This point is made by Klein and Lef

This point is made by Klein and Leffier (1981, p. 628) with respect to productive assets in general:
One potentially efficient alternative or supplement to the pure price premium
method of guaranteeing quality may be the use of nonsalvageable
productive assets rather than brand name (selling) assets... In particular,
if the firm uses a production process that has a non-salvageable capital
element, the normal rate of return (quasi-rent stream) on this element of
production capital effectively serves as a quality assuring premium.
In other words, technological sunk costs which generate future quasi-rents
serve as collateral because they provide auditors with 'something to lose' if
caught 'cheating'. Client-specific start-up costs are of this genre, as are other
technological sunk costs such as investments in SEC expertise or industry
specialization.
Another advantage of the surrogates analyzed here over brand name
explanations for quality-differentiated audits [as in, e.g., Benston (1975,
1980), Dopuch and Simunic (1979), and Simunic (1980)], is that our analysis
is conditioned on a more easily measured choice variable, auditor size. In
addition, the percentage of total fees dependent on retaining any one client is
subject to empirical estimation, e.g., by using relationships developed in Simunic
(1980). Predictions that auditors supply more or less 'brand name' in
response to some parameter shift are more difficult to operationalize. For
example, how does one determine that 'more' brand name is supplied? 2v The
next section develops the implications of our collateral properties to auditor
size argument for some recent recommendations of the Derieux Committee.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

This point is made by Klein and Leffier (1981, p. 628) with respect to productive assets in general:One potentially efficient alternative or supplement to the pure price premiummethod of guaranteeing quality may be the use of nonsalvageableproductive assets rather than brand name (selling) assets... In particular,if the firm uses a production process that has a non-salvageable capitalelement, the normal rate of return (quasi-rent stream) on this element ofproduction capital effectively serves as a quality assuring premium.In other words, technological sunk costs which generate future quasi-rentsserve as collateral because they provide auditors with 'something to lose' ifcaught 'cheating'. Client-specific start-up costs are of this genre, as are othertechnological sunk costs such as investments in SEC expertise or industryspecialization.Another advantage of the surrogates analyzed here over brand nameexplanations for quality-differentiated audits [as in, e.g., Benston (1975,1980), Dopuch and Simunic (1979), and Simunic (1980)], is that our analysisis conditioned on a more easily measured choice variable, auditor size. Inaddition, the percentage of total fees dependent on retaining any one client issubject to empirical estimation, e.g., by using relationships developed in Simunic(1980). Predictions that auditors supply more or less 'brand name' inresponse to some parameter shift are more difficult to operationalize. Forcontoh, bagaimana itu menentukan bahwa nama merek 'lebih' disediakan? 2vBagian berikutnya mengembangkan implikasi dari properti kami agunan untuk auditorukuran argumen untuk beberapa hari rekomendasi dari Komite Derieux.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Hal ini dibuat oleh Klein dan Leffier (1981, p 628.) Sehubungan dengan aktiva produktif pada umumnya:
Salah satu alternatif yang berpotensi efisien atau suplemen untuk harga premium murni
metode menjamin kualitas mungkin penggunaan nonsalvageable
aset produktif daripada nama merek (jual) aset ... Secara khusus,
jika perusahaan menggunakan proses produksi yang memiliki modal non-diselamatkan
elemen, tingkat normal pengembalian (sewa semu stream) pada elemen ini
modal produksi secara efektif berfungsi sebagai kualitas meyakinkan premium .
Dengan kata lain, teknologi biaya hangus yang menghasilkan masa kuasi-sewa
berfungsi sebagai jaminan karena mereka memberikan auditor dengan 'sesuatu kehilangan' jika
tertangkap 'kecurangan'. Biaya start-up spesifik-klien yang dari genre ini, seperti lainnya
biaya teknologi tenggelam seperti investasi di SEC keahlian atau industri
spesialisasi.
Keuntungan lain dari pengganti dianalisis di sini lebih nama merek
penjelasan untuk audit berkualitas dibedakan [seperti, misalnya, Benston (1975,
1980), Dopuch dan Simunic (1979), dan Simunic (1980)], adalah bahwa analisis kami
dikondisikan pada variabel pilihan yang lebih mudah diukur, ukuran auditor. Di
samping itu, persentase total biaya tergantung pada mempertahankan salah satu klien
tunduk estimasi empiris, misalnya, dengan menggunakan hubungan dikembangkan di Simunic
(1980). Prediksi bahwa auditor pasokan kurang lebih 'nama merek' di
menanggapi beberapa pergeseran parameter lebih sulit untuk mengoperasionalkan. Untuk
contoh, bagaimana seseorang menentukan bahwa 'lebih' nama merek dipasok? 2v The
bagian berikutnya mengembangkan implikasi agunan properti untuk auditor
argumen ukuran untuk beberapa rekomendasi terbaru dari Komite Derieux.