We use the term gamesmanship to ref

We use the term gamesmanship to refer generally to the actions that employees take to
improve their performance indicators without producing any positive economic effects
for the organization. Gamesmanship is a common harmful side effect faced in situations
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where accountability forms of control, either results or actions accountability, are used.
We discuss two major forms of gamesmanship: slack creation and data manipulation.
Creation of slack resources
Slack involves the consumption of organizational resources by employees in excess of
what is required;21 that is, consumption of resources by employees that cannot be justified
easily in terms of its contribution to organizational objectives.22
Slack creation often takes place when tight results controls are in use; that is, when
employees, mostly at management levels, are evaluated primarily on whether or not
they achieve their budget targets.23 Managers who miss their target face the prospect of
interventions in their jobs, the loss of organizational resources, the loss of annual bonuses
and pay raises, and sometimes even the loss of their job.24 Under these circumstances,
managers may look for ways to protect themselves from the downside risk of missing
budget targets and the stigma attached to underachievers.25 One way in which managers
keep tight results control from hurting them is by negotiating highly achievable targets;
that is, targets that are deliberately lower than their best-guess forecast of the future.
This is called budget slack; it protects the managers against unforeseen contingencies
and improves the probability that the budget target will be met, thus increasing the
likelihood of receiving a favorable evaluation and associated performance-dependent
rewards.
Evidence suggests that significant amounts of slack exist in most business organizations,
as estimated by the magnitude of slack (which one study estimated to be as high
as 20 to 25% of budgeted operating expenses),26 as well as by the prevalence of managers
willing to admit that they engage in slack creation (which another study found to be as
high as 80% of the managers interviewed).27
Slack has some beneficial and some negative effects. On the positive side, slack can
reduce manager tension, increase organizational resiliency to change, and make available
some resources that can be used for innovation.28 On the negative side, slack obscures
true underlying performance, and hence, distorts the decisions based on the obscured
information, such as performance evaluations and resource allocation decisions.
In most situations, slack is nearly impossible to prevent. Theoretically, slack is feasible
only where there is information asymmetry, where superiors have less than complete
knowledge about what can be accomplished in a given area, and where subordinates are
allowed to participate in setting the performance targets for that area.29 Thus, where performance
can be accurately forecast, or be set in a top-down manner, it should be possible
to prevent, or at least mitigate, slack. But these conditions exist only in rare situations
– highly stable environments. If accountability controls are used in other situations, slack
must be considered to be almost inevitable.30
Data manipulation
Data manipulation is another form of gamesmanship that is a common side effect of
accountability-type control systems. Manipulation involves an effort on the part of the
employee being controlled to look good by fudging the control indicators. It comes in
two basic forms: falsification and data management. Falsification involves reporting
erroneous data. Data management involves any action designed to change the reported
results; such as sales, earnings, or a debt/equity ratio, while providing no real economic
advantage to the organization and, sometimes, actually causing harm. Generally, data
management actions are designed to make the entity or manager look better, such as to
Gamesmanship
achieve a budget target or to increase stock price. But some of these actions are designed
to make the entity look worse: sometimes managers save sales or earnings for a future
period when they might be needed; sometimes they take a bath (that is, they make results
(look) worse in bad times to get an advance on better results in the subsequent period);
and sometimes they report abnormally poor results to try to lower the stock price to facilitate
a management buyout.31
Management of financial data can be accomplished through either accounting or operating
means. Accounting methods of data management involve an intervention in the
measurement process. Individuals engaging in accounting methods of data management
sometimes violate accounting rules, but more frequently they use the flexibility available
in either the selection of accounting methods or the application of those methods, or both,
to manage earnings.32 To boost earnings, for example, managers might shift from accelerated
to straight-line depreciation or change their judgments about accounting estimates
(such as about reserves, allowances, and write-offs). IBM corporation used revenues
from patent licenses and profits from asset sales to understate the company’s reported
general and administrative (G&A) expenses, to make the company look “lean.”33 A
Fortune article called accounting treatments like these, which are consistent with generally
accepted accounting principles, “legal, but lousy.”34
Operating methods of data management involve the altering of operating decisions. To
boost earnings in the current period, managers can delay the timing of discretionary
expenditures, accelerate the sales of assets, or work employees overtime to push out
additional shipments (sales) in the current accounting period. These methods affect the
size and/or timing of cash flows, as well as reported sales and earnings. Many companies,
including ClearOne Communications, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Krispy Kreme,
have been accused of booking revenue on sales to distributors (as opposed to wait until
the products have been sold by the distributor), thus taking advantage of the ambiguity
in accounting rules on revenue recognition. This ambiguity in accounting rules makes
“channel stuffing” tempting by persuading distributors to take more product than they
really need or want, particularly towards the end of a poor quarter, to help earnings look
better than they really are.35 Other common forms of data manipulation are given equally
colorful labels, such as “bill and hold,” “round tripping,” “big bath,” and “window dressing.”
Because altering decisions can adversely affect real economic value , rather than just accounting acrual , the operating method of data management can be much more costly to the firm than are the accounting method.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Kami menggunakan gamesmanship istilah untuk umumnya merujuk pada tindakan yang karyawan mengambilmeningkatkan indikator kinerja mereka tanpa menghasilkan efek ekonomi yang positifuntuk organisasi. Gamesmanship adalah efek samping berbahaya umum yang dihadapi dalam situasiBab 5 · Biaya sistem kontrol184185mana akuntabilitas bentuk pengawasan, baik hasil atau tindakan akuntabilitas, digunakan.Kita membahas dua bentuk utama gamesmanship: kendur manipulasi data dan penciptaan.Penciptaan sumber daya yang sepiKendur melibatkan konsumsi daya organisasi oleh karyawan melebihiapa saja diperlukan; 21, konsumsi sumber daya oleh karyawan yang tidak dapat dibenarkanmudah dalam kontribusinya terhadap organisasi objectives.22Kendur penciptaan sering terjadi ketika hasil ketat kontrol yang digunakan; yaitu, ketikakaryawan, terutama di tingkat manajemen, dievaluasi terutama pada apakah atau tidakmereka mencapai mereka anggaran targets.23 manajer yang kehilangan wajah target mereka prospekintervensi dalam pekerjaan mereka, hilangnya sumber daya organisasi, hilangnya bonus tahunandan membayar menimbulkan, dan kadang-kadang bahkan hilangnya job.24 mereka dalam keadaan ini,Manajer dapat mencari cara untuk melindungi diri dari risiko downside hilangtarget anggaran dan stigma yang melekat pada underachievers.25 salah satu cara di mana Manajertetap mengontrol ketat hasil dari menyakiti mereka adalah dengan menegosiasikan sangat dicapai target;itulah, target yang sengaja lebih rendah dari perkiraan terbaik-kira masa depan.Ini disebut kendur anggaran; melindungi para manajer terhadap kontinjensi yang tak terdugadan meningkatkan kemungkinan bahwa target anggaran akan bertemu, sehingga meningkatkankemungkinan menerima menguntungkan evaluasi dan terkait kinerja tergantungpenghargaan.Bukti menunjukkan bahwa ada sejumlah besar kendur dalam kebanyakan organisasi bisnis,sebagai perkiraan oleh besarnya kendur (satu studi yang diperkirakan sebagai tinggisebagai 20-25% dari biaya operasi yang dianggarkan sebesar), maupun oleh prevalensi manajer 26bersedia untuk mengakui bahwa mereka terlibat dalam pembuatan kendur (yang studi lain menemukan sebagaitinggi yaitu 80% dari manajer diwawancarai).27Kendur memiliki beberapa efek yang menguntungkan dan beberapa negatif. Di sisi positif, kendur dapatmengurangi ketegangan manajer, meningkatkan ketahanan organisasi untuk berubah, dan membuat tersediabeberapa sumber daya yang dapat digunakan untuk innovation.28 di sisi negatif, kendur mengaburkanbenar mendasari kinerja, dan oleh karena itu, mendistorsi keputusan berdasarkan menggelapkaninformasi, seperti kinerja evaluasi dan keputusan alokasi sumber daya.Dalam kebanyakan situasi, kendur hampir mustahil untuk mencegah. Secara teoritis, kendur layakhanya mana ada informasi asimetris, di mana atasan memiliki kurang lengkappengetahuan tentang apa yang dapat dicapai dalam bidang tertentu, dan di mana bawahanallowed to participate in setting the performance targets for that area.29 Thus, where performancecan be accurately forecast, or be set in a top-down manner, it should be possibleto prevent, or at least mitigate, slack. But these conditions exist only in rare situations– highly stable environments. If accountability controls are used in other situations, slackmust be considered to be almost inevitable.30Data manipulationData manipulation is another form of gamesmanship that is a common side effect ofaccountability-type control systems. Manipulation involves an effort on the part of theemployee being controlled to look good by fudging the control indicators. It comes intwo basic forms: falsification and data management. Falsification involves reportingerroneous data. Data management involves any action designed to change the reportedresults; such as sales, earnings, or a debt/equity ratio, while providing no real economicadvantage to the organization and, sometimes, actually causing harm. Generally, datamanagement actions are designed to make the entity or manager look better, such as toGamesmanshipachieve a budget target or to increase stock price. But some of these actions are designedto make the entity look worse: sometimes managers save sales or earnings for a futureperiod when they might be needed; sometimes they take a bath (that is, they make results(look) worse in bad times to get an advance on better results in the subsequent period);and sometimes they report abnormally poor results to try to lower the stock price to facilitatea management buyout.31Management of financial data can be accomplished through either accounting or operatingmeans. Accounting methods of data management involve an intervention in themeasurement process. Individuals engaging in accounting methods of data managementsometimes violate accounting rules, but more frequently they use the flexibility availablein either the selection of accounting methods or the application of those methods, or both,to manage earnings.32 To boost earnings, for example, managers might shift from acceleratedto straight-line depreciation or change their judgments about accounting estimates(such as about reserves, allowances, and write-offs). IBM corporation used revenuesfrom patent licenses and profits from asset sales to understate the company’s reportedgeneral and administrative (G&A) expenses, to make the company look “lean.”33 AFortune article called accounting treatments like these, which are consistent with generallyaccepted accounting principles, “legal, but lousy.”34Operating methods of data management involve the altering of operating decisions. Toboost earnings in the current period, managers can delay the timing of discretionaryexpenditures, accelerate the sales of assets, or work employees overtime to push outadditional shipments (sales) in the current accounting period. These methods affect theukuran dan/atau waktu arus kas, serta melaporkan penjualan dan pendapatan. Banyak perusahaan,ClearOne komunikasi, Bristol-Myers Squibb dan Krispy Kreme,telah dituduh terakhir pendapatan penjualan untuk distributor (sebagai lawan untuk menunggu sampaiProduk telah dijual oleh distributor), sehingga mengambil keuntungan dari ambiguitasdalam aturan-aturan akuntansi pada pengakuan pendapatan. Ambiguitas dalam aturan akuntansi membuat"saluran isian" menggoda dengan membujuk distributor untuk mengambil lebih banyak produk dari merekabenar-benar membutuhkan atau menginginkan, terutama menjelang akhir seperempat miskin, untuk membantu penghasilan yang terlihatlebih baik daripada mereka benar-benar are.35 bentuk umum lainnya manipulasi data diberikan samalabel yang berwarna-warni, seperti sebagai "tagihan dan memegang," "bulat tersandung," "mandi besar", dan "etalase."Karena mengubah keputusan dapat mempengaruhi nilai ekonomi riil, daripada hanya akuntansi acrual, metode operasi manajemen data dapat jauh lebih mahal untuk perusahaan daripada metode akuntansi.