- Teks
- Sejarah
are important indistinguishing betw
are important in
distinguishing between fraud and no-fraud firms, the type of owner is less so. The authors
conclude that the proportion of outside directors, the number of board meetings, and the tenure
of the board chair are associated with the incidence of fraud.
Taking a different perspective, Berry et al. (2006-this issue) examine the evolution of board
and other governance structures in young firms after they undertake IPOs. In particular, the
authors examine how board structure (including board independence and venture capitalist (VC)
representation), CEO ownership, VC ownership, CEO incentive pay, and unaffiliated
blockholdings change for up to 11 years after the IPO. The authors find that board independence
and the proportion of board seats held by VC’s increase as CEO ownership declines (a result that
is concentrated in those firms that survive the authors’ 11-year sample period). The authors
suggest that as one governance mechanism designed to control agency costs weakens (CEO
ownership) others (board structures) strengthen to fill the void.
Also of note, although I emphasize elements of board structure in this discussion, the pap
distinguishing between fraud and no-fraud firms, the type of owner is less so. The authors
conclude that the proportion of outside directors, the number of board meetings, and the tenure
of the board chair are associated with the incidence of fraud.
Taking a different perspective, Berry et al. (2006-this issue) examine the evolution of board
and other governance structures in young firms after they undertake IPOs. In particular, the
authors examine how board structure (including board independence and venture capitalist (VC)
representation), CEO ownership, VC ownership, CEO incentive pay, and unaffiliated
blockholdings change for up to 11 years after the IPO. The authors find that board independence
and the proportion of board seats held by VC’s increase as CEO ownership declines (a result that
is concentrated in those firms that survive the authors’ 11-year sample period). The authors
suggest that as one governance mechanism designed to control agency costs weakens (CEO
ownership) others (board structures) strengthen to fill the void.
Also of note, although I emphasize elements of board structure in this discussion, the pap
0/5000
penting dalam
membedakan antara penipuan dan penipuan no perusahaan, jenis pemilik kurang begitu. Para penulis
menyimpulkan bahwa proporsi luar Direksi, jumlah pertemuan Dewan dan masa jabatan
kursi Dewan terkait dengan insiden penipuan.
mengambil perspektif yang berbeda, Berry et al. (2006-ini masalah) memeriksa evolusi papan
dan struktur pemerintahan lainnya di perusahaan muda setelah mereka melakukan IPO. Secara khusus,
penulis menguji bagaimana papan struktur (termasuk papan kemerdekaan dan kapitalis ventura (VC)
representasi), CEO kepemilikan, kepemilikan VC, CEO insentif bayar, dan terafiliasi
blockholdings mengubah hingga 11 tahun setelah IPO. Para penulis menemukan bahwa Dewan kemerdekaan
dan proporsi kursi Dewan diadakan oleh VC peningkatan sebagai CEO kepemilikan menurun (hasil yang
terkonsentrasi di perusahaan-perusahaan yang bertahan para penulis sampel 11 tahun periode). Para penulis
menyarankan bahwa sebagai satu pemerintahan mekanisme yang dirancang untuk mengontrol biaya keagenan melemahkan (CEO
kepemilikan) lainnya (papan struktur) memperkuat untuk mengisi kekosongan.
juga dari catatan, Meskipun saya menekankan unsur-unsur struktur Dewan di diskusi ini, pap
membedakan antara penipuan dan penipuan no perusahaan, jenis pemilik kurang begitu. Para penulis
menyimpulkan bahwa proporsi luar Direksi, jumlah pertemuan Dewan dan masa jabatan
kursi Dewan terkait dengan insiden penipuan.
mengambil perspektif yang berbeda, Berry et al. (2006-ini masalah) memeriksa evolusi papan
dan struktur pemerintahan lainnya di perusahaan muda setelah mereka melakukan IPO. Secara khusus,
penulis menguji bagaimana papan struktur (termasuk papan kemerdekaan dan kapitalis ventura (VC)
representasi), CEO kepemilikan, kepemilikan VC, CEO insentif bayar, dan terafiliasi
blockholdings mengubah hingga 11 tahun setelah IPO. Para penulis menemukan bahwa Dewan kemerdekaan
dan proporsi kursi Dewan diadakan oleh VC peningkatan sebagai CEO kepemilikan menurun (hasil yang
terkonsentrasi di perusahaan-perusahaan yang bertahan para penulis sampel 11 tahun periode). Para penulis
menyarankan bahwa sebagai satu pemerintahan mekanisme yang dirancang untuk mengontrol biaya keagenan melemahkan (CEO
kepemilikan) lainnya (papan struktur) memperkuat untuk mengisi kekosongan.
juga dari catatan, Meskipun saya menekankan unsur-unsur struktur Dewan di diskusi ini, pap
Sedang diterjemahkan, harap tunggu..
are important in
distinguishing between fraud and no-fraud firms, the type of owner is less so. The authors
conclude that the proportion of outside directors, the number of board meetings, and the tenure
of the board chair are associated with the incidence of fraud.
Taking a different perspective, Berry et al. (2006-this issue) examine the evolution of board
and other governance structures in young firms after they undertake IPOs. In particular, the
authors examine how board structure (including board independence and venture capitalist (VC)
representation), CEO ownership, VC ownership, CEO incentive pay, and unaffiliated
blockholdings change for up to 11 years after the IPO. The authors find that board independence
and the proportion of board seats held by VC’s increase as CEO ownership declines (a result that
is concentrated in those firms that survive the authors’ 11-year sample period). The authors
suggest that as one governance mechanism designed to control agency costs weakens (CEO
ownership) others (board structures) strengthen to fill the void.
Also of note, although I emphasize elements of board structure in this discussion, the pap
distinguishing between fraud and no-fraud firms, the type of owner is less so. The authors
conclude that the proportion of outside directors, the number of board meetings, and the tenure
of the board chair are associated with the incidence of fraud.
Taking a different perspective, Berry et al. (2006-this issue) examine the evolution of board
and other governance structures in young firms after they undertake IPOs. In particular, the
authors examine how board structure (including board independence and venture capitalist (VC)
representation), CEO ownership, VC ownership, CEO incentive pay, and unaffiliated
blockholdings change for up to 11 years after the IPO. The authors find that board independence
and the proportion of board seats held by VC’s increase as CEO ownership declines (a result that
is concentrated in those firms that survive the authors’ 11-year sample period). The authors
suggest that as one governance mechanism designed to control agency costs weakens (CEO
ownership) others (board structures) strengthen to fill the void.
Also of note, although I emphasize elements of board structure in this discussion, the pap
Sedang diterjemahkan, harap tunggu..
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- Never Wanted
- tarik dj sampay malam
- Aku bodoh suka sama kamu
- network configuration is not correct
- Left, Right, X, Up, Down, Square, Left,
- selamat malam minggu
- Let me to switch to 3g
- URL is nor correct
- DOWN
- Nama kamu?
- Rekiested page not found
- Being left hand it is really hard to doJ
- Do u have a love
- Dank je duim wate baty
- Tentu saya memiliki cinta
- Leef
- Ok...ur sexyy pic sent me
- Lokasi yang mana anda cari diindonesia.B
- Aku tidak mau mengganggumu lagi
- Lokasi yang mana anda cari diindonesia.B
- kinda
- Nama kamu siaPa ?
- swagger
- sahabat selalu ada untuk kamu
