Conserving Biodiversity: Transferab

Conserving Biodiversity: Transferable Development Rights
Much of the conflict between developed and developing countries concerning the conservation of
biodiversity arises from a failure to distinguish between ownership and the spatial exercise of
development rights. The treatment of biodiversity as a global rather than national resource and the pressures to conserve it are perceived by developing countries as a challenge to their ownership and sovereignty over these resources. If, however, the primary purpose of efforts to protect biodiversity is conservation, not redistribution of resources, the first step is to recognize the ownership of developing countries over these resources and their right to develop them in order to maximize their own benefits.
The only negotiable issue then is the terms by which the development rights over critical habitats would voluntarily be transferred elsewhere in the country or abroad.
The concept of transferable development rights (TDRs) makes possible the creation of conservation areas without the need for assessment of land values and compensation: it simply creates a market with the demand and supply of development rights that results in an equilibrium price at which exchange or transfer takes place.
In principle, there is no reason why TDRs cannot be used internationally to transfer development
rights between countries. Tropical countries could set aside habitats for biodiversity conservation and divide each habitat into a number of TDRs, corresponding to an area unit, say, a hectare. Each TDR would state the location, condition, diversity, and degree of protection of the habitat and any special rights that it conveys to the buyer/holder. TDRs could then be offered for sale both locally and internationally at an initial offer price that covers fully the opportunity cost of the corresponding land unit (i.e., the net present value of the income stream of the foregone development opportunity). It is preferable to start at a relatively high price to test the market, since undervaluation is irreversible (following sale) while overvaluation is reversible (following non-sale). If the price turns out to be too
low to clear the market (i.e., to exhaust the supplied TDRs for a particular habitat), the price could be lowered to attract additional demand or the quality of the TDR can be enhanced by enlarging the area to include additional biodiversity values or by improving its protection and management.
The potential buyers of TDRs include local and international environmental organizations, local and international foundations and corporations, developed country governments, chemical and
pharmaceutical companies, scientific societies, universities and research institutions, and even
environmentally minded individuals from the developed countries. The motivation for purchasing
TDRs would naturally vary among prospective buyers. Some may have direct use values such as
prospecting for new chemicals or pharmaceuticals. Others may be expressing their non-use values
through the purchase of TDRs. Yet others might buy and hold TDRs if they expect them to rise in
value as a result of decreasing supply and increasing demand due to population and income growth, change in tastes, or an increase in environmental awareness. Certainly every new discovery of a valuable new species, or even a new use of existing species found in a particular habitat, would increase the value of the TDRs of that site.
Despite the variety of increasing benefits that TDRs may confer on prospective buyers and holders, it is unlikely that there will be sufficient demand to preserve all the habitats that are worth conserving (e.g. based on contingent valuation of willingness to pay), for reasons ranging from myopia to freeriding. Given the public-good nature of biodiversity conservation, governments of developed countries (the main beneficiaries) could take action to stimulate the demand for TDRs (pump priming). One way developed countries can stimulate the demand for TDRs is by providing credits to domestic firms and property owners for the acquisition of TDRs from developing countries against domestic environmental regulations such as building codes, forest harvesting and replanting regulations, environmental emission standards, CO 2 emissions, etc. A criticism of this method of stimulating the demands for TDRs might be that the conservation of biodiversity in the tropics would have been accomplished at the expense of the domestic environment in the developed countries. One way around this problem is to tighten environmental regulations from current levels and then provide offset credits for buyers and holders of TDRs. Another method is to introduce a conservation tax and then allow people the option to pay this annual tax or purchase and hold TDRs from conservation areas in lieu of the tax. The great advantage of this financing mechanism for the conservation of tropical forests and biodiversity is that it makes the opportunity costs clear and provides a vehicle for the beneficiaries to pay them. It also provides developing countries with substantial transfers of financial resources for sustainable development without compromising national ownership or sovereignty over tropical forests. Not only can TDRs be bought back, they can be leased on an annual basis rather than sold outright. Essentially, what the country is selling or leasing are not the rights to exploiting or developing its forests, but conservation services.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Konservasi keanekaragaman hayati: Hak pembangunan dipindahtangankanBanyak konflik antara maju dan berkembang negara tentang Konservasikeanekaragaman hayati yang timbul dari kegagalan untuk membedakan antara kepemilikan dan pelaksanaan spasialhak pembangunan. Perlakuan keanekaragaman hayati sebagai sumber daya global daripada nasional dan tekanan untuk melestarikan itu dirasakan oleh negara-negara berkembang sebagai sebuah tantangan untuk kepemilikan dan kedaulatan mereka atas sumber daya ini. Jika, namun, tujuan utama dari upaya untuk melindungi keanekaragaman hayati adalah konservasi, tidak redistribusi sumber daya, langkah pertama adalah untuk mengenali kepemilikan negara-negara berkembang atas sumber daya dan hak mereka untuk mengembangkan mereka untuk memaksimalkan keuntungan mereka sendiri.Masalahnya hanya negotiable kemudian adalah istilah yang hak-hak pembangunan atas habitat kritis secara sukarela akan ditransfer di tempat lain di negara atau luar negeri.Konsep hak dipindahtangankan pembangunan (pemerintah) memungkinkan penciptaan kawasan konservasi tanpa memerlukan penilaian nilai tanah dan kompensasi: itu hanya menciptakan pasar dengan permintaan dan pasokan hak pembangunan yang menghasilkan harga keseimbangan yang bertukar atau mentransfer berlangsung.Pada prinsipnya, tidak ada alasan mengapa pemerintah tidak dapat digunakan secara internasional untuk mentransfer pengembanganhak antara negara. Negara-negara tropis bisa menyisihkan habitat untuk konservasi keanekaragaman hayati dan membagi setiap habitat ke sejumlah peraturan, sesuai dengan daerah unit, mengatakan, hektar. Setiap TDR akan menyatakan lokasi, kondisi, keragaman, dan tingkat perlindungan habitat dan hak istimewa yang disampaikannya kepada pembeli/pemegang. Pemerintah dapat kemudian ditawarkan untuk dijual baik secara lokal dan internasional pada awal menawarkan harga yang meliputi sepenuhnya biaya kesempatan sesuai tanah unit (yaitu, nilai sekarang bersih aliran pendapatan kesempatan pembangunan terdahulu). Ianya lebih baik untuk memulai dengan harga yang relatif tinggi untuk menguji pasar, karena sehingga mereka kurang menghargaisumber ireversibel (setelah penjualan) sementara overvaluation reversibel (setelah bebas-penjualan). Jika harga ternyata terlalurendah untuk membersihkan pasar (yaitu, untuk pembuangan peraturan disediakan untuk habitat tertentu), harga bisa diturunkan untuk menarik tambahan permintaan atau kualitas TDR dapat ditingkatkan oleh memperbesar daerah untuk memasukkan nilai-nilai keanekaragaman hayati tambahan atau memperbaiki dengan perlindungan dan manajemen.Para calon pembeli pemerintah termasuk lokal dan organisasi lingkungan internasional, lokal dan internasional Yayasan dan perusahaan, dikembangkan pemerintah negara, kimia danfarmasi perusahaan, masyarakat ilmiah, Universitas dan lembaga-lembaga penelitian, dan bahkanindividu-individu yang berpikiran lingkungan dari negara-negara maju. Motivasi untuk pembelianPemerintah secara alami akan bervariasi antara calon pembeli. Beberapa mungkin memiliki nilai-nilai penggunaan langsung sepertiprospek untuk bahan kimia baru atau obat-obatan. Orang lain mungkin mengungkapkan nilai-nilai non-gunakan merekamelalui pembelian dari pemerintah. Namun orang lain mungkin membeli dan terus pemerintah jika mereka berharap mereka bangkit dalamnilai penurunan pasokan dan meningkatkan permintaan pertumbuhan penduduk dan pendapatan, perubahan selera, atau peningkatan kesadaran lingkungan. Tentu saja setiap penemuan baru jenis baru berharga, atau bahkan penggunaan baru dari spesies yang ada yang ditemukan di habitat tertentu, akan meningkatkan nilai peraturan dari situs tersebut.Despite the variety of increasing benefits that TDRs may confer on prospective buyers and holders, it is unlikely that there will be sufficient demand to preserve all the habitats that are worth conserving (e.g. based on contingent valuation of willingness to pay), for reasons ranging from myopia to freeriding. Given the public-good nature of biodiversity conservation, governments of developed countries (the main beneficiaries) could take action to stimulate the demand for TDRs (pump priming). One way developed countries can stimulate the demand for TDRs is by providing credits to domestic firms and property owners for the acquisition of TDRs from developing countries against domestic environmental regulations such as building codes, forest harvesting and replanting regulations, environmental emission standards, CO 2 emissions, etc. A criticism of this method of stimulating the demands for TDRs might be that the conservation of biodiversity in the tropics would have been accomplished at the expense of the domestic environment in the developed countries. One way around this problem is to tighten environmental regulations from current levels and then provide offset credits for buyers and holders of TDRs. Another method is to introduce a conservation tax and then allow people the option to pay this annual tax or purchase and hold TDRs from conservation areas in lieu of the tax. The great advantage of this financing mechanism for the conservation of tropical forests and biodiversity is that it makes the opportunity costs clear and provides a vehicle for the beneficiaries to pay them. It also provides developing countries with substantial transfers of financial resources for sustainable development without compromising national ownership or sovereignty over tropical forests. Not only can TDRs be bought back, they can be leased on an annual basis rather than sold outright. Essentially, what the country is selling or leasing are not the rights to exploiting or developing its forests, but conservation services.