2.2 Tax avoidance motivesThe earnin

2.2 Tax avoidance motives
The earnings announcement timing literature suggests managers respond to natural incentives within the firm in deciding the timing of the earnings announcement. Managers, endowed with private information about the firm and its future prospects, may be inclined to manipulate the timing of the earnings announcement in order to alter the news released to the market and/or exploit news for personal gain. An alternative explanation for these results is the extent to which corporate tax avoidance impacts the timing of the annual earnings announcement. That is, managers may engage in tax planning throughout the year which may or may not complement earnings management activity. Tax planning designed to permanently reduce the firm’s tax liability increase after-tax earnings which may assist the firm in meeting market expectations. This activity may require additional time at fiscal year-end in order to evaluate the extent to which tax avoidance will assist the firm in meeting expectations and to formulate a response to parties external to the firm. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) suggest the inherent complexity in many tax structures can potentially act as a device to mask opportunistic rent diversion, through the consumption of managerial perks or personal empire building. They find that incentive compensation helps to reduce the level of tax avoidance as it aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests particularly for firms with weak governance structures. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest additional research investigating the implications of Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) theory is warranted. The focus in this paper is not on the identification of tax aggressive firms; rather, this study proposes that one likely consequence of higher levels of tax avoidance is a less timely annual earnings announcement. If tax avoidance and rent diversion utilize complementary technologies, then firms with higher levels of tax avoidance will be more likely to engage in opportunistic behavior. The earnings announcement timing literature suggests greater opportunistic behavior (or greater opportunistic incentives) may result in a less timely earnings announcement. Consequently, investors may receive a less timely earnings announcement due to the complementary nature of tax avoidance and managerial opportunism. This leads to our primary hypothesis:
H1: Greater exhibited levels of tax avoidance is associated with a less timely annual earnings announcement.
Recent studies have begun to document the causes and consequences of the complementary relationship between tax avoidance and opportunistic incentives. For example, Frank et al. (2009) find a strong positive relation between tax avoidance and aggressive

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

2.2 pajak penghindaran motifThe earnings announcement timing literature suggests managers respond to natural incentives within the firm in deciding the timing of the earnings announcement. Managers, endowed with private information about the firm and its future prospects, may be inclined to manipulate the timing of the earnings announcement in order to alter the news released to the market and/or exploit news for personal gain. An alternative explanation for these results is the extent to which corporate tax avoidance impacts the timing of the annual earnings announcement. That is, managers may engage in tax planning throughout the year which may or may not complement earnings management activity. Tax planning designed to permanently reduce the firm’s tax liability increase after-tax earnings which may assist the firm in meeting market expectations. This activity may require additional time at fiscal year-end in order to evaluate the extent to which tax avoidance will assist the firm in meeting expectations and to formulate a response to parties external to the firm. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) suggest the inherent complexity in many tax structures can potentially act as a device to mask opportunistic rent diversion, through the consumption of managerial perks or personal empire building. They find that incentive compensation helps to reduce the level of tax avoidance as it aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests particularly for firms with weak governance structures. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest additional research investigating the implications of Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) theory is warranted. The focus in this paper is not on the identification of tax aggressive firms; rather, this study proposes that one likely consequence of higher levels of tax avoidance is a less timely annual earnings announcement. If tax avoidance and rent diversion utilize complementary technologies, then firms with higher levels of tax avoidance will be more likely to engage in opportunistic behavior. The earnings announcement timing literature suggests greater opportunistic behavior (or greater opportunistic incentives) may result in a less timely earnings announcement. Consequently, investors may receive a less timely earnings announcement due to the complementary nature of tax avoidance and managerial opportunism. This leads to our primary hypothesis:H1: Tingkat dipamerkan lebih besar penghindaran pajak ini dikaitkan dengan sebuah pengumuman pendapatan tahunan yang kurang tepat waktu.Penelitian terbaru telah mulai untuk mendokumentasikan penyebab dan konsekuensi dari hubungan saling melengkapi antara penghindaran pajak dan insentif oportunistik. Sebagai contoh, Frank et al. (2009) studi hubungan positif yang kuat antara penghindaran pajak dan agresif

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Motif penghindaran 2.2 Pajak
Penghasilan pengumuman waktu literatur menyarankan manajer menanggapi insentif alami dalam perusahaan dalam menentukan waktu pengumuman laba. Manajer, diberkahi dengan informasi pribadi tentang prospek masa depan yang fi rm dan, mungkin cenderung untuk memanipulasi waktu dari pengumuman laba untuk mengubah berita yang dirilis ke pasar dan / atau mengeksploitasi berita untuk keuntungan pribadi. Penjelasan alternatif untuk hasil ini adalah sejauh mana pajak perusahaan menghindari dampak waktu pengumuman laba tahunan. Artinya, manajer mungkin terlibat dalam perencanaan pajak sepanjang tahun yang mungkin atau mungkin tidak melengkapi aktivitas manajemen laba. Perencanaan pajak yang dirancang untuk secara permanen mengurangi fi rm ini pajak kewajiban peningkatan laba setelah pajak yang dapat membantu fi rm dalam memenuhi ekspektasi pasar. Kegiatan ini mungkin memerlukan waktu tambahan di fiscal akhir tahun untuk mengevaluasi sejauh mana penghindaran pajak akan membantu fi rm ekspektasi pertemuan dan merumuskan respon terhadap pihak eksternal ke perusahaan. Desai dan Dharmapala (2006) menunjukkan kompleksitas yang melekat dalam banyak struktur pajak yang berpotensi dapat bertindak sebagai perangkat untuk menutupi oportunistik sewa pengalihan, melalui konsumsi tunjangan manajerial atau bangunan kerajaan pribadi. Mereka fi nd bahwa kompensasi insentif membantu untuk mengurangi tingkat penghindaran pajak karena sejalan kepentingan manajer dan pemegang saham terutama untuk perusahaan-perusahaan dengan struktur pemerintahan yang lemah. Hanlon dan Heitzman (2010) menyarankan penelitian tambahan menyelidiki implikasi dari Desai dan Dharmapala (2006) teori dibenarkan. Fokus dalam makalah ini adalah tidak pada pengidentifikasian agresif pajak perusahaan-perusahaan; bukan, penelitian ini mengusulkan bahwa salah satu konsekuensi kemungkinan tingkat yang lebih tinggi dari penghindaran pajak adalah kurang tepat waktu pendapatan tahunan pengumuman. Jika penghindaran pajak dan sewa pengalihan memanfaatkan teknologi yang saling melengkapi, maka perusahaan-perusahaan dengan tingkat yang lebih tinggi dari penghindaran pajak akan lebih mungkin untuk terlibat dalam perilaku oportunistik. Pengumuman laba waktu literatur menunjukkan perilaku yang lebih besar oportunistik (atau insentif oportunistik yang lebih besar) dapat mengakibatkan pengumuman laba kurang tepat waktu. Akibatnya, investor dapat menerima pengumuman laba kurang tepat waktu karena sifat komplementer penghindaran pajak dan oportunisme manajerial. Hal ini menyebabkan hipotesis utama kami:
H1: Besar dipamerkan tingkat penghindaran pajak dikaitkan dengan kurang tepat waktu pendapatan tahunan pengumuman.
Penelitian terbaru telah mulai mendokumentasikan penyebab dan konsekuensi dari hubungan yang saling melengkapi antara penghindaran pajak dan insentif oportunistik. Misalnya, Frank et al. (2009) fi nd hubungan positif yang kuat antara penghindaran pajak dan agresif