Tradeable Fishing QuotasLike most o

Tradeable Fishing Quotas
Like most of the world's fisheries, New Zealand suffered from excess fishing efforts and overfishing which threatened the resource. To reduce overfishing, the New Zealand government issued tradeable catch quotas on all fish harvested, allocated to individual fishermen according to their historical catches. Fees were imposed on the recipients of these quotas, and the revenues generated were used to buy back quotas from fishermen who would rather have the money than the right to fish their allocated quota. Fishermen were asked to indicate the price at which they were willing to sell their quotas and leave the industry, the government bought back the quotas from those fishermen who were willing to sell at the lowest price until the desired level of fishing effort reduction was reached.
Since the quotas were also tradeable among fishermen, they began to be transferred to the most
efficient fishermen, ensuring that the aggregate fishing quota was caught at minimum cost. Those
who left the fishery by selling their quotas to other fishermen or the government did so voluntarily and were fully compensated. Thus, the scheme accomplished four objectives: (a) protection of the resource, (b) increased efficiency (maximization of fishery rents), (c) fairness, and (d) self-financing (from fees on quotes rather than from the government budget).
For these reasons, the system of individual tradeable catch quotas is of particular relevance and applicability to developing countries with heavily overexploited fisheries. They can be combined with fee-financed retraining and relocation programs to encourage surplus fishermen to sell their quotas and take up alternative occupations. A problem arises when unemployment and underemployment in the rest of the economy are widespread since few fishermen would be willing to sell their catch quotas and exit the fishery if employment alternatives are not available. While under these circumstances a larger than normal level of fishing effort is justified, maximizing rents and distributing them according to pre-assigned resource shares to existing fishermen is preferable to allowing overfishing to continue unchecked.
Deposit Refund Systems in the U.S. and Europe
Deposit-refund systems on beverage containers combined with product charges on non-reusable
containers have been operating successfully in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The percentage of
containers returned is 90% for beer and soft drinks and 70%-80% for wine and liquor, while the
market share of non-returnable bottles is kept small (less than 5% in Finland). Similarly, successful deposit-refund systems for beverage containers also operate in many states in the U.S. There is evidence to suggest that consumers are responsive to the level of the deposit. For example, in 1983 Sweden introduced a deposit of ECU 0.04 on aluminum beverage cans, which resulted in the return of 60% to 70% of the cans. In 1987, the government doubled the deposit (which by that time had lost part of its real value to inflation), and in response 80% of the cans were returned. The success with
deposit-refund systems has encouraged several European countries to extend the system to other
products such as batteries, car hulks, and pesticide residues. Denmark and the Netherlands
introduced refundable deposits for batteries with a high content of cadmium and mercury to control
soil contamination. A deposit-refund system for car batteries has been introduced or is being
considered in several European countries and the U.S.
Norway and Sweden have introduced deposit refund systems for car hulks since the mid-to-late
1970s to reduce solid waste and visual pollution and to promote the reuse of materials. The system worked well in Norway and poorly in Sweden for a good reason. In Norway the deposit in 1988 was ECU 130 per vehicle, while in Sweden it was only ECU 42. While in both countries a larger amount was refunded when the hulk was delivered, in Sweden the deposit and the refund were lower than the cost of scrapping. Thus, a much smaller percentage of disused cars was returned in Sweden than in Norway (90% to 99%).
Lastly, there is an interesting Dutch proposal for extending the deposit-refund concept to various polluting chemicals such as cadmium, mercury, etc. The deposit would be paid by the producer or the importer of the substance; it would then be passed on to the user of the products that contain the substance and be refunded to the final user (or exporter) when the product is disposed or exported. Producers of products containing the substance could also be eligible for a refund of any waste of the substance they return or dispose of safely. Thus, the deposit-refund system is gradually expanding from an instrument of limited scope (mainly beverage containers) into a more generic instrument that can be used at the micro level by industry to limit environmental liability risks (as in the case of hazardous chemicals) and at the macro level by policy-makers to transform the current linear production process into a more ecologically sound circular flow.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Kuota tradeable MemancingSeperti kebanyakan dunia perikanan, Selandia baru mengalami kelebihan Memancing upaya dan penebangan hutan yang mengancam sumber daya. Untuk mengurangi penangkapan ikan secara berlebihan, Selandia Baru pemerintah mengeluarkan kuota tradeable menangkap semua ikan dipanen, nelayan yang dialokasikan untuk masing-masing menurut hasil tangkapan mereka sejarah. Biaya yang dikenakan pada penerima kuota ini, dan pendapatan yang dihasilkan digunakan untuk membeli kembali kuota dari nelayan yang lebih suka memiliki uang daripada hak untuk ikan kuota dialokasikan mereka. Nelayan diminta untuk menunjukkan harga di mana mereka bersedia untuk menjual kuota mereka dan meninggalkan industri, pemerintah membeli kembali kuota dari para nelayan yang bersedia untuk menjual pada harga terendah sampai tingkat yang diinginkan Memancing upaya pengurangan tercapai.Karena kuota juga tradeable kalangan nelayan, mereka mulai dipindahkan ke yang palingnelayan efisien, memastikan bahwa kuota agregat Memancing tertangkap pada biaya minimum. Orang-orangyang meninggalkan Perikanan dengan menjual kuota mereka ke nelayan lain atau pemerintah melakukannya secara sukarela dan telah mendapatkan kompensasi penuh. Dengan demikian, skema tercapai empat tujuan: () perlindungan atas sumber daya, (b) peningkatan efisiensi (maksimalisasi dari sewa Perikanan), (c) keadilan, dan (d) Self financing (dari biaya pada kutipan bukan dari anggaran pemerintah).For these reasons, the system of individual tradeable catch quotas is of particular relevance and applicability to developing countries with heavily overexploited fisheries. They can be combined with fee-financed retraining and relocation programs to encourage surplus fishermen to sell their quotas and take up alternative occupations. A problem arises when unemployment and underemployment in the rest of the economy are widespread since few fishermen would be willing to sell their catch quotas and exit the fishery if employment alternatives are not available. While under these circumstances a larger than normal level of fishing effort is justified, maximizing rents and distributing them according to pre-assigned resource shares to existing fishermen is preferable to allowing overfishing to continue unchecked.Deposit Refund Systems in the U.S. and EuropeDeposit-refund systems on beverage containers combined with product charges on non-reusablecontainers have been operating successfully in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The percentage ofcontainers returned is 90% for beer and soft drinks and 70%-80% for wine and liquor, while themarket share of non-returnable bottles is kept small (less than 5% in Finland). Similarly, successful deposit-refund systems for beverage containers also operate in many states in the U.S. There is evidence to suggest that consumers are responsive to the level of the deposit. For example, in 1983 Sweden introduced a deposit of ECU 0.04 on aluminum beverage cans, which resulted in the return of 60% to 70% of the cans. In 1987, the government doubled the deposit (which by that time had lost part of its real value to inflation), and in response 80% of the cans were returned. The success withdeposit-refund systems has encouraged several European countries to extend the system to otherproducts such as batteries, car hulks, and pesticide residues. Denmark and the Netherlandsintroduced refundable deposits for batteries with a high content of cadmium and mercury to controlsoil contamination. A deposit-refund system for car batteries has been introduced or is beingconsidered in several European countries and the U.S.Norway and Sweden have introduced deposit refund systems for car hulks since the mid-to-late1970s to reduce solid waste and visual pollution and to promote the reuse of materials. The system worked well in Norway and poorly in Sweden for a good reason. In Norway the deposit in 1988 was ECU 130 per vehicle, while in Sweden it was only ECU 42. While in both countries a larger amount was refunded when the hulk was delivered, in Sweden the deposit and the refund were lower than the cost of scrapping. Thus, a much smaller percentage of disused cars was returned in Sweden than in Norway (90% to 99%).Lastly, there is an interesting Dutch proposal for extending the deposit-refund concept to various polluting chemicals such as cadmium, mercury, etc. The deposit would be paid by the producer or the importer of the substance; it would then be passed on to the user of the products that contain the substance and be refunded to the final user (or exporter) when the product is disposed or exported. Producers of products containing the substance could also be eligible for a refund of any waste of the substance they return or dispose of safely. Thus, the deposit-refund system is gradually expanding from an instrument of limited scope (mainly beverage containers) into a more generic instrument that can be used at the micro level by industry to limit environmental liability risks (as in the case of hazardous chemicals) and at the macro level by policy-makers to transform the current linear production process into a more ecologically sound circular flow.