grounded in both Greek and Hebraic elements in both systems. In the modern period, starting in the seventeenth century, the dominant idea was of natural equality in the tradition of natural law and social contract theory. Hobbes (1651) postulated that in their natural condition, individuals possess equal rights, because over time they have the same capacity to do each other harm. Locke (1690) argued that all human beings have the same natural right to both (self-)ownership and freedom. Rousseau (1755) declared social inequality to be a virtually primeval decline of the human race from natural equality in a harmonious state of nature: a decline catalyzed by the human urge for perfection, property and possessions (Dahrendorf 1962). For Rousseau (1755, 1762), the resulting inequality and rule of violence can only be overcome by tying unfettered subjectivity to a common civil existence and popular sovereignty. In Kant's moral philosophy (1785), the categorical imperative formulates the equality postulate of universal human worth. His transcendental and philosophical reflections on autonomy and self-legislation lead to a recognition of the same freedom for all rational beings as the sole principle of human rights (Kant 1797, p. 230). Such Enlightenment ideas stimulated the great modern social movements and revolutions, and were taken up in modern constitutions and declarations of human rights. During the French Revolution, equality — along with freedom and fraternity — became a basis of the Déclaration des droits de l´homme et du citoyen of 1789.
The principle of equal dignity and respect is now accepted as a minimum standard throughout mainstream Western culture. Some misunderstandings regarding moral equality need to be clarified. To say that men are equal is not to say they are identical. The postulate of equality implies that underneath apparent differences, certain recognizable entities or units exist that, by dint of being units, can be said to be ‘equal.’ (Thomson 1949, p. 4). Fundamental equality means that persons are alike in important relevant and specified respects alone, and not that they are all generally the same or can be treated in the same way (Nagel 1991). In a now commonly posed distinction, stemming from Dworkin (1977, p. 370), moral equality can be understood as prescribing treatment of persons as equals, i.e., with equal concern and respect, and not the often implausible principle of treating persons equally. This fundamental idea of equal respect for all persons and of the equal worth or equal dignity of all human beings (Vlastos 1962) is accepted as a minimal standard by all leading schools of modern Western political and moral culture. Any political theory abandoning this notion of equality will not be found plausible today. In a period in which metaphysical, religious and traditional views have lost their general plausibility (Habermas 1983, p. 53, 1992, pp. 39-44), it appears impossible to peacefully reach a general agreement on common political aims without accepting that persons must be treated as equals. As a result, moral equality constitutes the ‘egalitarian plateau’ for all contemp

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

2.1 Formal Kesetaraan
Ketika dua orang memiliki status yang sama dalam setidaknya satu hal normatif yang relevan, mereka harus diperlakukan sama berkenaan dengan respect.This ini adalah prinsip yang berlaku umum resmi kesetaraan yang dirumuskan Aristoteles mengacu pada Plato: "memperlakukan seperti kasus sebagai seperti "(Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, V.3 1131a10-b15;. Politik, III.9.1280 a8-15, III 12. 1282b18-23.). Tentu saja pertanyaan penting adalah yang hal yang normatif yang relevan dan yang tidak. Beberapa penulis melihat prinsip ini formal kesetaraan sebagai aplikasi spesifik aturan rasionalitas: itu tidak rasional, karena tidak konsisten, untuk mengobati kasus yang sama tidak merata tanpa alasan yang cukup (Berlin 1955-1956). Tapi kebanyakan penulis bukan menekankan bahwa apa yang dipertaruhkan di sini adalah prinsip moral keadilan, pada dasarnya sesuai dengan pengakuan sifat memihak dan disemestakan penilaian moral. Yakni, dalil kesetaraan resmi menuntut lebih dari konsistensi dengan preferensi subjektif seseorang. Apa yang lebih penting adalah kemungkinan pembenaran vis-à-vis orang lain dari perlakuan yang sama atau tidak sama dalam pertanyaan -. Dan ini hanya atas dasar fitur obyektif situasi ini 2,2 Proporsional Kesetaraan Menurut Aristoteles, ada dua macam kesetaraan, numerik dan proporsional (Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, 1130b-1132b; lih Plato, Hukum, VI.757b-c). Suatu bentuk pengobatan lain atau sebagai akibat dari itu distribusi adalah sama numerik ketika memperlakukan semua orang sebagai dibedakan, sehingga memperlakukan mereka identik atau memberikan mereka jumlah yang sama dari per kapita yang baik. Itu tidak selalu hanya. Sebaliknya, bentuk pengobatan lain atau distribusi sebanding atau relatif sama ketika memperlakukan orang semua yang relevan dalam kaitannya dengan karena mereka. Hanya kesetaraan numerik adalah kasus khusus dari persamaan proporsional. Numerik kesetaraan hanya di bawah keadaan khusus, yaitu. ketika orang berkedudukan sama di hal yang relevan sehingga proporsi yang relevan adalah sama. Proporsional kesetaraan lanjut menentukan kesetaraan formal; itu adalah lebih tepat dan rinci, maka sebenarnya rumusan yang lebih komprehensif kesetaraan formal. Ini menunjukkan apa yang menghasilkan persamaan yang memadai. kesetaraan proporsional dalam pengobatan dan distribusi barang ke orang melibatkan setidaknya berikut konsep atau variabel: Dua orang atau lebih (P1, P2) dan dua atau lebih alokasi barang ke orang (G) dan X dan Y sebagai kuantitas di mana individu memiliki kualitas normatif yang relevan E. ini dapat direpresentasikan sebagai persamaan dengan pecahan atau rasio. Jika P1 memiliki E dalam jumlah X dan jika P2 memiliki E dalam jumlah Y, maka P1 adalah karena G dalam jumlah X 'dan P2 adalah karena G dalam jumlah Y', sehingga rasio X / Y = X '/ Y' berlaku. (NB Untuk rumus untuk digunakan, berbagai berpotensi besar faktor yang terlibat harus baik diukur pada prinsipnya dan sepadan, yakni mampu sintesis menjadi nilai agregat.) Ketika faktor berbicara untuk pengobatan atau distribusi yang tidak merata, karena orang-orang yang tidak sama dalam hal-hal yang relevan, pengobatan atau distribusi sebanding dengan faktor-faktor ini hanya. Klaim yang tidak sama untuk pengobatan atau distribusi harus dipertimbangkan secara proporsional. Itu adalah prasyarat untuk orang yang dianggap sama Prinsip ini juga dapat dimasukkan ke dalam hirarki, teori egaliter. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa output yang sama dituntut dengan masukan yang sama. Bangsawan, perfeksionis, dan meritocrats semua percaya bahwa orang harus dinilai sesuai dengan gurun yang berbeda mereka, dipahami oleh mereka dalam arti luas pemenuhan beberapa kriteria yang relevan. Dan mereka percaya bahwa penghargaan dan hukuman, manfaat dan beban, harus proporsional dengan gurun tersebut. Sejak definisi ini daun terbuka yang karena apa, bisa ada ketimpangan yang besar ketika datang ke dianggap mendasar (alami) hak, gurun, dan layak - dan ketimpangan seperti terlihat pada kedua Plato dan Aristoteles. ide Aristoteles tentang keadilan kesetaraan proporsional mengandung wawasan mendasar. Idenya menawarkan kerangka kerja untuk argumen rasional antara ide-ide egaliter dan non-egaliter keadilan, titik fokus yang menjadi pertanyaan dari dasar untuk kesetaraan yang memadai (Hinsch 2003). Kedua belah pihak menerima keadilan kesetaraan proporsional. Analisis Aristoteles menjelaskan bahwa argumen melibatkan fitur memutuskan apakah dua orang yang akan dianggap sama atau tidak sama dalam konteks distributif. Pada tingkat formal penjelasan konseptual murni, keadilan dan kesetaraan yang terhubung melalui prinsip-prinsip peradilan formal dan proporsional. Keadilan tidak dapat dijelaskan tanpa prinsip-prinsip kesetaraan ini; prinsip-prinsip kesetaraan hanya menerima signifikansi normatif mereka dalam peran mereka sebagai prinsip-prinsip keadilan. Formal dan proporsional kesetaraan hanyalah sebuah skema konseptual. Ini perlu dilakukan tepat - yaitu, variabel terbuka perlu diisi. Dalil resmi masih cukup kosong selama itu masih belum jelas kapan atau melalui apa memiliki dua atau lebih orang atau kasus harus dianggap sama. Semua perdebatan konsepsi yang tepat keadilan, yaitu, siapa yang disebabkan apa, dapat dipahami sebagai kontroversi atas pertanyaan yang sama dan kasus yang tidak sama (Aristoteles, Politics, 1282b 22). Untuk alasan ini teori kesetaraan benar dalam menekankan bahwa klaim bahwa orang yang berutang kesetaraan menjadi informatif hanya ketika seseorang mengatakan - apa persamaan mereka berutang (Nagel 1979; Rae 1981; Sen 1992, hal 13.). Sebenarnya, setiap teori normatif menyiratkan gagasan tertentu kesetaraan. Dalam rangka untuk menjelaskan posisi mereka, egalitarian harus demikian memperhitungkan tertentu (egaliter) konsepsi kesetaraan. . Untuk melakukannya, mereka harus mengidentifikasi prinsip-prinsip substantif kesetaraan, dibahas di bawah 2,3 Moral Kesetaraan Sampai abad kedelapan belas, diasumsikan bahwa manusia tidak sama dengan alam - yaitu, bahwa ada hirarki alami manusia. Postulat ini runtuh dengan munculnya ide hak alamiah dan asumsi dari kesetaraan tatanan alam di antara semua manusia. Terhadap Plato dan Aristoteles, rumus klasik keadilan yang menurut suatu tindakan hanya ketika ia menawarkan setiap individu nya karena mengambil makna substantif egaliter dalam perjalanan waktu, yaitu. semua orang layak martabat yang sama dan rasa hormat yang sama. Sekarang ini adalah konsepsi luas diadakan substantif, universal, kesetaraan moral. Ini dikembangkan antara Stoa, yang menekankan kesetaraan alami semua makhluk rasional, dan pada awal Perjanjian Baru Kristen, yang ditinggikan kesetaraan manusia di hadapan Allah untuk prinsip: satu untuk memastikan tidak selalu ditaati kemudian oleh gereja Kristen. Ide penting ini juga diambil baik dalam Talmud dan dalam Islam, di mana ia didasarkan pada kedua elemen Yunani dan Ibrani di kedua sistem. Pada periode modern, dimulai pada abad ketujuh belas, ide yang dominan adalah kesetaraan alami dalam tradisi hukum alam dan teori kontrak sosial. Hobbes (1651) mendalilkan bahwa dalam kondisi alami mereka, individu memiliki hak yang sama, karena dari waktu ke waktu mereka memiliki kapasitas yang sama untuk melakukan setiap bahaya lainnya. Locke (1690) berpendapat bahwa semua manusia memiliki hak alami yang sama untuk kedua (diri) kepemilikan dan kebebasan. Rousseau (1755) menyatakan ketimpangan sosial menjadi penurunan hampir purba dari ras manusia dari kesetaraan alami dalam keadaan yang harmonis alam: penurunan dikatalisasi oleh dorongan manusia untuk kesempurnaan, properti dan harta benda (Dahrendorf 1962). Untuk Rousseau (1755, 1762), ketimpangan dan aturan yang dihasilkan dari kekerasan hanya bisa diatasi dengan mengikat subjektivitas terbatas kepada keberadaan sipil umum dan kedaulatan rakyat. Dalam filsafat moral Kant (1785), imperatif kategoris merumuskan dalil persamaan nilai kemanusiaan universal. Refleksi transendental dan filosofis tentang otonomi dan self-undang mengarah pada pengakuan kebebasan yang sama bagi semua makhluk rasional sebagai satu-satunya prinsip hak asasi manusia (Kant 1797, p. 230). Ide Pencerahan seperti mendorong gerakan sosial yang besar modern dan revolusi, dan dibawa dalam konstitusi modern dan deklarasi hak asasi manusia. Selama Revolusi Perancis, kesetaraan - bersama dengan kebebasan dan persaudaraan - menjadi dasar Deklarasi des Droits de l'homme et du citoyen dari 1789. Prinsip martabat yang sama dan rasa hormat kini diterima sebagai standar minimum di seluruh budaya Barat mainstream. Beberapa kesalahpahaman tentang persamaan moral perlu diperjelas. Untuk mengatakan bahwa laki-laki adalah sama tidak berarti mereka adalah identik. Postulat kesetaraan menyiratkan bahwa di balik perbedaan jelas, entitas dikenali tertentu atau unit ada yang, berkat menjadi unit, dapat dikatakan 'sama.' (Thomson 1949, p. 4). Fundamental kesetaraan berarti bahwa orang-orang yang sama dalam hal penting yang relevan dan ditentukan sendiri, dan tidak bahwa mereka semua umumnya sama atau dapat diobati dengan cara yang sama (Nagel 1991). Dalam perbedaan sekarang umum diajukan, berasal dari Dworkin (1977, p. 370), persamaan moral dapat dipahami sebagai resep pengobatan orang sebagai sama, yaitu, dengan perhatian yang sama dan rasa hormat, dan tidak prinsip sering tidak masuk akal mengobati orang yang sama. Gagasan dasar rasa hormat yang sama bagi semua orang dan nilai yang sama atau martabat yang sama dari semua manusia (Vlastos 1962) diterima sebagai standar minimal oleh semua sekolah terkemuka budaya politik dan moral Barat modern. Setiap teori politik meninggalkan gagasan kesetaraan tidak akan ditemukan masuk akal hari ini. Pada periode di mana metafisik, agama dan tradisional dilihat kehilangan masuk akal umum mereka (Habermas 1983, hal. 53, 1992, hlm. 39-44), tampaknya tidak mungkin untuk damai mencapai kesepakatan umum tentang tujuan politik yang sama tanpa menerima bahwa orang-orang harus diperlakukan sebagai sederajat. Akibatnya, persamaan moral merupakan 'dataran egaliter' untuk semua contemp