A unique feature of the NR affair w

A unique feature of the NR affair was the role of the government. When the supervisory
authorities’ announcement that the bank was solvent and safe failed to abate the run on
deposits, the government took the unprecedented move of guaranteeing all deposits at
NR irrespective of size. This latter requirement was also to be extended to all new
deposits and customers although a fee would be charged to NR plus a percentage of any
new deposit inflows. This was presumably to allow the bank to offer services to
customers while at the same time preventing the bank (shareholders) benefiting from
the BOE’s support.
In effect, the tax-payer absorbed the risk of NR becoming insolvent. In this event, the
government would effectively have claim over NR assets. It also implied that the taxpayer
took the risk of a fall in house prices which,in the event of insolvency,could mean that,
in the case of borrowers defaulting on high loan-value ratios, the value of some of the houses taken into government possession would be less than the defaulted mortgage.
This difference would be a cost to the tax-payer.

There are substantial implications of this unprecedented intervention by the government.
Firstly, it will have created a clear perception that depositors in any bank subject to a
run of deposits will be protected in full. In effect, depositor risk has effectively been
socialised and the DPS has been made redundant. Secondly, it undermines the credibility
of the formal DPS. Thirdly, it is likely to undermine the credibility of any subsequent
scheme that is likely to emerge. Fourthly, with de facto total protection cover, the
standard moral hazard has been intensified. For all these reasons, the long-run
implications of the unprecedented guarantee of the government are substantial.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

A unique feature of the NR affair was the role of the government. When the supervisory authorities’ announcement that the bank was solvent and safe failed to abate the run ondeposits, the government took the unprecedented move of guaranteeing all deposits atNR irrespective of size. This latter requirement was also to be extended to all newdeposits and customers although a fee would be charged to NR plus a percentage of anynew deposit inflows. This was presumably to allow the bank to offer services tocustomers while at the same time preventing the bank (shareholders) benefiting from the BOE’s support.In effect, the tax-payer absorbed the risk of NR becoming insolvent. In this event, the government would effectively have claim over NR assets. It also implied that the taxpayertook the risk of a fall in house prices which,in the event of insolvency,could mean that,in the case of borrowers defaulting on high loan-value ratios, the value of some of the houses taken into government possession would be less than the defaulted mortgage.This difference would be a cost to the tax-payer.There are substantial implications of this unprecedented intervention by the government.Firstly, it will have created a clear perception that depositors in any bank subject to arun of deposits will be protected in full. In effect, depositor risk has effectively been socialised and the DPS has been made redundant. Secondly, it undermines the credibility dari formal DPS. Ketiga, ada kemungkinan untuk merusak kredibilitas apapun berikutnya skema yang mungkin muncul. Keempat, dengan penutup perlindungan total secara de facto, standar moral hazard telah diintensifkan. Untuk semua alasan ini, jangka panjang implikasi dari jaminan yang belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya pemerintah substansial.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Sebuah fitur unik dari urusan NR adalah peran pemerintah. Ketika pengawas
pengumuman otoritas 'bahwa bank adalah pelarut dan aman gagal untuk mengurangi jangka pada
deposito, pemerintah mengambil langkah belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya untuk menjamin semua deposito di
NR terlepas dari ukuran. Persyaratan terakhir ini juga akan diperluas ke semua baru
deposito dan pelanggan meskipun biaya akan dibebankan NR ditambah persentase dari setiap
arus masuk deposito baru. Ini adalah mungkin untuk memungkinkan bank untuk menawarkan layanan kepada
pelanggan, sementara pada saat yang sama mencegah bank (pemegang saham) mendapatkan manfaat dari
dukungan BOE.
Akibatnya, pembayar pajak menyerap risiko NR menjadi bangkrut. Dalam acara ini,
pemerintah secara efektif akan memiliki klaim atas aset NR. Hal ini juga tersirat bahwa wajib pajak
mengambil risiko penurunan harga rumah yang, dalam hal kepailitan, bisa berarti bahwa,
dalam kasus peminjam default pada tinggi rasio pinjaman-nilai, nilai dari beberapa rumah dibawa ke pemerintah kepemilikan akan kurang dari hipotek macet.
Perbedaan ini akan menjadi biaya untuk pembayar pajak. Ada implikasi besar intervensi ini belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya oleh pemerintah. Pertama, itu akan menciptakan persepsi yang jelas bahwa deposan di setiap subjek Bank untuk run deposito akan dilindungi secara penuh. Akibatnya, risiko deposan secara efektif telah disosialisasikan dan DPS telah dibuat berlebihan. Kedua, merusak kredibilitas dari DPS formal. Ketiga, kemungkinan untuk merusak kredibilitas setiap selanjutnya skema yang mungkin muncul. Keempat, dengan de facto total tutupan perlindungan, yang moral hazard standar telah diintensifkan. Untuk semua alasan ini, jangka panjang implikasi dari jaminan belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya dari pemerintah yang cukup besar.