CONCLUSIONSThis article has examine

CONCLUSIONS

This article has examined how efforts to come to grips with mineral governance challenges expose a variety of institutional ambiguities and political conundrums, with pragmatic deci- sion-making rendered convoluted as attempts at conceptualiz- ing the “informal mining sector” and local rights in this context vary considerably. Some scholars stress the incessant risks of uncontrolled informal labor, portraying rural popula- tions as culprits that encroach upon other people’s land. Other critics blame deeply entrenched attitudes and long-established patterns of ignoring poorer labor groups’ concerns while championing the concerns of large corporations and govern- ment elites. Evidently, central and local government authori- ties have not been as effective as the much-debated legislative reforming activities might lead one to expect, and in some cases they have actively worked against each other. Given the still-evolving opportunities for district-level man- agement in the wake of Indonesia’s Autonomy Laws, experi- ences need to be shared and discussed critically. On one hand, the UN development agencies’ attempts to promote lo- cal rights may have helped in some small and symbolic way to promote short term district-level consensus-building regarding the legalization of informal livelihoods in Central Kalimantan; yet, it ultimately produced conspicuously ambiguous results when it comes to actually moving toward the goal of empow- ering vulnerable groups. Just as the decentralization of power from national to district authorities has had mixed blessings, development interventions themselves remain filled with com- plexities that call into question whether community-based re- source management can work as a coherent development strategy for minerals, and whether rural groups can be effec- tive in resisting powerful international pressures that favor of large companies and centralized control over rural re- sources.
While Bebbington, Hinojosa, et al. (2008) urged for more attention to regional nuances in how social movements resist neo-liberal influences in the expansion of the mining industry, my study re-iterates this important call. My analysis has also emphasized the need for an even more disaggregated and mul- ti-dimensional notion of the “mining sector” to begin with, particularly to appreciate the diverse participants who depend on small-scale mining for income. Rural groups can be mar- ginalized precisely because popular resource management/ rights discourses oversimplify complexity and perpetuate a sense of homogeneous, “illegal” identities. Political tensions in Indonesia also illustrate why the notion of “governance
failure” itself should be re-interpreted critically when we begin to theorize about mineral resources. Although government agents are frequently regarded as “weak and failing” when enforcing resource laws, patterns of police involvement in Gal- angan illustrate the need to understand political and economic interests in perpetuating informality. The case highlights a power dynamic where elites benefit not only from “state fail- ures” but from perilous global development ideologies that perpetuate inequalities by prioritizing the enforcement of existing property rights as a generic solution to rural lawless- ness. The escalation of police crackdowns in 2010, in Galan- gan and elsewhere, therefore, need to be understood precisely with these political and economic dimensions in mind, and scholars need to better integrate small-scale miners’ concerns when discussing extractive sector reform. While scholars in some countries have encouraged donors to assist the small-scale mining sector, recognizing it is “comprised of individuals who are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty, lack- ing the necessary financial and technological means to im- prove their standards of living” (Hilson & Pardie, 2006, p. 106), the present study has shown that the empowerment of vulnerable mining groups in Indonesia remains an immense challenge if this requires altering an entrenched power dy- namic of winners and losers. Reducing emphasis on police crackdowns in resource management strategies could at least help avert some of the kinds of conflict that have been seen as problems for marginalized workforces. The case of Galan- gan also suggests that legalizing some small-scale mining can help to ensure that environmental destruction does not expand in new forested areas. Rather than oscillating between too harsh a crackdown and too pithy a response, government agents need to cultivate balanced approaches, with policies carefully guided by region-specific research.
It can be concluded that Indonesia’s mineral policies illus- trate a trend that is common to many developing countries: privilege has recurrently been given to foreign investment strategies with poor regard for local miners. Mechanisms for local administration and environmental oversight were poorly built into Indonesia’s early umbrella policies for resource man- agement, and although recent revisions to mining laws ad- dressed and updated the “KP” clause, they still have given no policy framework for how to develop small-scale mining through “community management” as modern development ideologies theoretically seem to prioritize. It may well be con- cluded that key government institutions in Indonesia have never sufficiently invested in supporting local rights and labor assistance systems in mining communities. Yet, the role of managing revenues from extractive activities is likely to con- tinue to constitute a closely watched area in future research and policy debate and could have influences in altering institu- tional options. District governments in Indonesia are still learning what their responsibilities are, and after all, remain still in a relatively early stage of deciding what to do with increasing mining revenues (Otto et al., 2006). In my study, interviewees suggested the idea that future UN projects should encourage local governments to set aside specific tax revenues for community development programs to educate and assist informal workers. This sort of trajectory might perhaps one day be pursued, but interviewees suggest this will only happen if donors and governments both agree to focus on actively supporting what has traditionally been seen as a “dirty” sector for rural development—small-scale mining—which remains far less fashionable when compared to other sector (e.g., agri- cultural) assistance programs. While neither large sums of money nor more bureaucracy necessarily advance develop- ment at the district level, policymakers would be advised to

learn from different regional experiences. The UN’s inability to gain authorization and access to assist illegal miners at a site in North Sulawesi, as discussed, can be compared with the col- laborative (but short-lived) UN development programs in Central Kalimantan; this may be illustrative of how collabora- tion in mining regulation has a great deal of unevenness geo- graphically, the implications of which remain under-studied.
Finally, efforts to develop regulatory oversight and coordi- nation are inexorably hampered by difficulties in gaining ac- cess to the very places where assistance is most needed. Combined with logistical challenges (e.g., remote mining set- tlements), regional governments clearly lack qualified staffs to carry out monitoring functions. The multiplication of departmental roles also hampers systematic, transparent and uniform regulatory programing. Any idealistic notion of “indigenous empowerment” or “community-based man- agement” becomes particularly complicated given conflicting ideas about the porous and murky boundaries of what con- stitutes “mining community” in rural places where distinc- tions between informal/formal governance arrangements, migrant/indigenous labor dynamics and legal/illegal activi- ties are blurry. To help clarify a small part of the blurriness, detailed mapping of mining areas and geological deposits might help to locate areas where the government might be willing to legalize small-scale mining (hypothetically, the Galangan area); but alternatively, it might do the opposite, helping to fuel future police crackdowns and serve as a dis- traction from social concerns within mining communities, the complexities of which international institutions often overlook. To support effective and equitable approaches, researchers and donor agencies need to recognize that “poor understanding of artisanal mine community dynamics and operators’ needs has, in a number of cases, led to the design and implementation of inappropriate industry support schemes and interventions” (Hilson, 2007, p. 235). While researchers need to link rigorous analysis of diverse power dynamics that shape labor challenges for mineworkers, it is high time to recognize that problems with mineral re- source management occur to a large degree because experts
and policymakers often neglect locally articulated priorities, and that “if we are to live in a peaceful, just, and balanced modern social world we can no longer deny people their rights to their own cultures, ecologies, and economies (Esco- bar, 2006, p. 6).
To conclude, understanding governance and rights regimes in Indonesia’s informal mining context requires that analysts recognize rural development dynamics through conceptual lenses that are considerably more multi-dimensional than those that emphasize illegality on local scales. While dominant discourses continue to emphasize a need for law enforcement, this study has emphasized that the multiplication, overlap and ambiguity in the roles of government institutions, and the lack of understanding about inter-linkages between local labor rights and environmental management, have perpetuated a more fundamental development problem: the failure to assist rural workers in their livelihood trajectories. Scholars should