This article attempts to fill a gap

This article attempts to fill a gap in the scholarly literature on comparative regional integration by focussing on the nature of the economic constitution rather than the importance and quality of formal institutions. It examines the relationship between institutions and economic integration from the perspective of constitutional economics, that is, as explained by James Buchanan (1990) ‘ . . . a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules, and institutions within which individuals interact, and the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen into being’, and assesses whether an RIA’s success or failure depends on the economic constitution chosen by the participating states. In particular, the article examines the EU’s achievement of the single market, a frontier-free market with the objectives of the free movement of goods and services, labour and capital, free of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, all constituent elements of RIAs. As we illustrate in this article, the choice of an appropriate economic constitution has been fundamental to the EU’s success in bringing about a single market. Drawing on the work of constitutional economists, we argue that such an economic constitution is essential for the success of an RIA that aims to create a single market.