The authority of the Indonesian Sta

The authority of the Indonesian State Audit Board was also strengthened, giving it the
right to audit government reports, public sector spending, and any government
projects (Harun and Robinson, 2010). The only parties with access to State Audit Board
opinions in the past were president-approved members of National Parliament; audit
opinions were treated as state secrets (Nasution, 2008):
Under Suharto’s regime the [State Audit Board], like Parliament, had no function in
overseeing the government (NL2).
So while the State Audit Board had, on paper, been an independent body since 1945, it
had provided no real public information. Post-reform, the State Audit Board became
independently empowered and was required to report to the broad public (Law 15,
2006, Article 2). Audit opinions and (now) recommendations from the Board were to be
used by Parliament to evaluate performance at all levels of government (Central,
Provincial, and Municipal). Notifications from the State Audit Board indicating fraud or
misuse of resources (common in Indonesian government practice, Harun et al., 2012)
were to be reported to the police or attorneys general, and were applicable to all levels
of government (Law 15/2006, Article 8).
The former Head of the State Audit Board, Anwar Nasution, pointed out that
accounting information and audit reports in government today are radically different
from those produced previously. He claimed this was due to the fact that information
was now available to the public (Nasution, 2006). These practices were clearly in line
with World Bank expectations of decentralization.
All central and LGs are now required to offer accrual-based balance sheets, income and
expense reports, and performance reports, in addition to the traditional cash flow and
budget statements (Law 17/2003, Article 33). Local authorities must employ a performancebased budgeting system (Law 25, 2004, Articles 4 and 5), which takes into account Central
Government’s strategic plan (Law 15/2004, Sections 4 and 5). A national executive
body – including elected officials – must now consult with Parliament and the public to set
programmes and budgets. Such consultations must be made available under formal public
meetings (Law 24/2004), and costs must be subject to local and public review. The potential
for local voice, concerning fiscal matters of government, is now legislatively empowered,
and opportunities for public discourse are required under law. Thus “voice” has been
facilitated for these local players, at least in theory.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Otoritas Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Indonesia juga diperkuat, memberikanhak untuk mengaudit laporan pemerintah, pengeluaran sektor publik, dan pemerintahproyek-proyek (Harun dan Robinson, 2010). Hanya pihak-pihak dengan akses ke Badan Pemeriksa Keuanganpendapat di masa lalu yang disetujui Presiden anggota parlemen nasional; Auditpendapat ini diperlakukan sebagai rahasia negara (Nasution, 2008):Di bawah rezim Suharto [Audit Dewan negara], seperti Parlemen, telah ada fungsimengawasi pemerintah (NL2).Jadi sementara Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan memiliki, di atas kertas, menjadi badan independen sejak tahun 1945, itutelah memberikan informasi tidak nyata publik. Pasca reformasi, Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan menjadiindependen diberdayakan dan diminta untuk melapor ke masyarakat luas (UU 15,2006, Pasal 2). Pendapat audit dan (sekarang) rekomendasi dari Dewan itu harusdigunakan oleh parlemen untuk mengevaluasi kinerja di semua tingkat pemerintahan (Central,Provinsi, dan Municipal). Pemberitahuan dari Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan menunjukkan penipuan ataupenyalahgunaan sumber daya (umum dalam praktek pemerintah Indonesia, Harun et al., 2012)harus dilaporkan kepada pihak Kepolisian atau Jaksa Agung, dan itu berlaku untuk semua tingkatpemerintahan (undang-undang 15/2006, Pasal 8).Mantan Kepala Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, Anwar Nasution, menunjukkan bahwainformasi akuntansi dan audit laporan dalam pemerintahan hari yang berbedadari mereka diproduksi sebelumnya. Ia mengklaim ini adalah karena fakta bahwa informasiwas now available to the public (Nasution, 2006). These practices were clearly in linewith World Bank expectations of decentralization.All central and LGs are now required to offer accrual-based balance sheets, income andexpense reports, and performance reports, in addition to the traditional cash flow andbudget statements (Law 17/2003, Article 33). Local authorities must employ a performancebased budgeting system (Law 25, 2004, Articles 4 and 5), which takes into account CentralGovernment’s strategic plan (Law 15/2004, Sections 4 and 5). A national executivebody – including elected officials – must now consult with Parliament and the public to setprogrammes and budgets. Such consultations must be made available under formal publicmeetings (Law 24/2004), and costs must be subject to local and public review. The potentialfor local voice, concerning fiscal matters of government, is now legislatively empowered,and opportunities for public discourse are required under law. Thus “voice” has beenfacilitated for these local players, at least in theory.