Somewhat more promising is the permit trading program between point an terjemahan - Somewhat more promising is the permit trading program between point an Bahasa Indonesia Bagaimana mengatakan

Somewhat more promising is the perm

Somewhat more promising is the permit trading program between point and non-point pollution
sources at the Dillon Reservoir in Colorado. Under this system point sources are allowed to treat their effluents by less than required (drinking water) standards in exchange for reduction or treatment of non-point pollution sources. In the Dillon Reservoir case, the point sources are publicly owned sewage treatment plants, and the non-point sources are agricultural, recreational, and urban activities. The scope for trading arises from the lower marginal costs of treating discharges from nonpoint sources to some level (say from zero to 60% or 70%) compared to treating point discharges from 95%-98%, which requires new purification facilities. The fact that trading in this system is between the waste treatment facilities and the water authorities implies low transaction costs and hence easier implementation. Despite EPA estimates of cost savings of approximately $1 million a year, no trading has taken place since the program's inception in 1984.
The U.S. is currently considering the use of a tradeable permits system to control acid rain and to promote newspaper recycling. The SO 2 allowance trading system sets an 8.9 million ton per year national cap on SO 2 emissions from utilities beginning in 2000 to be reached in two phases (Joskow, 1991). 8.9 million SO 2 allowances (each allowance representing a ton of SO 2 ) will be issued and allocated freely to existing sources based on baseline fuel use and a specified emissions rate. (The available allowance for Phase II units is ratcheted down to meet the national cap on SO 2 emissions by the year 2000). To comply with the statute, each existing unit must hold allowances equal to or greater than their emissions during the year. Allowances can be traded within and between utilities as well as banked for future use. Thus, by allowing low-cost abaters to “over-comply” and sell surplus allowances and high-cost abaters to “under-comply” and purchase additional allowances to cover their deficit, the system aims to minimize the overall cost of compliance with the national SO 2 cap.
New sources must purchase allowances from existing sources. The estimated value of an allowance
is US$400-US$700, although the actual value would be determined by the market. Firms found to
produce excess emissions will have to purchase permits as well as pay a penalty of US$2,000 per
ton. Except for monitoring compliance and a small EPA auction and fixed-price sale (programs
involving less than 3% of Phase II allowances), the EPA's involvement in private market
arrangements will be minimal. For this very reason the program is expected to work better than earlier emission trading programs. Another reason is that monitoring technologies for SO 2 exist and firms are required to install continuous emission monitors.
The U.S. Congress is considering a marketable permit system to stimulate the recycling of old
newspapers. The bill under consideration requires producers and importers of newsprint to use an
increasing percentage of recycled fibers each year and hence a diminishing percentage of virgin pulp.
A system of marketable permits or credits would help the individual producers and importers meet the industry-wide percentage of recycled fiber content at a lower cost than uniform percentages. Dinan (1992) has studied the proposed system and concluded that the level of production under a
percentage-based permit system would be higher than under a quantity-based system and that the
cost savings are potentially high but their realization depends on: (a) level of compliance; (b)
competitiveness of the permit market; (c) transaction costs; and (d) the certainty regarding the
legitimacy of permits and the future prospects of the market for permits. At a somewhat superficial level, tradeable emission permits (TEP) appear to have little applicability to
developing countries. First, TEPs involve trading pollution rights in countries where even commodities are not freely traded in undistorted, competitive markets. Second, the system of TEPs seems to require a level of market sophistication and abstraction that does not exist in many developing countries. More damagingly, TEPs seem to require large data requirements and monitoring capabilities that are very scarce in developing countries. All of these criticisms are valid if developing countries attempt to copy the U.S. system of TEPs which is clearly overregulated and cumbersome.
The concept that is most useful to developing countries is the concept of earning and trading pollution credits among industries of differential abatement costs. First, because production costs vary more widely among developing country firms than among firms in developed countries, the gains from trading pollution credits are likely to be proportionately larger. Second, because the industry in developing countries is undergoing faster growth and structural change and has a wider scope for efficiency improvements than its developed country counterparts, the introduction of TEPs is more likely to lead to efficiency gains and structural changes than to increased cost of production and shifting of economic growth, especially if it is phased in over a period of 5-10 years. A developing country can begin by introducing TEPs for large domestic and foreign firms as well as public utilities. At a second stage, trades can also be established between point and non-point sources of pollution.By working with local industry associations, governments can reduce monitoring and enforcement costs. The application of these elements of the TEP are found in proposed pollution-abatement credit trading for Indonesia (see below) in support of the existing, but unmet, regulatory standards.
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Agak lebih menjanjikan adalah perdagangan program antara titik dan titik bebas polusi izinsumber-sumber di Dillon Reservoir di Colorado. Di bawah sistem ini sumber titik diperbolehkan untuk mengobati limbah mereka dengan standar kurang diperlukan (minum air) dengan imbalan pengurangan atau pengobatan titik bebas polusi sumber. Dalam kasus Dillon Reservoir, sumber titik publik dimiliki sewage treatment Plant, dan bebas-titik sumber adalah kegiatan pertanian, rekreasi, dan perkotaan. Cakupan perdagangan timbul dari lebih rendah biaya marjinal memperlakukan discharge dari sumber-sumber nonpoint untuk tingkat tertentu (katakanlah dari nol sampai 60% atau 70%) dibandingkan dengan mengobati titik discharge dari 95% - 98%, yang memerlukan fasilitas pemurnian baru. Fakta bahwa trading dalam sistem ini adalah antara fasilitas pengolahan limbah dan air otoritas berarti biaya transaksi yang rendah dan karenanya lebih mudah implementasi. Meskipun EPA perkiraan penghematan biaya sekitar $1 juta per tahun, tiada perdagangan telah terjadi sejak awal program pada tahun 1984.AS sedang mempertimbangkan penggunaan sistem tradeable izin untuk mengontrol hujan asam dan untuk mempromosikan daur ulang di koran. Sistem perdagangan yang diperbolehkan jadi 2 set 8,9 juta ton per tahun Nasional cap di jadi 2 emisi dari utilitas yang dimulai pada tahun 2000 untuk dicapai dalam dua tahap (Joskow, 1991). 8,9 juta sehingga 2 tunjangan (tunjangan masing-masing mewakili satu ton jadi 2) akan dikeluarkan dan dialokasikan secara bebas sumber-sumber yang ada didasarkan pada penggunaan bahan bakar dasar dan tingkat emisi ditetapkan. (Tersedia yang diperbolehkan untuk tahap II unit ratcheted mempertemukan topi Nasional emisi jadi 2 tahun 2000). Untuk mematuhi undang-undang, setiap unit yang ada harus memegang tunjangan sama atau lebih besar dari emisi mereka selama tahun. Tunjangan dapat diperdagangkan dalam dan antara utilitas serta Membelok untuk penggunaan masa depan. Dengan demikian, dengan membiarkan abaters biaya rendah untuk "over memenuhi" dan menjual kelebihan tunjangan dan biaya tinggi abaters "di bawah-memenuhi" dan pembelian tambahan tunjangan untuk menutupi defisit mereka, sistem yang bertujuan untuk meminimalkan biaya keseluruhan kepatuhan dengan tutup jadi 2 nasional. Sumber-sumber baru harus membeli tunjangan dari sumber yang ada. Perkiraan nilai uang sakuadalah US$ 400 - US$ 700, meskipun nilai aktual akan ditentukan oleh pasar. Perusahaan-perusahaan yang ditemukanmenghasilkan kelebihan emisi akan harus membeli izin serta membayar denda sebesar US$ 2.000 perton. Kecuali untuk memantau kepatuhan dan kecil EPA lelang dan harga tetap penjualan (programmelibatkan kurang dari 3% tunjangan tahap II), EPA keterlibatan dalam pasar swastapengaturan akan menjadi minimal. Untuk alasan ini, program ini diharapkan untuk bekerja lebih baik daripada sebelumnya emisi program trading. Alasan lain adalah bahwa ada pengawasan teknologi untuk jadi 2 dan perusahaan diminta untuk memasang monitor emisi yang terus-menerus.Kongres AS sedang mempertimbangkan sistem izin dipasarkan untuk merangsang daur ulang lamaSurat Kabar. Undang-undang di bawah pertimbangan memerlukan produsen dan importir dari kertas untuk menggunakanmeningkatkan persentase recycled serat setiap tahun dan karenanya persentase yang semakin berkurang perawan pulp.Sistem izin dipasarkan atau kredit akan membantu masing-masing produsen dan importir memenuhi industri-lebar persentase kadar serat daur ulang dengan biaya yang lebih rendah daripada persentase seragam. Dinan (1992) telah mempelajari sistem yang diusulkan dan menyimpulkan bahwa tingkat produksi di bawahpersentase berbasis izin sistem akan menjadi lebih tinggi daripada di bawah sebuah sistem berbasis kuantitas dan bahwapenghematan biaya berpotensi tinggi tetapi realisasi mereka tergantung pada: (a) tingkat kepatuhan; (b)daya saing dari pasar izin; (c) transaksi biaya; dan (d) kepastian mengenaikeabsahan izin dan prospek masa depan pasar untuk izin. Pada tingkat yang agak dangkal, tradeable emisi izin (TEP) tampaknya memiliki sedikit penerapan kenegara-negara berkembang. Pertama, sebuh melibatkan hak-hak polusi di negara-negara di mana bahkan komoditas yang tidak bebas diperdagangkan di pasar-pasar yang kompetitif, sekarang perdagangan. Kedua, sistem sebuh tampaknya membutuhkan tingkat kecanggihan pasar dan abstraksi yang tidak ada di banyak negara berkembang. Lebih damagingly, sebuh tampaknya membutuhkan persyaratan besar data dan kemampuan pemantauan yang sangat langka di negara berkembang. Kritik-kritik ini semua berlaku jika negara-negara berkembang yang mencoba untuk menyalin sistem US sebuh yang jelas overregulated dan rumit.Konsep yang paling berguna untuk negara-negara berkembang adalah konsep penghasilan dan perdagangan polusi kredit antara industri diferensial pengurangan biaya. Pertama, karena biaya produksi lebih bervariasi antara perusahaan negara berkembang daripada antara perusahaan di negara maju, keuntungan dari perdagangan kredit polusi cenderung menjadi besar. Kedua, karena industri di negara-negara berkembang sedang mengalami lebih cepat pertumbuhan dan struktural mengubah dan memiliki cakupan yang lebih luas untuk peningkatan efisiensi daripada rekan-rekan negara maju, pengenalan sebuh lebih cenderung mengarah untuk efisiensi dan perubahan struktural daripada peningkatan biaya produksi dan pergeseran pertumbuhan ekonomi, terutama jika itu adalah bertahap kurun waktu 5-10 tahun. Negara berkembang dapat mulai dengan memperkenalkan sebuh untuk perusahaan domestik dan asing yang besar serta utilitas publik. Pada tahap kedua, perdagangan dapat juga dibentuk antara titik dan bebas-titik sumber polusi.Dengan bekerja dengan industri lokal asosiasi, pemerintah dapat mengurangi biaya pengawasan dan penegakan. Penerapan elemen-elemen ini dari TEP ditemukan dalam pengurangan polusi yang diusulkan kredit perdagangan untuk Indonesia (Lihat di bawah) untuk mendukung yang ada, tetapi tidak terpenuhi, standar peraturan.
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Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:[Salinan]
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Somewhat more promising is the permit trading program between point and non-point pollution
sources at the Dillon Reservoir in Colorado. Under this system point sources are allowed to treat their effluents by less than required (drinking water) standards in exchange for reduction or treatment of non-point pollution sources. In the Dillon Reservoir case, the point sources are publicly owned sewage treatment plants, and the non-point sources are agricultural, recreational, and urban activities. The scope for trading arises from the lower marginal costs of treating discharges from nonpoint sources to some level (say from zero to 60% or 70%) compared to treating point discharges from 95%-98%, which requires new purification facilities. The fact that trading in this system is between the waste treatment facilities and the water authorities implies low transaction costs and hence easier implementation. Despite EPA estimates of cost savings of approximately $1 million a year, no trading has taken place since the program's inception in 1984.
The U.S. is currently considering the use of a tradeable permits system to control acid rain and to promote newspaper recycling. The SO 2 allowance trading system sets an 8.9 million ton per year national cap on SO 2 emissions from utilities beginning in 2000 to be reached in two phases (Joskow, 1991). 8.9 million SO 2 allowances (each allowance representing a ton of SO 2 ) will be issued and allocated freely to existing sources based on baseline fuel use and a specified emissions rate. (The available allowance for Phase II units is ratcheted down to meet the national cap on SO 2 emissions by the year 2000). To comply with the statute, each existing unit must hold allowances equal to or greater than their emissions during the year. Allowances can be traded within and between utilities as well as banked for future use. Thus, by allowing low-cost abaters to “over-comply” and sell surplus allowances and high-cost abaters to “under-comply” and purchase additional allowances to cover their deficit, the system aims to minimize the overall cost of compliance with the national SO 2 cap.
New sources must purchase allowances from existing sources. The estimated value of an allowance
is US$400-US$700, although the actual value would be determined by the market. Firms found to
produce excess emissions will have to purchase permits as well as pay a penalty of US$2,000 per
ton. Except for monitoring compliance and a small EPA auction and fixed-price sale (programs
involving less than 3% of Phase II allowances), the EPA's involvement in private market
arrangements will be minimal. For this very reason the program is expected to work better than earlier emission trading programs. Another reason is that monitoring technologies for SO 2 exist and firms are required to install continuous emission monitors.
The U.S. Congress is considering a marketable permit system to stimulate the recycling of old
newspapers. The bill under consideration requires producers and importers of newsprint to use an
increasing percentage of recycled fibers each year and hence a diminishing percentage of virgin pulp.
A system of marketable permits or credits would help the individual producers and importers meet the industry-wide percentage of recycled fiber content at a lower cost than uniform percentages. Dinan (1992) has studied the proposed system and concluded that the level of production under a
percentage-based permit system would be higher than under a quantity-based system and that the
cost savings are potentially high but their realization depends on: (a) level of compliance; (b)
competitiveness of the permit market; (c) transaction costs; and (d) the certainty regarding the
legitimacy of permits and the future prospects of the market for permits. At a somewhat superficial level, tradeable emission permits (TEP) appear to have little applicability to
developing countries. First, TEPs involve trading pollution rights in countries where even commodities are not freely traded in undistorted, competitive markets. Second, the system of TEPs seems to require a level of market sophistication and abstraction that does not exist in many developing countries. More damagingly, TEPs seem to require large data requirements and monitoring capabilities that are very scarce in developing countries. All of these criticisms are valid if developing countries attempt to copy the U.S. system of TEPs which is clearly overregulated and cumbersome.
The concept that is most useful to developing countries is the concept of earning and trading pollution credits among industries of differential abatement costs. First, because production costs vary more widely among developing country firms than among firms in developed countries, the gains from trading pollution credits are likely to be proportionately larger. Second, because the industry in developing countries is undergoing faster growth and structural change and has a wider scope for efficiency improvements than its developed country counterparts, the introduction of TEPs is more likely to lead to efficiency gains and structural changes than to increased cost of production and shifting of economic growth, especially if it is phased in over a period of 5-10 years. A developing country can begin by introducing TEPs for large domestic and foreign firms as well as public utilities. At a second stage, trades can also be established between point and non-point sources of pollution.By working with local industry associations, governments can reduce monitoring and enforcement costs. The application of these elements of the TEP are found in proposed pollution-abatement credit trading for Indonesia (see below) in support of the existing, but unmet, regulatory standards.
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