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Northern Rock Case Study1THE NORTHE

Northern Rock Case Study
1
THE NORTHERN ROCK CRISIS: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PROBLEM WAITING TO
HAPPEN
David T Llewellyn1
BACKGROUND
For three days in August 2007, the UK experienced its first run on a bank since Overend
and Gurney, the London wholesale discount bank in 1866. Around £3 billion of deposits
were withdrawn (around 11 percent of the bank’s total retail deposits) from a medium
sized bank – Northern Rock (NR). The unedifying spectacle of widely-publicised long
queues outside the bank’s branches testified to the bank’s serious problems. The NR
crisis was the first time the Bank of England (BOE), the UK’s central bank, had operated
its new money market regime in conditions of acute stress in financial markets, and it
was the first time it had acted as a lender-of-last-resort for many years.
Northern Rock (previously a UK mutual building society) converted to bank status in
1997. Without the previous constraints on its operating permissions, it acquired legal
powers to conduct the full range of banking business. However, it remained focussed
predominantly on the residential mortgage market. From the outset, it adopted a
securitisation and funding strategy which was increasingly based on secured wholesale
money (by issuing mortgage-backed securities) and other capital market funding.
Before considering the nature of the NR crisis, several points of perspective are noted at
the outset: the bank remained legally solvent (the nominal value of assets exceeding
liabilities), only months earlier the bank had reported record profits, the quality of its
assets was never in question, its loan-loss record was good by industry standards, and
for many years the bank was regarded as a star-performer in the financial markets.
Two problems emerged during the summer months of 2007: there was a generalised
lack of confidence in a particular asset class (mortgage bank securities) associated in
large part with developments in the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States;
and doubts emerged about the viability of the NR business model in particular.
In September 2007, NR was forced to seek substantial assistance from the BOE even
after the regulatory authorities, the UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the
Treasury (the UK government’s finance office), had given assurances that the bank was
solvent, and all deposits at the bank would be guaranteed.
THE CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL MARKET TURMOIL
The NR episode needs to be set in the context of the global financial market turbulence
experienced during the summer of 2007. Recent years have experienced an
unprecedented wave of complex financial innovation with the creation of new financial
instruments and vehicles. In the words of the BOE, this financial innovation had the
effect of “creating often opaque and complex financial instruments with high embedded
leverage” (BOE, 2007a). Two major instruments at the centre of the financial market
turmoil were Securitisation and Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs – instruments
created from a portfolio of asset-backed securities and then broken into tranches of
varying default risk with resulting varied prices): in both cases issue volumes rose
sharply in the years prior to the crisis. Figure 1 shows the sharp rise in European
securitisations, and figure 2 indicates the volume of global CDO issues and particularly
the sharp increase in 2006 and the first half of 2007, followed by an almost total collapse
in the summer months of that year.
Securitisation involves a bank bringing together a large number of its loans (e.g.
mortgages) into a single package and selling the portfolio into the capital market. The
portfolio might be bought by other financial institutions or by specially created Special
Purpose Vehicles, Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), or Conduits established by the
securitising bank itself. The buyer issues securities (e.g. FRNs, asset-backed commercial
1 Copyright David T Llewellwn
Northern Rock Case Study
2
paper, longer-term paper) which are rated by a rating agency according to the quality of
the underlying assets in the portfolio. In effect, the bank passes the loans to others, and
the strategy is often referred to as originate-and-distribute even though the purchaser
might be a specially-created bankruptcy-remote subsidiary of the bank itself. The bank
may offer a line of credit to the purchaser to be activated in the event that the buyer
encounters difficulty in renewing its short-term securities.
Figure 1
European securitisation (1998 -2005; € billions)
Figure 2
Global collateralised debt obligation issuance
Cagr = 35%
+78%
320
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Northern Rock Case Study
3
The global market financial turmoil during the summer of 2007 was triggered by
developments in the rapidly growing sub-prime mortgage (SPM) market in the US. A
high proportion of such mortgage loans were securitised and also combined into
instruments such as CDOs. These in turn were rated by rating agencies although, in
hindsight, in a misleading way in that a CDO would be given a high rating based on only
the small proportion of loans within it that was low risk.
The mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and CDOs were purchased by banks around the
world, hedge funds, and conduits established by banks either for themselves or clients.
Such purchases were funded in the main by the issue of short term securities (e.g.
asset-backed commercial paper) and in some cases received lines of credit from banks
including banks initiating securitisation programmes.
Problems emerged at various times during 2007 as a result of a combination of factors:
a decline in house prices in the US, the impact of the earlier rise in US interest rates,
large-scale defaults on SPMs (during 2007 repossession in the US reached a thirty-seven
year high), and a sharp decline in the prices of mortgage-backed securities.
Above all, both the primary and secondary markets in SPM securities effectively closed
and concern developed over the exposure of some banks in the market. There was
uncertainty, for instance, about which banks were holding MBSs and CDOs. In particular,
some banks who were dependent on securitisation programmes encountered serious
funding problems because of all these uncertainties. Issuing banks and their conduits
faced both a liquidity constraint and a rise in the cost of funding as it became
increasingly difficult to roll-over short-term debt issues. Liquidity in the inter-bank
markets also weakened and a tiering of interest rates emerged during the summer.
Banks encountered funding difficulties because of their uncertain exposure to the
weakening MBS market, or because of their commitment to provide lines of credit to
MBS holders. There was also concern that some banks would be required to hold on their
balance sheets mortgage assets they had originally intended to securitise and sell.
Overall, there was a sharp movement away from the MBS market.
All of this created considerable market uncertainty in the summer months of 2007 which
lead to a sharp fall in many asset classes, considerable uncertainty as to the risk
exposure of banks, credit markets dried up and most especially those focussed on asset
backed securities, and liquidity dried up in the markets for MBSs and CDOs. Overall,
there was considerable uncertainty regarding the true value of credit instruments (partly
because the market had virtually ceased to function effectively) and the risk exposure of
banks. As a result, a loss of confidence developed in the value of all asset-backed
securities on a global basis. This was the general context of some banks (and notably
NR) facing funding problems.
The liquidity problem became serious because securitisation vehicles such as conduits
and SIVs were funding the acquisition of long-term mortgages (and other loans) by
issuing short-term debt instruments such as asset-backed commercial paper. As liquidity
dried up, banks could not finance their off-balance-sheet vehicles and were forced to
take assets back on to the balance sheet or hold on to assets they were planning to
securitise. This effectively amounts to a process of re-intermediation.
Although NR was not exposed to the US SPM market, it became caught up in all this
because of its business model: securitisation as a central strategy, and reliance on shortterm
money market funding. It faced several related problems: it could not securitise
and sell new mortgage assets and hence needed to keep assets on the balance sheet
that it had intended to sell, and it faced a sharp rise in interest rates in the money
market with the result that borrowing costs (even in the event that it could borrow at all)
rose above the yield on its mortgage assets.
The most serious dimension from a systemic point of view was the run on deposits at
NR. Clearly, statements to the effect that the bank was solvent did not convince
Northern Rock Case Study
4
depositors. In any case, a bank run can be rational if all depositors believe the bank is
solvent but also believe that all other depositors believe it is not.
THE RESCUE OPERATION
A traditional role of a central bank is to act as a lender-of-last-resort (LLR) to illiquid
solvent banks. In order to limit the moral hazard, this is done against good quality
collateral and at a penalty rate of interest. In order not to aggravate a temporary
liquidity problem of a bank by panicking depositors to withdraw funds, in the past in the
UK this has been done on a covert basis and without publicity at the time. The BOE now
judges (though this has been challenged by the European Commission) that current
requirements of transparency mean that any such support must be public.
In the UK, the ultimate responsibility for authorisation of support operations by the BOE
in a financial crisis rests with the Chancellor of the Exchequer (UK equivalent to the
minister of finance). There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is a political
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Studi kasus Northern Rock1KRISIS NORTHERN ROCK: MASALAH MULTI-DIMENSI MENUNGGU UNTUKTERJADIDavid T Llewellyn1LATAR BELAKANGSelama tiga hari pada bulan Agustus 2007, Inggris mengalami menjalankan pertama di bank sejak Overenddan Gurney, bank diskon Grosir London pada tahun 1866. Di sekitar £3 miliar depositoyang ditarik (sekitar 11 persen dari total ritel deposito) dari mediaukuran bank-Northern Rock (NR). Tontonan unedifying luas-dipublikasikan lamaantrian di luar cabang bank menyaksikan bank masalah serius. NRkrisis adalah pertama kalinya Bank of England (BOE), bank sentral Inggris, telah dioperasikanpasar uang rezim yang baru dalam kondisi stres akut di pasar keuangan, dankali pertama itu telah bertindak sebagai pemberi pinjaman-dari-terakhir-resor selama bertahun-tahun.Northern Rock (sebelumnya UK saling membangun masyarakat) dikonversi ke status bank di1997. tanpa kendala sebelumnya pada izin operasi yang, memperoleh hukumkewenangan untuk melakukan berbagai macam bisnis perbankan. Namun, itu tetap terfokusdominan di pasar perumahan hipotek. Dari awal, mengadopsisekuritisasi dan pendanaan strategi yang semakin berdasarkan dijamin Grosiruang (dengan mengeluarkan mortgage-backed securities) dan dana pasar modal lain.Sebelum mempertimbangkan sifat krisis NR, beberapa poin dari perspektif dicatat diawal: bank tetap hukum pelarut (dengan nilai nominal aset melebihiliabilities), only months earlier the bank had reported record profits, the quality of itsassets was never in question, its loan-loss record was good by industry standards, andfor many years the bank was regarded as a star-performer in the financial markets.Two problems emerged during the summer months of 2007: there was a generalisedlack of confidence in a particular asset class (mortgage bank securities) associated inlarge part with developments in the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States;and doubts emerged about the viability of the NR business model in particular.In September 2007, NR was forced to seek substantial assistance from the BOE evenafter the regulatory authorities, the UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) and theTreasury (the UK government’s finance office), had given assurances that the bank wassolvent, and all deposits at the bank would be guaranteed.THE CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL MARKET TURMOILThe NR episode needs to be set in the context of the global financial market turbulenceexperienced during the summer of 2007. Recent years have experienced anunprecedented wave of complex financial innovation with the creation of new financialinstruments and vehicles. In the words of the BOE, this financial innovation had theeffect of “creating often opaque and complex financial instruments with high embeddedleverage” (BOE, 2007a). Two major instruments at the centre of the financial marketturmoil were Securitisation and Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs – instrumentscreated from a portfolio of asset-backed securities and then broken into tranches ofvarying default risk with resulting varied prices): in both cases issue volumes rosesharply in the years prior to the crisis. Figure 1 shows the sharp rise in Europeansecuritisations, and figure 2 indicates the volume of global CDO issues and particularlythe sharp increase in 2006 and the first half of 2007, followed by an almost total collapsein the summer months of that year.Securitisation involves a bank bringing together a large number of its loans (e.g.mortgages) into a single package and selling the portfolio into the capital market. Theportfolio might be bought by other financial institutions or by specially created SpecialPurpose Vehicles, Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), or Conduits established by thesecuritising bank itself. The buyer issues securities (e.g. FRNs, asset-backed commercial1 Copyright David T LlewellwnNorthern Rock Case Study2paper, longer-term paper) which are rated by a rating agency according to the quality ofthe underlying assets in the portfolio. In effect, the bank passes the loans to others, andthe strategy is often referred to as originate-and-distribute even though the purchasermight be a specially-created bankruptcy-remote subsidiary of the bank itself. The bankmay offer a line of credit to the purchaser to be activated in the event that the buyerencounters difficulty in renewing its short-term securities.Figure 1European securitisation (1998 -2005; € billions)Figure 2Global collateralised debt obligation issuanceCagr = 35%+78%3200501001502002503003501998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005Northern Rock Case Study3The global market financial turmoil during the summer of 2007 was triggered bydevelopments in the rapidly growing sub-prime mortgage (SPM) market in the US. Ahigh proportion of such mortgage loans were securitised and also combined intoinstruments such as CDOs. These in turn were rated by rating agencies although, inhindsight, in a misleading way in that a CDO would be given a high rating based on onlythe small proportion of loans within it that was low risk.The mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and CDOs were purchased by banks around theworld, hedge funds, and conduits established by banks either for themselves or clients.Such purchases were funded in the main by the issue of short term securities (e.g.asset-backed commercial paper) and in some cases received lines of credit from banksincluding banks initiating securitisation programmes.Problems emerged at various times during 2007 as a result of a combination of factors:a decline in house prices in the US, the impact of the earlier rise in US interest rates,large-scale defaults on SPMs (during 2007 repossession in the US reached a thirty-sevenyear high), and a sharp decline in the prices of mortgage-backed securities.Above all, both the primary and secondary markets in SPM securities effectively closedand concern developed over the exposure of some banks in the market. There wasuncertainty, for instance, about which banks were holding MBSs and CDOs. In particular,some banks who were dependent on securitisation programmes encountered seriousfunding problems because of all these uncertainties. Issuing banks and their conduitsfaced both a liquidity constraint and a rise in the cost of funding as it becameincreasingly difficult to roll-over short-term debt issues. Liquidity in the inter-bankmarkets also weakened and a tiering of interest rates emerged during the summer.Banks encountered funding difficulties because of their uncertain exposure to theweakening MBS market, or because of their commitment to provide lines of credit toMBS holders. There was also concern that some banks would be required to hold on theirbalance sheets mortgage assets they had originally intended to securitise and sell.Overall, there was a sharp movement away from the MBS market.All of this created considerable market uncertainty in the summer months of 2007 whichlead to a sharp fall in many asset classes, considerable uncertainty as to the riskexposure of banks, credit markets dried up and most especially those focussed on assetbacked securities, and liquidity dried up in the markets for MBSs and CDOs. Overall,there was considerable uncertainty regarding the true value of credit instruments (partlybecause the market had virtually ceased to function effectively) and the risk exposure of
banks. As a result, a loss of confidence developed in the value of all asset-backed
securities on a global basis. This was the general context of some banks (and notably
NR) facing funding problems.
The liquidity problem became serious because securitisation vehicles such as conduits
and SIVs were funding the acquisition of long-term mortgages (and other loans) by
issuing short-term debt instruments such as asset-backed commercial paper. As liquidity
dried up, banks could not finance their off-balance-sheet vehicles and were forced to
take assets back on to the balance sheet or hold on to assets they were planning to
securitise. This effectively amounts to a process of re-intermediation.
Although NR was not exposed to the US SPM market, it became caught up in all this
because of its business model: securitisation as a central strategy, and reliance on shortterm
money market funding. It faced several related problems: it could not securitise
and sell new mortgage assets and hence needed to keep assets on the balance sheet
that it had intended to sell, and it faced a sharp rise in interest rates in the money
market with the result that borrowing costs (even in the event that it could borrow at all)
rose above the yield on its mortgage assets.
The most serious dimension from a systemic point of view was the run on deposits at
NR. Clearly, statements to the effect that the bank was solvent did not convince
Northern Rock Case Study
4
depositors. In any case, a bank run can be rational if all depositors believe the bank is
solvent but also believe that all other depositors believe it is not.
THE RESCUE OPERATION
A traditional role of a central bank is to act as a lender-of-last-resort (LLR) to illiquid
solvent banks. In order to limit the moral hazard, this is done against good quality
collateral and at a penalty rate of interest. In order not to aggravate a temporary
liquidity problem of a bank by panicking depositors to withdraw funds, in the past in the
UK this has been done on a covert basis and without publicity at the time. The BOE now
judges (though this has been challenged by the European Commission) that current
requirements of transparency mean that any such support must be public.
In the UK, the ultimate responsibility for authorisation of support operations by the BOE
in a financial crisis rests with the Chancellor of the Exchequer (UK equivalent to the
minister of finance). There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is a political
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Northern Rock Studi Kasus
1
THE NORTHERN ROCK KRISIS: MASALAH MULTI-DIMENSI MENUNGGU UNTUK
TERJADI
David T Llewellyn1
LATAR BELAKANG
Selama tiga hari pada bulan Agustus 2007, Inggris mengalami run pertama pada bank sejak Overend
dan Gurney, diskon wholesale bank London pada tahun 1866 . Sekitar £ 3 miliar deposito
ditarik (sekitar 11 persen dari total deposito ritel bank) dari media
berukuran Bank - Northern Rock (NR). Tontonan tidak membangun dari banyak dipublikasikan panjang
antrian di luar cabang bank bersaksi untuk masalah serius bank. NR
krisis adalah pertama kalinya Bank of England (BOE), bank sentral Inggris, telah beroperasi
rezim baru pasar uang dalam kondisi stres akut di pasar keuangan, dan itu
adalah pertama kalinya ia telah bertindak sebagai pemberi pinjaman-dari -Terakhir-resort selama bertahun-tahun.
Northern Rock (sebelumnya masyarakat saling bangunan UK) dikonversi menjadi bank di
1997. Tanpa kendala sebelumnya pada izin operasi, mengakuisisi hukum
kekuasaan untuk melakukan berbagai macam bisnis perbankan. Namun, tetap difokuskan
terutama pada pasar hipotek perumahan. Dari awal, itu mengadopsi
strategi sekuritisasi dan pendanaan yang semakin berdasarkan grosir dijamin
uang (dengan menerbitkan surat berharga berbasis mortgage) dan pendanaan pasar modal lainnya.
Sebelum mempertimbangkan sifat krisis NR, beberapa poin dari perspektif dicatat di
dalam awal: bank tetap pelarut secara hukum (nilai nominal aset melebihi
kewajiban), hanya beberapa bulan sebelumnya bank telah melaporkan rekor keuntungan, kualitas yang
aset tidak pernah dipertanyakan, rekor pinjaman-kerugian baik oleh standar industri, dan
untuk bertahun-tahun bank dianggap sebagai bintang-pemain di pasar keuangan.
Dua masalah muncul selama bulan-bulan musim panas 2007: ada umum
kurangnya kepercayaan di kelas aset tertentu (surat berharga bank hipotek) terkait di
sebagian besar dengan perkembangan pasar hipotek sub-prime di Amerika Serikat;
dan keraguan muncul tentang kelangsungan hidup model bisnis NR khususnya.
Pada bulan September 2007, NR terpaksa mencari bantuan substansial dari BOE bahkan
setelah pihak berwenang, Inggris Financial Services Authority (FSA) dan
Treasury (kantor keuangan pemerintah Inggris), telah memberikan jaminan bahwa bank adalah
pelarut, dan semua deposito di bank akan dijamin.
KONTEKS gejolak pasar keuangan
The NR episode perlu diatur dalam konteks gejolak pasar keuangan global
yang dialami selama musim panas 2007. Beberapa tahun terakhir telah mengalami
gelombang belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya inovasi keuangan yang kompleks dengan penciptaan keuangan baru
instrumen dan kendaraan. Dalam kata-kata BOE, inovasi keuangan ini memiliki
efek "menciptakan instrumen keuangan sering buram dan kompleks dengan tertanam tinggi
leverage yang" (BOE, 2007a). Dua instrumen utama di pusat pasar keuangan
gejolak yang Sekuritisasi dan dijamin Kewajiban Utang (CDO - instrumen
dibuat dari portofolio efek beragun aset dan kemudian dipecah menjadi tahapan
yang bervariasi risiko gagal bayar dengan menghasilkan harga bervariasi): dalam kedua kasus volume masalah naik
tajam pada tahun-tahun sebelum krisis. Gambar 1 menunjukkan kenaikan tajam dalam Eropa
securitisations, dan angka 2 menunjukkan volume isu CDO global dan khususnya
peningkatan tajam pada tahun 2006 dan semester pertama tahun 2007, diikuti oleh runtuhnya hampir total
di musim panas tahun itu.
Sekuritisasi melibatkan bank menyatukan sejumlah besar pinjaman (misalnya
KPR) ke dalam satu paket dan menjual portofolio ke pasar modal. The
portofolio mungkin dibeli oleh lembaga keuangan lainnya atau dengan khusus diciptakan khusus
Kendaraan Purpose, Kendaraan Investasi Terstruktur (SIVs), atau Saluran ditetapkan oleh
Bank securitising sendiri. Pembeli mengeluarkan surat berharga (misalnya FRN, komersial beragun aset
1 Hak Cipta David T Llewellwn
Northern Rock Studi Kasus
2
kertas, kertas jangka panjang) yang dinilai oleh lembaga pemeringkat sesuai dengan kualitas
aset yang mendasari dalam portofolio. Akibatnya, bank melewati pinjaman kepada orang lain, dan
strategi sering disebut sebagai berasal-dan-mendistribusikan meskipun pembeli
mungkin khusus diciptakan anak kebangkrutan-jauh dari bank itu sendiri. Bank
dapat menawarkan jalur kredit untuk pembeli akan diaktifkan dalam hal pembeli
bertemu kesulitan dalam memperbaharui surat berharga jangka pendek.
Gambar 1
sekuritisasi Eropa (1998 -2005; € miliaran)
Gambar 2
global kewajiban utang collateralised penerbitan
CAGR = 35%
+ 78%
320
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Northern Rock Studi Kasus
3
Pasar gejolak keuangan global selama musim panas tahun 2007 dipicu oleh
perkembangan di subprime mortgage yang berkembang pesat (SPM) pasar di AS. Sebuah
proporsi yang tinggi dari pinjaman hipotek seperti itu sekuritas dan juga digabungkan menjadi
instrumen seperti CDO. Ini pada gilirannya dinilai oleh lembaga pemeringkat meskipun, di
belakang, dengan cara menyesatkan dalam bahwa CDO akan diberi rating tinggi berdasarkan hanya
proporsi kecil dari pinjaman di dalamnya yang berisiko rendah.
The sekuritas berbasis mortgage (MBS) dan CDO dibeli oleh bank-bank di seluruh
dunia, hedge fund, dan saluran yang didirikan oleh bank baik untuk diri sendiri atau klien.
pembelian tersebut didanai di utama oleh isu sekuritas jangka pendek (misalnya
beragun aset surat berharga) dan dalam beberapa kasus menerima jalur kredit dari bank
termasuk bank memulai program sekuritisasi.
Masalah muncul di berbagai kali selama tahun 2007 sebagai hasil dari kombinasi faktor:
penurunan harga rumah di AS, dampak dari kenaikan sebelumnya di suku bunga AS,
besar- default skala pada SPMs (selama tahun 2007 kepemilikan di AS mencapai tiga puluh tujuh
tahun tinggi) penurunan, dan tajam dalam harga sekuritas berbasis mortgage.
Di atas semua, baik di pasar primer dan sekunder pada efek SPM secara efektif ditutup
dan kepedulian dikembangkan selama eksposur beberapa bank di pasar. Ada
ketidakpastian, misalnya, tentang yang bank memegang MBSS dan CDO. Secara khusus,
beberapa bank yang tergantung pada program sekuritisasi mengalami serius
masalah pendanaan karena semua ketidakpastian ini. Menerbitkan bank dan saluran mereka
menghadapi kedua kendala likuiditas dan kenaikan biaya pendanaan karena menjadi
semakin sulit untuk roll-over masalah utang jangka pendek. Likuiditas di antar bank
pasar juga melemah dan tiering suku bunga muncul selama musim panas.
Bank mengalami kesulitan pendanaan karena paparan pasti mereka ke
MBS pasar melemah, atau karena komitmen mereka untuk menyediakan jalur kredit untuk
pemegang MBS. Ada juga kekhawatiran bahwa beberapa bank akan diperlukan untuk mempertahankan mereka
aset neraca hipotek mereka awalnya ditujukan untuk securitise dan menjual.
Secara keseluruhan, ada gerakan tajam dari pasar MBS.
Semua ini menciptakan ketidakpastian pasar yang cukup besar di musim panas bulan tahun 2007 yang
menyebabkan penurunan tajam di banyak kelas aset, ketidakpastian untuk risiko
eksposur bank, pasar kredit mengering dan paling terutama yang difokuskan pada aset
sekuritas yang didukung, dan likuiditas mengering di pasar untuk MBSS dan CDO. Secara keseluruhan,
ada ketidakpastian mengenai nilai sebenarnya dari instrumen kredit (sebagian
karena pasar telah hampir berhenti berfungsi secara efektif) dan eksposur risiko
bank. Akibatnya, hilangnya kepercayaan dikembangkan di nilai semua aset-didukung
sekuritas secara global. Ini adalah konteks umum beberapa bank (dan terutama
NR) menghadapi masalah pendanaan.
Masalah likuiditas menjadi serius karena kendaraan sekuritisasi seperti saluran
dan SIVs mendanai akuisisi hipotek jangka panjang (dan pinjaman lainnya) oleh
menerbitkan utang jangka pendek instrumen seperti surat berharga beragun aset. Likuiditas
kering, bank tidak bisa membiayai kendaraan off-balance-sheet mereka dan dipaksa untuk
mengambil aset kembali ke neraca atau mempertahankan aset mereka berencana untuk
securitise. Ini secara efektif sebesar proses re-intermediasi.
Meskipun NR tidak terkena pasar AS SPM, menjadi terjebak dalam semua ini
karena model bisnis: sekuritisasi sebagai strategi utama, dan ketergantungan pada jangka pendek
dana pasar uang. Menghadapi beberapa masalah terkait: tidak bisa securitise
dan menjual aset hipotek baru dan karenanya dibutuhkan untuk menjaga aset pada neraca
yang berniat untuk menjual, dan menghadapi kenaikan tajam suku bunga di uang
pasar dengan hasil yang meminjam biaya (bahkan dalam hal itu bisa meminjam sama sekali)
naik di atas imbal hasil aset hipotek nya.
Dimensi yang paling serius dari sudut pandang sistemik adalah jangka deposito di
NR. Jelas, pernyataan yang menyatakan bahwa bank itu pelarut tidak meyakinkan
Northern Rock Studi Kasus
4
deposan. Dalam kasus apapun, menjalankan bank yang dapat rasional jika semua deposan percaya bank
pelarut tetapi juga percaya bahwa semua deposan lain percaya itu tidak.
THE RESCUE OPERASI
Peran tradisional dari bank sentral untuk bertindak sebagai pemberi pinjaman-of-terakhir -resort (LLR) untuk tidak likuid
bank pelarut. Untuk membatasi moral hazard, hal ini dilakukan terhadap kualitas baik
jaminan dan pada tingkat hukuman bunga. Agar tidak memperburuk sementara
masalah likuiditas bank dengan panik deposan menarik dana, di masa lalu di
Inggris ini telah dilakukan secara rahasia dan tanpa publisitas pada saat itu. BOE sekarang
hakim (meskipun ini telah ditantang oleh Komisi Eropa) yang saat ini
persyaratan transparansi berarti bahwa dukungan tersebut harus publik.
Di Inggris, tanggung jawab utama untuk otorisasi operasi dukungan oleh BOE
dalam krisis keuangan terletak pada Kanselir Menteri Keuangan Britania Raya (Inggris setara dengan
menteri keuangan). Ada dua alasan untuk ini. Pertama, itu adalah politik
Sedang diterjemahkan, harap tunggu..
 
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