is now also considered problematic, at least where itresults from use  terjemahan - is now also considered problematic, at least where itresults from use  Bahasa Indonesia Bagaimana mengatakan

is now also considered problematic,

is now also considered problematic, at least where it
results from use of hybrid mismatch arrangements.
The work to combat hybrid mismatch arrangements
will involve development of model treaty provisions
and recommendations for domestic legislation to neutralize
the effect of both hybrid instruments and entities.
Because the OECD recognizes that treaty
changes could at most only result in denial of withholding
tax relief and not, for example, denial of a deduction
for interest, changes to domestic law are also
envisaged. This could include changes to (1) prevent
exemption or non-recognition of payments that are
deductible in the payor’s jurisdiction, (2) deny deductions
for payments not includible in income, and (3)
prevent double deductions. Also contemplated are coordination
and tie-breaker rules where more than one
country seeks to apply those rules to a transaction or
structure.
This action item is obviously one of the most political
and emotionally charged; the OECD has made
it clear that so-called ‘‘stateless income’’ is unacceptable
and is one of the primary targets of the BEPS
project. But this is an issue where the ‘‘optics’’ of the
problem (multinationals’ ability to structure transactions
and internal value chains to achieve ‘‘stateless
income’’) may be bigger than any actual substantive
problem. For example, from the U.S. perspective,
once a decision has been made to exclude an item
from the tax base or provide an exemption or to treat
an entity or an instrument a certain way, the U.S.
should not care whether another country taxes that
item of income or how it treats an entity or instrument.
Moreover, countries are generally very protective
of their sovereignty over the design of tax rules and,
absent harmonization of those rules across the globe,
differences in domestic legislation (including characterization
of instruments or entities) are inevitable. It
may be a reasonable goal to harmonize the characterization
of instruments and entities, but it would require
inordinately difficult design and coordination efforts
to do so. Correspondingly, application of antimismatch
rules may result in double taxation,
especially where their operation is uncertain, where
they are overbroad, or where different countries use
different rules.
This is a complex issue and also an area where the
OECD has already done a significant amount of
work.22 It will therefore be difficult to achieve rational
improvements within one year for suggested
changes to domestic rules and two years for proposed
changes to the Model Tax Convention. Additionally,
several tools are also already available to combat perceived
abuses, such as Article 23A(4) of the OECD
Model Tax Convention (which relieves the residence
State of the obligation to provide relief from double
taxation under the exemption method in certain cases)
and paragraph 15 of the commentary to Article 1 (providing
language for a subject-to-tax provision) .
This is also an area where perhaps the need for action
is animated by concerns over tax planning engaged
in by U.S. multinationals under our check-thebox
rule;23 however, there are differences in entity
characterization in other tax systems as well. For example,
in 1999 the OECD provided guidance to address
common differences in the tax treatment of partnerships
among member countries’ tax systems.24 Hybrid
entities are not simply a problem caused solely
by the U.S. check-the-box rules — although such
rules make avoidance of the CFC rules easier, other
countries with weak or non-existent CFC rules and
territorial taxation systems do not have the moral high
ground on this issue. Finally, this is a not-uncommon
situation where member countries are asking the
OECD to solve problems that they are capable of addressing
with their own domestic rules.25
Action 3 is the shortest item in the Action Plan and
provides simply that the OECD will design modern
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules. The Action
Plan notes that CFC rules may have beneficial
‘‘spillover effects’’ in source countries (because taxpayers
have no or reduced incentive to shift profits to
low-tax jurisdictions), but it does not acknowledge restrictions
faced by European countries because of European
Court of Justice decisions.26
Additionally, it will be difficult for the OECD to
reach consensus on model CFC rules (each country
would have different preferences as to how much it
should limit deferral) and unclear why member countries
cannot simply enact changes to their domestic
rules on their own. Moreover, any proposal to tighten
CFC rules should consider the potentially perverse incentives
that may result. For example, the Obama administration
has included in its budget proposal for
the past several years a provision to tax currently excess
returns associated with intangibles that have been
22
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is now also considered problematic, at least where itresults from use of hybrid mismatch arrangements.The work to combat hybrid mismatch arrangementswill involve development of model treaty provisionsand recommendations for domestic legislation to neutralizethe effect of both hybrid instruments and entities.Because the OECD recognizes that treatychanges could at most only result in denial of withholdingtax relief and not, for example, denial of a deductionfor interest, changes to domestic law are alsoenvisaged. This could include changes to (1) preventexemption or non-recognition of payments that aredeductible in the payor’s jurisdiction, (2) deny deductionsfor payments not includible in income, and (3)prevent double deductions. Also contemplated are coordinationand tie-breaker rules where more than onecountry seeks to apply those rules to a transaction orstructure.This action item is obviously one of the most politicaland emotionally charged; the OECD has madeit clear that so-called ‘‘stateless income’’ is unacceptableand is one of the primary targets of the BEPSproject. But this is an issue where the ‘‘optics’’ of theproblem (multinationals’ ability to structure transactionsand internal value chains to achieve ‘‘statelessincome’’) may be bigger than any actual substantiveproblem. For example, from the U.S. perspective,once a decision has been made to exclude an itemfrom the tax base or provide an exemption or to treatan entity or an instrument a certain way, the U.S.should not care whether another country taxes thatitem of income or how it treats an entity or instrument.Moreover, countries are generally very protectiveof their sovereignty over the design of tax rules and,absent harmonization of those rules across the globe,differences in domestic legislation (including characterizationof instruments or entities) are inevitable. Itmay be a reasonable goal to harmonize the characterizationof instruments and entities, but it would requireinordinately difficult design and coordination effortsto do so. Correspondingly, application of antimismatchrules may result in double taxation,especially where their operation is uncertain, wherethey are overbroad, or where different countries usedifferent rules.This is a complex issue and also an area where theOECD has already done a significant amount ofwork.22 It will therefore be difficult to achieve rationalimprovements within one year for suggestedchanges to domestic rules and two years for proposedchanges to the Model Tax Convention. Additionally,several tools are also already available to combat perceivedabuses, such as Article 23A(4) of the OECDModel Tax Convention (which relieves the residenceState of the obligation to provide relief from doubletaxation under the exemption method in certain cases)and paragraph 15 of the commentary to Article 1 (providinglanguage for a subject-to-tax provision) .This is also an area where perhaps the need for actionis animated by concerns over tax planning engagedin by U.S. multinationals under our check-theboxrule;23 however, there are differences in entitycharacterization in other tax systems as well. For example,in 1999 the OECD provided guidance to addresscommon differences in the tax treatment of partnershipsamong member countries’ tax systems.24 Hybridentities are not simply a problem caused solelyby the U.S. check-the-box rules — although suchrules make avoidance of the CFC rules easier, othercountries with weak or non-existent CFC rules andterritorial taxation systems do not have the moral highground on this issue. Finally, this is a not-uncommonsituation where member countries are asking theOECD to solve problems that they are capable of addressingwith their own domestic rules.25Action 3 is the shortest item in the Action Plan andprovides simply that the OECD will design moderncontrolled foreign corporation (CFC) rules. The ActionPlan notes that CFC rules may have beneficial‘‘spillover effects’’ in source countries (because taxpayershave no or reduced incentive to shift profits tolow-tax jurisdictions), but it does not acknowledge restrictionsfaced by European countries because of EuropeanCourt of Justice decisions.26Additionally, it will be difficult for the OECD toreach consensus on model CFC rules (each countrywould have different preferences as to how much itshould limit deferral) and unclear why member countriescannot simply enact changes to their domesticrules on their own. Moreover, any proposal to tightenCFC rules should consider the potentially perverse incentivesthat may result. For example, the Obama administrationhas included in its budget proposal forthe past several years a provision to tax currently excessreturns associated with intangibles that have been22
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kini juga dianggap bermasalah, setidaknya mana
hasil dari penggunaan pengaturan ketidakcocokan hybrid.
Pekerjaan untuk memerangi pengaturan mismatch hybrid
akan melibatkan pengembangan ketentuan Model perjanjian
dan rekomendasi untuk undang-undang domestik untuk menetralisir
efek dari kedua instrumen hibrida dan entitas.
Karena OECD mengakui bahwa perjanjian
perubahan bisa paling banyak hanya menghasilkan penolakan pemotongan
keringanan pajak dan tidak, misalnya, penolakan pengurang
untuk kepentingan, perubahan hukum dalam negeri juga
dipertimbangkan. Hal ini dapat mencakup perubahan (1) mencegah
pembebasan atau non-pengakuan pembayaran yang
dikurangkan dalam yurisdiksi pembayar ini, (2) menyangkal pemotongan
untuk pembayaran tidak tercakup dalam pendapatan, dan (3)
mencegah pemotongan ganda. Juga dimaksud adalah koordinasi
dan aturan tie-breaker di mana lebih dari satu
negara berusaha untuk menerapkan aturan-aturan untuk transaksi atau
struktur.
Item tindakan ini jelas salah satu yang paling politik
dan emosional; OECD telah membuat
jelas bahwa apa yang disebut '' pendapatan stateless '' tidak dapat diterima
dan merupakan salah satu target utama dari BEPS
proyek. Tapi ini adalah masalah di mana '' optik '' dari
masalah (multinasional 'kemampuan untuk struktur transaksi
dan rantai nilai internal untuk mencapai' 'stateless
pendapatan' ') mungkin lebih besar daripada substantif sebenarnya
masalah. Sebagai contoh, dari perspektif AS,
setelah keputusan telah dibuat untuk mengecualikan item
dari basis pajak atau memberikan pengecualian atau untuk mengobati
suatu entitas atau instrumen dengan cara tertentu, AS
seharusnya tidak peduli apakah negara lain mengenakan pajak yang
item pendapatan atau bagaimana memperlakukan entitas atau instrumen.
Selain itu, negara-negara umumnya sangat protektif
kedaulatan mereka atas desain peraturan pajak dan,
harmonisasi absen dari aturan-aturan di seluruh dunia,
perbedaan dalam undang-undang domestik (termasuk karakterisasi
instrumen atau badan) yang tak terelakkan. Ini
mungkin tujuan yang masuk akal untuk menyelaraskan karakterisasi
instrumen dan badan, tetapi akan memerlukan
desain dan koordinasi terlampau sulit upaya
untuk melakukannya. Sejalan dengan itu, penerapan antimismatch
aturan dapat menyebabkan pajak ganda,
terutama di mana operasi mereka tidak pasti, di mana
mereka terlalu luas, atau di mana negara-negara yang berbeda menggunakan
aturan yang berbeda.
Ini adalah masalah yang kompleks dan juga daerah di mana
OECD telah melakukan sejumlah besar dari
work.22 Ini akan karena itu sulit untuk mencapai rasional
perbaikan dalam waktu satu tahun untuk menyarankan
perubahan aturan dalam negeri dan dua tahun untuk diusulkan
perubahan pada Model Pajak konvensi. Selain itu,
beberapa alat juga sudah tersedia untuk memerangi dirasakan
pelanggaran, seperti Pasal 23A (4) dari OECD
Model Konvensi Pajak (yang mengurangi kediaman
Negara kewajiban untuk memberikan bantuan dari ganda
perpajakan dengan metode pembebasan dalam kasus tertentu)
dan ayat 15 dari komentar dengan Pasal 1 (menyediakan
bahasa untuk penyediaan subjek-ke-pajak).
Ini juga merupakan daerah di mana mungkin perlunya tindakan
yang dijiwai oleh kekhawatiran atas perencanaan pajak yang terlibat
dalam oleh perusahaan multinasional AS di bawah check-thebox kami
aturan ; 23 namun, ada perbedaan entitas
karakterisasi dalam sistem pajak lainnya juga. Misalnya,
pada tahun 1999 OECD memberikan panduan untuk mengatasi
perbedaan umum dalam perlakuan pajak dari kemitraan
antara systems.24 pajak Hybrid negara anggota
'entitas tidak hanya masalah yang disebabkan semata-mata
oleh AS check-the-box aturan - meskipun seperti
aturan membuat menghindari dari CFC aturan mudah, lain
negara dengan aturan CFC lemah atau tidak ada dan
sistem perpajakan teritorial tidak memiliki moral yang tinggi
tanah pada masalah ini. Akhirnya, ini adalah tidak-jarang
situasi di mana negara-negara anggota yang meminta
OECD untuk memecahkan masalah yang mereka mampu menangani
dengan rules.25 negeri mereka sendiri
Aksi 3 adalah item terpendek dalam Rencana Aksi dan
memberikan hanya yang OECD akan merancang yang modern
perusahaan asing dikendalikan (CFC) aturan. Aksi
Rencana mencatat bahwa aturan CFC mungkin menguntungkan
'' efek spillover '' di negara-negara sumber (karena wajib pajak
tidak memiliki atau insentif berkurang bergeser keuntungan untuk
yurisdiksi pajak rendah), tetapi tidak mengakui pembatasan
yang dihadapi oleh negara-negara Eropa karena Eropa
Pengadilan decisions.26
Selain itu, akan sulit untuk OECD untuk
mencapai konsensus tentang aturan Model CFC (masing-masing negara
akan memiliki preferensi yang berbeda untuk berapa banyak itu
harus membatasi penangguhan) dan mengapa negara-negara anggota tidak jelas
tidak bisa hanya memberlakukan perubahan domestik mereka
aturan sendiri. Selain itu, setiap usulan untuk memperketat
aturan CFC harus mempertimbangkan insentif berpotensi sesat
yang mungkin terjadi. Misalnya, pemerintahan Obama
telah dimasukkan dalam usulan anggaran untuk
beberapa tahun terakhir penyisihan pajak saat ini kelebihan
pengembalian yang terkait dengan berwujud yang telah
22
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