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Kantian Accounts of Corporate Socia

Kantian Accounts of Corporate Social Responsibility
Although I have discussed corporate social responsibility on a number of occasions including Business Ethics co-authored with Ronald Duska and in Management Ethics as well as in Chap. 6 of this volume, I have never speci fi cally used Kantian ethics as the ground for the discussion. Recently there have been two contributions to the discussion of corporate social responsibility. The fi r st is by Jeffery Smith. 52 In Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective , I had argued that a business organization should be viewed as a moral community and that managers had an imperfect duty of benefi c ence to their corporate stakeholders. However, I did not elaborate on just what that duty consists of and how extensive it is. In his “Corporate Duties of Virtue: Making (Kantian) Sense of Corporate Social Responsibility,” Smith provides an argument to show that corporations have an imperfect duty of social responsibility. He does this through a careful reading of the Kantian texts on the duty of benefi c ence as well as some recent Kantian scholarship on that topic. As a result of that analysis Smith argues that “the duty of benefi c ence is a duty regarding how moral agents should deliberate about how to live”. At the corporate level, then, the duty requires that managers “integrate concern for others in their commercial dealings.” Integrating this concern into corporate decision making provides a rich account of corporate social responsibility. Smith’s contribution is an important expansion of the Kantian project to a topic in business ethics that has not often been viewed from the perspective of a major ethical theory. I am unaware, for example, of an Aristotelian account of
52 Smith, Jeffery. (2012). “Corporate Duties of Virtue: Making (Kantian) Sense of Corporate Social Responsibility” in Denis Arnold and Jared Harris (eds.), Kantian Business Ethics : Critical Perspectives. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 59–75.
68 4 Kantian Themes
corporate social responsibility. Smith’s essay is solidly grounded in the Kantian text and Kantian scholarship while providing a clear and managerially sound account of corporate social responsibility. There is no separation thesis here. I am happy to concur with his analysis and the conclusions based on it. Another paper on this topic is “A Neo-Kantian Foundation of Social Responsibility”, by Wim Dubbink and Luc van Liedekerke. 53 Many have argued that corporations have a social responsibility to improve society. However, is this responsibility a moral duty or is it voluntary-something it would be nice for corporations to do? In Business Ethics : A Kantian Perspective, I argued the traditional Kantian line that there is a genuine imperfect duty to help improve society but there was great latitude in how often the duty was to be acted upon and on what actions the duty to improve society might actually require. In “A Neo-Kantian Foundation of Social Responsibility” the authors ground the morality of social responsibility in political theory-specifi c ally in free market democratic liberalism. For them, Kant’s political theory and the political philosophy of his neo-Kantian followers provide the ground, while I tried to derive the obligations directly from Kant’s ethical theory. Dubbink and Liedekerke begin with Kant’s distinction between the duties of Right and the duties of Virtue. The former are duties imposed by law and necessary for a civil society. The latter are requirements of virtue. Are the duties of virtue morally required? Is the requirement to help others mandatory? These scholars think that at least some set of the duties of virtue are required and if that is the case, there are duties of virtue that are required and duties of virtue that are voluntary. If I understand this argument correctly, it would mean that some speci fi c imperfect duties would always be required just as perfect duties are. However, Dubbink and Liedekerke think that the focus on the imperfect/perfect distinction is not as helpful in making their point as the distinction between duties of Right and duties of Virtue. The issue for them is whether “individuals must independently acknowledge the full set of general rules, otherwise morality would no longer be about self-governance.” 54 As I understand it, they argue that some duties of virtue are always duties in the sense that they must be considered when acting. In other words, whenever the executives of a company make decisions, the duty to consider how society is affected is always present. However, in some (many?), cases any duty to improve society is trumped by other considerations. I believe this approach has much in common with the general theoretic position of Barbara Herman in Moral Literacy . In addition with respect to the content of the duty to improve society, Dubbink and Liedekerke, believe that these non voluntary duties of virtue are socially determined rather than determined by individuals acting independently and in isolation. After all the kingdom of ends is a social concept. This paper fi ts well with the renewed interest in Kant’s political philosophy and his views on duty in the Metaphysics of Morals. It is also grounded in the work of contemporary Kant

The New Generation of Scholars Applying Kant to Business Ethics
scholars particularly, as mentioned, the work of Barbara Herman. Although I am completing a paper that uses the traditional perfect imperfect distinction to specify what is required of corporations to help society, I fi n d the Dubbink/Liedekerke approach to be innovative and thought provoking. Another debate about corporate social responsibility is whether corporations can be held to be suffi c iently like persons to be held morally responsible. Dubbink and Smith consider this issue from a Kantian perspective in their paper “A Political Account of Corporate Social Responsibility.” 55 In this article Dubbink and Smith revisit an issue that has longed plagued business ethicists, Does a business organization have the necessary and suf fi cient characteristics of personhood so that it can be held morally responsible independently of any individual or individuals in the corporation. John Ladd and Manny Velasquez were among the early scholars who claimed that a corporation did not have those characteristics. However, in a series of articles, Peter French argued that a corporate internal decision structure did provide a suf fi cient analogy to human personhood so that a corporation could be held morally responsible. 56 Dubbink and Smith propose a set of weaker conditions that would still allow us to speak of corporations per se of either taking or not taking ethical decisions into account. And surprising they appeal to Kantian theory to do so. I say surprisingly because Kant’s theory of ascribing moral responsibility intuitively is very strict. They argue that we humans have reason to look upon corporations as administrators of duty. “Corporations are administrators of duty to the extent that citizens come to expect that the corporation will take into account a relevant set of moral principles when it renders a judgment or decision about what course of action to take.” 57 For Dubbink and Smith, corporate moral responsibility is not about making moral judgments of praise or blame or even of being held accountable for legal sanctions. They note correctly that Kant’s ethics cannot say much about that because, as Kant observed, it is very hard to determine a person’s true motive. With that in mind what Dubbink and Smith need to show is that corporations per se have the ability to take into account moral factors in their decision making process. It should be noted that they accept as fact that corporations have a corporate internal decision making structures along the lines that French presented. The crux of their argument then seems to be as follows: 1. Corporations are capable of rational action planning. Observation and Corporate Internal Decision Making Structures 2. Corporations can act on reasons Observation
55 Dubbink, W. and J. Smith. (2011). “A Political Account of the Corporation as a Morally Responsible Actor,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, XIV(2), 223–246. 56 Ladd, John. (1970). “Morality and the Idea of Rationality in Formal Organizations,” The Monist, 54(4), 47–60 and Velasquez, Manuel. (2003). “Debunking Moral Responsibility,” Business Ethics Quarterly , 13, 531–562; French, Peter. (1979). “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 16(3), 207–215. 57 Dubbink and Smith. “A Political Account of the Corporation as a Morally Responsible Actor,” p. 233.
70 4 Kantian Themes
3. Corporations can act on moral reasons, because there is nothing special that distinguishes moral reasons from other kinds of reasons. Analogy 4 . T he moral reasons that a corporation must take into account are dictated by society Observation 5 . 1 –4 are suffi c ient to say that corporations are able to take ethical considerations into account in their decision making capacity. What corporations cannot do is re fl ectively endorse the moral principles. Corporations are not persons to that extent. Later in the paper, Dubbink and Smith point out that it is one thing to adopt an ethical principle as a reason and quite another to justify that principle or the use of that principle in a particular case. Given their comments about endorsement, I assume they think that corporations cannot give justifi c ations for principles. But I am not convinced here. Is it meaningful to speak of a corporation justifying a principle of fi nance, accounting or marketing? I think it is? Then why can’t it give a justi fi cation of a moral principle as well. See premise 3 in the argument above. What I am arguing is that if the corporate internal decision-making structure isLadd and Velasquez than it might appear at fi rst. Obviously the
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Kantian Accounts of Corporate Social Responsibility
Although I have discussed corporate social responsibility on a number of occasions including Business Ethics co-authored with Ronald Duska and in Management Ethics as well as in Chap. 6 of this volume, I have never speci fi cally used Kantian ethics as the ground for the discussion. Recently there have been two contributions to the discussion of corporate social responsibility. The fi r st is by Jeffery Smith. 52 In Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective , I had argued that a business organization should be viewed as a moral community and that managers had an imperfect duty of benefi c ence to their corporate stakeholders. However, I did not elaborate on just what that duty consists of and how extensive it is. In his “Corporate Duties of Virtue: Making (Kantian) Sense of Corporate Social Responsibility,” Smith provides an argument to show that corporations have an imperfect duty of social responsibility. He does this through a careful reading of the Kantian texts on the duty of benefi c ence as well as some recent Kantian scholarship on that topic. As a result of that analysis Smith argues that “the duty of benefi c ence is a duty regarding how moral agents should deliberate about how to live”. At the corporate level, then, the duty requires that managers “integrate concern for others in their commercial dealings.” Integrating this concern into corporate decision making provides a rich account of corporate social responsibility. Smith’s contribution is an important expansion of the Kantian project to a topic in business ethics that has not often been viewed from the perspective of a major ethical theory. I am unaware, for example, of an Aristotelian account of
52 Smith, Jeffery. (2012). “Corporate Duties of Virtue: Making (Kantian) Sense of Corporate Social Responsibility” in Denis Arnold and Jared Harris (eds.), Kantian Business Ethics : Critical Perspectives. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 59–75.
68 4 Kantian Themes
corporate social responsibility. Smith’s essay is solidly grounded in the Kantian text and Kantian scholarship while providing a clear and managerially sound account of corporate social responsibility. There is no separation thesis here. I am happy to concur with his analysis and the conclusions based on it. Another paper on this topic is “A Neo-Kantian Foundation of Social Responsibility”, by Wim Dubbink and Luc van Liedekerke. 53 Many have argued that corporations have a social responsibility to improve society. However, is this responsibility a moral duty or is it voluntary-something it would be nice for corporations to do? In Business Ethics : A Kantian Perspective, I argued the traditional Kantian line that there is a genuine imperfect duty to help improve society but there was great latitude in how often the duty was to be acted upon and on what actions the duty to improve society might actually require. In “A Neo-Kantian Foundation of Social Responsibility” the authors ground the morality of social responsibility in political theory-specifi c ally in free market democratic liberalism. For them, Kant’s political theory and the political philosophy of his neo-Kantian followers provide the ground, while I tried to derive the obligations directly from Kant’s ethical theory. Dubbink and Liedekerke begin with Kant’s distinction between the duties of Right and the duties of Virtue. The former are duties imposed by law and necessary for a civil society. The latter are requirements of virtue. Are the duties of virtue morally required? Is the requirement to help others mandatory? These scholars think that at least some set of the duties of virtue are required and if that is the case, there are duties of virtue that are required and duties of virtue that are voluntary. If I understand this argument correctly, it would mean that some speci fi c imperfect duties would always be required just as perfect duties are. However, Dubbink and Liedekerke think that the focus on the imperfect/perfect distinction is not as helpful in making their point as the distinction between duties of Right and duties of Virtue. The issue for them is whether “individuals must independently acknowledge the full set of general rules, otherwise morality would no longer be about self-governance.” 54 As I understand it, they argue that some duties of virtue are always duties in the sense that they must be considered when acting. In other words, whenever the executives of a company make decisions, the duty to consider how society is affected is always present. However, in some (many?), cases any duty to improve society is trumped by other considerations. I believe this approach has much in common with the general theoretic position of Barbara Herman in Moral Literacy . In addition with respect to the content of the duty to improve society, Dubbink and Liedekerke, believe that these non voluntary duties of virtue are socially determined rather than determined by individuals acting independently and in isolation. After all the kingdom of ends is a social concept. This paper fi ts well with the renewed interest in Kant’s political philosophy and his views on duty in the Metaphysics of Morals. It is also grounded in the work of contemporary Kant

The New Generation of Scholars Applying Kant to Business Ethics
scholars particularly, as mentioned, the work of Barbara Herman. Although I am completing a paper that uses the traditional perfect imperfect distinction to specify what is required of corporations to help society, I fi n d the Dubbink/Liedekerke approach to be innovative and thought provoking. Another debate about corporate social responsibility is whether corporations can be held to be suffi c iently like persons to be held morally responsible. Dubbink and Smith consider this issue from a Kantian perspective in their paper “A Political Account of Corporate Social Responsibility.” 55 In this article Dubbink and Smith revisit an issue that has longed plagued business ethicists, Does a business organization have the necessary and suf fi cient characteristics of personhood so that it can be held morally responsible independently of any individual or individuals in the corporation. John Ladd and Manny Velasquez were among the early scholars who claimed that a corporation did not have those characteristics. However, in a series of articles, Peter French argued that a corporate internal decision structure did provide a suf fi cient analogy to human personhood so that a corporation could be held morally responsible. 56 Dubbink and Smith propose a set of weaker conditions that would still allow us to speak of corporations per se of either taking or not taking ethical decisions into account. And surprising they appeal to Kantian theory to do so. I say surprisingly because Kant’s theory of ascribing moral responsibility intuitively is very strict. They argue that we humans have reason to look upon corporations as administrators of duty. “Corporations are administrators of duty to the extent that citizens come to expect that the corporation will take into account a relevant set of moral principles when it renders a judgment or decision about what course of action to take.” 57 For Dubbink and Smith, corporate moral responsibility is not about making moral judgments of praise or blame or even of being held accountable for legal sanctions. They note correctly that Kant’s ethics cannot say much about that because, as Kant observed, it is very hard to determine a person’s true motive. With that in mind what Dubbink and Smith need to show is that corporations per se have the ability to take into account moral factors in their decision making process. It should be noted that they accept as fact that corporations have a corporate internal decision making structures along the lines that French presented. The crux of their argument then seems to be as follows: 1. Corporations are capable of rational action planning. Observation and Corporate Internal Decision Making Structures 2. Corporations can act on reasons Observation
55 Dubbink, W. and J. Smith. (2011). “A Political Account of the Corporation as a Morally Responsible Actor,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, XIV(2), 223–246. 56 Ladd, John. (1970). “Morality and the Idea of Rationality in Formal Organizations,” The Monist, 54(4), 47–60 and Velasquez, Manuel. (2003). “Debunking Moral Responsibility,” Business Ethics Quarterly , 13, 531–562; French, Peter. (1979). “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 16(3), 207–215. 57 Dubbink and Smith. “A Political Account of the Corporation as a Morally Responsible Actor,” p. 233.
70 4 Kantian Themes
3. Corporations can act on moral reasons, because there is nothing special that distinguishes moral reasons from other kinds of reasons. Analogy 4 . T he moral reasons that a corporation must take into account are dictated by society Observation 5 . 1 –4 are suffi c ient to say that corporations are able to take ethical considerations into account in their decision making capacity. What corporations cannot do is re fl ectively endorse the moral principles. Corporations are not persons to that extent. Later in the paper, Dubbink and Smith point out that it is one thing to adopt an ethical principle as a reason and quite another to justify that principle or the use of that principle in a particular case. Given their comments about endorsement, I assume they think that corporations cannot give justifi c ations for principles. But I am not convinced here. Is it meaningful to speak of a corporation justifying a principle of fi nance, accounting or marketing? I think it is? Then why can’t it give a justi fi cation of a moral principle as well. See premise 3 in the argument above. What I am arguing is that if the corporate internal decision-making structure isLadd and Velasquez than it might appear at fi rst. Obviously the
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Kantian Account Corporate Social Responsibility
Meskipun saya telah membahas tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan pada sejumlah kesempatan termasuk Etika Bisnis ditulis bersama dengan Ronald Duska dan Etika Manajemen serta di Chap. 6 dari buku ini, saya tidak pernah secara spesifik digunakan etika Kantian sebagai dasar untuk diskusi. Baru-baru ini ada dua kontribusi untuk diskusi tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan. Fi r st adalah dengan Jeffery Smith. 52 Dalam Etika Bisnis: Sebuah Perspektif Kantian, saya berpendapat bahwa sebuah organisasi bisnis harus dilihat sebagai komunitas moral dan bahwa manajer memiliki tugas yang tidak sempurna bene fi c ence kepada para pemangku kepentingan perusahaan mereka. Namun, saya tidak merinci apa tugas yang terdiri dari dan seberapa luas itu. Dalam bukunya "Tugas Perusahaan Kebajikan: Pembuatan (Kantian) Rasa Tanggung Jawab Sosial Perusahaan," Smith memberikan argumen untuk menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan memiliki kewajiban yang tidak sempurna dari tanggung jawab sosial. Dia melakukan ini melalui hati-hati membaca teks Kantian pada tugas bene fi c ence serta beberapa beasiswa Kantian baru pada topik tersebut. Sebagai hasil dari analisis bahwa Smith berpendapat bahwa "tugas bene fi c ence adalah tugas tentang bagaimana agen moral yang harus berunding tentang bagaimana hidup". Pada tingkat perusahaan, maka, tugas mensyaratkan bahwa manajer "mengintegrasikan kepedulian terhadap orang lain dalam urusan komersial mereka." Mengintegrasikan keprihatinan ini ke dalam pengambilan keputusan perusahaan menyediakan rekening kaya tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan. Kontribusi Smith merupakan perluasan penting dari proyek Kantian ke topik etika bisnis yang tidak sering dipandang dari perspektif teori etika yang besar. Saya menyadari, misalnya, dari rekening Aristotelian dari
52 Smith, Jeffery. (2012). "Tugas Perusahaan Kebajikan: Pembuatan (Kantian) Rasa Tanggung Jawab Sosial Perusahaan" di Denis Arnold dan Jared Harris (eds.), Etika Bisnis Kantian: Perspektif Kritis. Cheltenham. Edward Elgar Publishing, 59-75
68 4 Tema Kantian
tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan. Esai Smith adalah kokoh didasarkan pada teks Kantian dan Kantian beasiswa sambil memberikan rekening yang jelas dan manajerial suara tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan. Tidak ada pemisahan tesis sini. Saya senang untuk setuju dengan analisis dan kesimpulan berdasarkan itu. Makalah lain pada topik ini adalah "A Neo-Kantian Yayasan Social Responsibility", oleh Wim Dubbink dan Luc van Liedekerke. 53 Banyak yang berpendapat bahwa perusahaan memiliki tanggung jawab sosial untuk meningkatkan masyarakat. Namun, adalah tanggung jawab ini kewajiban moral atau itu sukarela-sesuatu yang akan menyenangkan bagi perusahaan untuk melakukan? Dalam Etika Bisnis: Sebuah Perspektif Kantian, saya berpendapat garis Kantian tradisional yang ada tugas yang tidak sempurna tulus untuk membantu meningkatkan masyarakat tapi ada lintang besar dalam seberapa sering tugas itu harus ditindaklanjuti dan apa tindakan bertugas untuk meningkatkan masyarakat mungkin benar-benar membutuhkan. Dalam "A Neo-Kantian Yayasan Social Responsibility" para penulis tanah moralitas tanggung jawab sosial dalam politik teori-spesifik sekutu dalam pasar bebas liberalisme demokrasi. Bagi mereka, teori politik Kant dan filsafat politik pengikut neo-Kantian nya menyediakan tanah, sementara aku mencoba untuk menurunkan kewajiban langsung dari teori etika Kant. Dubbink dan Liedekerke mulai dengan perbedaan Kant antara tugas Hak dan tugas Kebajikan. Mantan adalah pungutan yang diberlakukan oleh hukum dan diperlukan untuk masyarakat sipil. Yang terakhir adalah persyaratan kebajikan. Apakah tugas kebajikan moral diperlukan? Apakah persyaratan untuk membantu orang lain wajib? Para sarjana ini berpikir bahwa setidaknya beberapa set tugas kebajikan yang diperlukan dan jika itu terjadi, ada tugas kebajikan yang diperlukan dan tugas kebajikan yang bersifat sukarela. Jika saya memahami argumen ini benar, itu berarti bahwa beberapa fi c tugas yang tidak sempurna tertentu akan selalu dibutuhkan seperti tugas yang sempurna adalah. Namun, Dubbink dan Liedekerke berpikir bahwa fokus pada yang tidak sempurna / perbedaan yang sempurna ini tidak membantu dalam membuat poin mereka sebagai perbedaan antara tugas Hak dan kewajiban Kebajikan. Masalah bagi mereka adalah apakah "individu harus independen mengakui set lengkap aturan umum, jika moralitas tidak lagi tentang self-governance." 54 Seperti yang saya pahami, mereka berpendapat bahwa beberapa tugas kebajikan selalu tugas dalam arti bahwa mereka harus dipertimbangkan ketika bertindak. Dengan kata lain, setiap kali eksekutif dari sebuah perusahaan membuat keputusan, tugas untuk mempertimbangkan bagaimana masyarakat dipengaruhi selalu hadir. Namun, dalam beberapa (banyak?), Kasus kewajiban untuk memperbaiki masyarakat adalah palsu oleh pertimbangan lain. Saya percaya pendekatan ini memiliki banyak kesamaan dengan posisi teori umum Barbara Herman di Moral Literasi. Selain berkaitan dengan isi dari tugas untuk meningkatkan masyarakat, Dubbink dan Liedekerke, percaya bahwa tugas-tugas non sukarela kebajikan ditentukan secara sosial daripada ditentukan oleh individu bertindak secara independen dan dalam isolasi. Setelah semua kerajaan berakhir adalah konsep sosial. Ini kertas fi ts baik dengan minat baru dalam filsafat politik Kant dan pandangannya bertugas di Metafisika dari Moral. Hal ini juga didasarkan pada karya kontemporer Kant The New Generation of Scholars Menerapkan Kant ke Etika Bisnis ulama khususnya, seperti yang disebutkan, karya Barbara Herman. Meskipun saya menyelesaikan sebuah makalah yang menggunakan perbedaan yang tidak sempurna tradisional yang sempurna untuk menentukan apa yang dibutuhkan perusahaan-perusahaan untuk membantu masyarakat, saya fi nd pendekatan Dubbink / Liedekerke untuk menjadi inovatif dan merangsang pemikiran. Perdebatan lain tentang tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan adalah apakah perusahaan dapat dianggap suf fi c iently seperti orang yang akan bertanggung jawab secara moral. Dubbink dan Smith mempertimbangkan masalah ini dari perspektif Kantian dalam makalah mereka "Account Politik Corporate Social Responsibility." 55 Dalam artikel ini Dubbink dan Smith kembali masalah yang telah merindukan ahli etika bisnis terganggu, Apakah organisasi bisnis memiliki diperlukan dan suf fi Karakteristik efisien kepribadian sehingga dapat diselenggarakan secara moral bertanggung jawab secara independen dari setiap individu atau individu dalam korporasi. John Ladd dan Manny Velasquez di antara para ulama awal yang menyatakan bahwa sebuah perusahaan tidak memiliki karakteristik. Namun, dalam serangkaian artikel, Peter Perancis berpendapat bahwa struktur keputusan internal perusahaan memang memberikan analogi yang mencukupi untuk kepribadian manusia sehingga perusahaan bisa bertanggung jawab secara moral. 56 Dubbink dan Smith mengusulkan serangkaian kondisi lemah yang masih akan memungkinkan kita untuk berbicara tentang perusahaan per se baik mengambil atau tidak mengambil keputusan etis ke rekening. Dan mengejutkan mereka menarik bagi teori Kantian untuk melakukannya. Saya katakan mengejutkan karena teori Kant menganggap tanggung jawab moral intuitif sangat ketat. Mereka berpendapat bahwa kita manusia memiliki alasan untuk memandang perusahaan sebagai administrator tugas. "Korporasi adalah administrator tugas sejauh warga datang untuk mengharapkan bahwa perusahaan akan mempertimbangkan satu set relevan prinsip-prinsip moral ketika membuat sebuah penilaian atau keputusan tentang tindakan apa yang harus diambil." 57 Untuk Dubbink dan Smith, perusahaan tanggung jawab moral bukan tentang membuat penilaian moral pujian atau menyalahkan atau bahkan yang bertanggung jawab atas sanksi hukum. Mereka mencatat dengan benar bahwa etika Kant tidak bisa mengatakan banyak tentang hal itu karena, seperti Kant mengamati, sangat sulit untuk menentukan motif sejati seseorang. Dengan itu dalam pikiran apa yang Dubbink dan Smith perlu menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan per se memiliki kemampuan untuk memperhitungkan faktor-faktor moral dalam proses pengambilan keputusan mereka. Perlu dicatat bahwa mereka menerima sebagai fakta bahwa perusahaan memiliki keputusan internal perusahaan membuat struktur sepanjang garis yang disajikan Perancis. Inti dari argumen mereka kemudian tampaknya sebagai berikut: 1. Perusahaan mampu perencanaan tindakan rasional. Observasi dan Corporate internal Struktur Pengambilan Keputusan 2. Perusahaan dapat bertindak atas alasan Pengamatan 55 Dubbink, W. dan J. Smith. (2011). "Akun Politik Corporation sebagai Aktor moral bertanggung jawab," Teori Etika dan Moral Practice, XIV (2), 223-246. 56 Ladd, John. (1970). "Moralitas dan Ide Rasionalitas dalam Organisasi Formal," The Monist, 54 (4), 47-60 dan Velasquez, Manuel. (2003). "Membongkar Tanggung Jawab Moral," Etika Bisnis Quarterly, 13, 531-562; Perancis, Peter. (1979). "The Corporation sebagai Moral Person," American Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (3), 207-215. 57 Dubbink dan Smith. "Akun Politik Corporation sebagai Aktor moral bertanggung jawab," hal. 233. 70 4 Kantian Tema 3. Perusahaan dapat bertindak atas alasan moral, karena tidak ada yang khusus yang membedakan alasan moral dari jenis lain alasan. Analogi 4. T dia alasan moral bahwa sebuah perusahaan harus memperhitungkan ditentukan oleh Pengamatan masyarakat 5. 1 -4 adalah suf ​​fi c recipient untuk mengatakan bahwa perusahaan dapat mengambil pertimbangan etika dipertimbangkan dalam keputusan mereka membuat kapasitas. Apa perusahaan tidak bisa lakukan adalah kembali fl ectively mendukung prinsip-prinsip moral. Perusahaan tidak orang sejauh itu. Kemudian di koran, Dubbink dan Smith menunjukkan bahwa itu adalah satu hal untuk mengadopsi prinsip etika sebagai alasan dan cukup lain untuk membenarkan bahwa prinsip atau penggunaan prinsip bahwa dalam kasus tertentu. Mengingat komentar mereka tentang dukungan, saya menganggap mereka berpikir bahwa perusahaan tidak bisa memberikan pembenaran fi c negosiasi untuk prinsip-prinsip. Tapi aku tidak yakin di sini. Apakah berarti berbicara tentang sebuah perusahaan yang membenarkan prinsip keuangan, akuntansi atau pemasaran? Saya pikir itu? Lalu mengapa tidak bisa itu memberikan fi kasi pembenaran dari prinsip moral juga. Lihat premis 3 dalam argumen di atas. Apa yang saya berdebat adalah bahwa jika internal perusahaan pengambilan keputusan struktur isLadd dan Velasquez daripada mungkin muncul di pertama. Jelas





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